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The Asia-Pacific has become the Indo-Pacific region 
as the US, Japan, Australia and India have decided 
to join forces and scale-up their political, economic 
and security cooperation. The message coming from 
Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and Delhi is clear: China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is no longer the only game 
in town and Beijing’s policymakers better get ready for 
fierce competition. Japan’s ongoing and future “quality 
infrastructure” policies and investments in the Indo-Pacific 
in particular make it very clear that Tokyo wants a (much) 
bigger slice of the pie of infrastructure investments in the 
region. China’s territorial expansionism in the South China 
Sea and its increasing interests and presence in countries 
in South Asia have done their share to help the four 
aforesaid countries expand their security and defence ties. 
Beijing, of course, smells containment in all of this and it 
probably has a point.  
Who will have the upper hand in shaping and defining 
Asian security and providing developing South and 
Southeast Asia with badly-needed infrastructure: the 
US and Japan together with its allies or the increasingly 
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In 2007, in a speech before the Indian Parliament, Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe brought back to light an ancient 
Asian geographical vision: the so-called “confluence of the two 
seas”. It referred to the idea of linking the Pacific with the Indian 
Ocean, as Japanese policymakers conceived the concept at the 
time. That would later become the “Indo-Pacific region”, replac-
ing the “Asia-Pacific” as a geopolitical concept, thus incorporat-
ing countries and countries’ policies deep inside but also out-
side the geographical boundaries of the Asia-Pacific. This is also 
the reason why Europe – or better – some individual European 
countries such as France and the UK, are currently developing 
and adopting policies and strategies in the name of the “Indo-
Pacific”. It goes hand in hand with the increased presence of 
British and French navy vessels in Asian territorial waters. 
The “Indo-Pacific” concept turned into a more coherent con-
struct when it was first discussed and announced – at the gov-
ernmental level – in the 2013 Australian Defence White Paper. 
Hence, since 2013, the geopolitical concept of “Indo-Pacific” 
has begun to be conceived as a means to connect India to the 
Pacific Ocean, e.g. by establishing closer political and security 
relations between New Delhi and the other key East Asian state 
actors minus China.
The concept also attracted interest within the administra-
tion of former US President Barack Obama, but it did not 
immediately push Washington to shift its strategic engage-
ment in the region from the “Pivot to Asia” announced in 
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2011 to a full-fledged “Indo-Pacific” strategy. However, after 
Donald Trump’s first trip to Asia in November 2017, the Indo-
Pacific started to take shape as the geopolitical and concep-
tual background of US security and strategic involvement in 
Asia. The former “Asia-Pacific” became the “Indo-Pacific” for 
Washington’s defence and security policy planners.
Even if much needs to be decided and defined as far as fur-
ther strategic, economic, and trade cooperation between the 
US, Japan, Australia, and India is concerned in the Indo-Pacific 
region, the US under Trump is putting significant political cap-
ital and resources into expanding security relations with these 
major actors of the Indo-Pacific region.
Needless to say, the Indo-Pacific concept is also gaining trac-
tion because of China’s increasing foreign and security policy 
assertiveness (in the region and beyond). Currently, the outliers 
– as far as the expansion of security and defence ties are con-
cerned – are Japan and India, also motivated by the expansive 
nature of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Joint Japanese-
Indian concerns are indeed directly related to the kind of pol-
icies and strategies China pursues with countries collaborating 
with Beijing on BRI projects in Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and 
Europe. Neither Japan nor India are part of the BRI, and even 
if Japan no longer categorically excludes collaborating with 
China on BRI infrastructure and development-related projects, 
the prospects of Japanese contributions to China-driven BRI 
continue to remain very bleak. Tokyo links its contributions 
to a series of preconditions, which many of the BRI projects 
simply do not meet.
However, not only Japan and India are expanding their on-
the-ground cooperation to add substance and result-oriented 
projects to the concept of the Indo-Pacific. The US has begun 
to join Tokyo and New Delhi in promoting large infrastruc-
ture projects, either in a bilateral or multilateral framework. 
“Quality infrastructure” by Japan, the US, and India is what 
they promote, with an emphasis on quality as “sustainable” and 
“balanced” in opposition to Chinese-led mega-infrastructure 
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projects. These projects, critics point out, have led to a sharp 
increase in developing countries’ debts to China, beyond sus-
tainable levels. Japan has successfully kept the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) alive, after Donald Trump decided to aban-
don this inter-regional free trade agreement on his first day in 
office in January 2017. For its part, India continues adopting 
what since 2014 it refers to as “Look East” policies, i.e. India’s 
closer involvement in East and Southeast Asian politics and 
security.
Australia, in turn, has since 2013 adapted its foreign poli-
cy strategy to the fast-changing Asian strategic landscape. The 
growing Chinese presence in the Pacific Ocean is further un-
dermining Australia’s diplomatic leverage on the small Pacific 
Ocean countries. Thus, Canberra is aiming at closer coopera-
tion with Japan, India, and the US. This quadrilateral relation-
ship is gaining, in fact, a new momentum under the term and 
concept of “Quad”.
However, if India, Japan, the US, and Australia are now 
firmly committed to the establishment of a new strategic area 
for regional interstate relations, China, of course, will not be 
sitting on its hands. The increased cooperation among those 
four democratic countries is perceived and interpreted in China 
as part of a US-driven containment strategy towards Beijing. 
To be sure, China will not passively wait for what it fears is 
US-Japanese-driven containment to materialise and has its own 
ideas on how to position itself – possibly with partners – in the 
Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, at this stage, China is also mov-
ing towards the establishment of new strategic stances, with the 
objective of confronting those challenges, posed by real or im-
aginary containment policies. From the Chinese perspective, 
the BRI is therefore not only a massive inter-regional infra-
structure project but also an instrument to defend the country 
from US-driven geopolitical and economic encirclement.
This Report aims to analyse the whole spectrum of geopo-
litical, strategic, and economic layers that together form the 
emerging “Indo-Pacific” reality.
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To start with, Gurpreet S. Khurana investigates the origins 
of the “Indo-Pacific” concept. After examining the importance 
of India’s rise for the subsequent development and definition of 
the concept, he puts the spotlight on the evolving East Asian 
geopolitics and geo-economics after the establishment of this 
new strategic framework.
Sergio Miracola investigates the infrastructural, economic, 
and trade importance of the new Indo-Pacific area and how – 
and to what extent – it can be seen as a counter-pole to China’s 
BRI. His chapter illustrates the major economic and infrastruc-
tural projects sponsored by Japan and the US and explains how 
these two state actors are expanding their diplomatic network 
in order to check China’s rise. Furthermore, the author analyses 
China’s strategic counter-response to what it perceives as a US-
Japanese-Indian attempt to “encircle” China.
Brad Glosserman devotes specific attention to the new 
American strategy for the Indo-Pacific. He divides his analysis 
into three dimensions: economic, infrastructural, and security. 
Glosserman explains how the US under Donald Trump is plan-
ning to transform Obama’s “pivot to Asia” into a more compre-
hensive and all-encompassing economic and security strategy in 
the Indo-Pacific region. He illustrates how Washington under 
Trump is funding new infrastructural projects for the region 
in order to offer an alternative model to the Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative. The so-called “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” 
(FOIP) strategy, above all endorsed and propagated by Tokyo 
and Washington, is part of their efforts to present actors inside 
and outside the region with an alternative to China’s BRI.
India is at the core of Jagannath P. Panda’s analysis. The author 
points out that the economic and military rise of India is changing 
Asia’s geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. He gauges the new 
shifts of Indian foreign policy, especially under Narendra Modi, 
who has lately boosted Indian regional confidence through the 
“Act East Policy” (AEP). Particular attention is also given to New 
Delhi’s Pacific diplomacy towards the Pacific Island Countries 
(PICs), which are courted by both China and India.
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In chapter five, Axel Berkofsky analyses Japanese policies and 
strategies in and towards the Indo-Pacific. Together with the 
US, India, and Australia, Tokyo is putting itself in the forefront 
of hedging against China’s BRI, offering like-minded countries 
and those concerned about being and becoming too dependent 
on China an alternative model of economic and security co-
operation in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan’s deep pockets and 
concerns about Chinese dominance in Asia have led Tokyo un-
der Prime Minister Abe to provide numerous countries in Asia, 
Central Asia, and Africa – sometimes in conjunction with India 
and the US – with economic and financial support for what 
Japan (and the US) refer to as “quality infrastructure”. As the 
author puts it, Tokyo does all it can to increase its influence and 
involvement as a reliable and financially well-equipped partner 
for developing countries in the Indo-Pacific.
The final chapter by John Hemmings deals with Australia’s 
approach and policies towards the Indo-Pacific. The author 
traces Canberra’s progressive involvement in regional dynamics 
by analysing the binary diplomacy that has marked Australia’s 
foreign policy over the last two decades. Canberra has moved 
from the previous “US or Asia” to the current “US or China” 
discourse, in order to keep the US-Australia alliance in place 
while also trying to benefit from trade and investment ties with 
Beijing. Among other things, Hemmings analyses Canberra’s 
participation in the major regional projects sponsored mainly 
by the US and Japan. Australia’s foreign and security policies to-
wards the Asia-Pacific and later the Indo-Pacific were shaped by 
the growing Chinese presence in the Pacific and its ability to in-
fluence other and small Asia-Pacific states over which Australia 
has historically exerted influence. Hemmings concludes his 
chapter by examining how Canberra has progressively trans-
formed its foreign policy stance, moving from a strong bilateral 
relationship with the US to broader regional involvement in 
order to cope with China’s rising regional influence.  
Are East and Southeast Asia embarking on a road to an over-
all geopolitical transformation? Is the Indo-Pacific reshaping 
regional trade and infrastructural networks? How will China 
respond at both the geo-economic and strategic levels to what it 
perceives to be a US-driven policy of encirclement and/or con-
tainment? How will the countries involved, such as India and 
Australia – both of which maintain very close economic, trade, 
and investment ties with China  – react should Beijing choose 
to retaliate economically to US-driven China containment pol-
icies? How is the BRI helping China consolidate its new foreign 
policy strategy in the Indo-Pacific region? 
This Report tries hard to find answers to these and other 
questions, by identifying the political and economic prospects, 
challenges, and opportunities of the Indo-Pacific reality.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director
1.  What is the Indo-Pacific? 
     The New Geopolitics 
     of the Asia-Centred Rim Land
Gurpreet S. Khurana
Since 2010, the concept of “Indo-Pacific” has gained increas-
ing prevalence in the geopolitical and strategic discourse, and 
is now being used worldwide by policy-makers, analysts, and 
academics. The term “Indo-Pacific” combines the Indian and 
the Pacific oceans into a singular regional construct. However, 
in geopolitical terms, the two regions are vastly dissimilar in the 
geo-economics that shape such geopolitics, and even in terms 
of security environment. If so, is the concept of “Indo-Pacific” 
a “conceptual aberration”?
This contemporary geopolitical “aberration” did not exist up 
until to the XVIII century, when the civilisational ethos of India 
and China started having a profound impact on Asia and be-
yond, with the two together contributing to more than half of 
the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP)1. On such basis, in 
1920, a German geopolitician named Karl Haushofer predicted 
Asia’s resurgence and sought to capture the historical narrative 
on the concentration of humanity and culture of the Chinese 
and Indian civilisational entities and their roles on the future 
power relations in the “Greater Indo-Pacific Ocean”, which he 
1 The global contribution to world’s GDP by major economies from year 1 to 
2003 according to Angus Maddison’s estimates. A. Maddison, Contours of  the 
World Economy I-2030AD, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
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called Indopazifischer Raum (Indo-Pacific Space)2. Importantly, 
he covered the era when the two civilisations never had a conti-
nental interface (Tibet separated the two), and, therefore, only 
maritime linkages. Thus, his narrative aptly reflected the reality 
of that bygone era. 
Quite possibly, the contemporary “Indo-Pacific” idea is 
a reincarnation of the erstwhile spirit in a new form, though 
with new geopolitical realities. A 2011 report of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), titled “Asia 2050: Realising the 
Asian Century” states that 
Asia is in the middle of a historic transformation […]. By nearly 
doubling its share of global gross domestic product (GDP) to 
52% by 2050, Asia would regain the dominant economic posi-
tion it held some 300 years ago, before the industrial revolution3.
Notably, in the past half-century, a number of countries in the 
entire swath of the Afro-Asian rim land and Australasia have 
developed more rapidly than the rest of the world and still are. 
The GDP of the countries in the “maritime underbelly” of Asia 
is poised to surpass 50% of the global GDP much sooner than 
what was predicted in a 2011 ADB Report. An analysis un-
dertaken at the New Delhi’s National Maritime Foundation 
(NMF) indicates that the combined GDP (in PPP terms) of 
the 36 countries of “maritime Asia” already constitutes 48% of 
the global GDP (2017). For the 62 Indo-Pacific countries of 
the Afro-Asian rim land – including Oceania – the proportion 
is 51.5%. Even more comprehensively, all 74 countries of the 
entire Indo-Pacific region (including the Americas) contribute 
to nearly 72% of the global GDP4. This indeed makes the “Rise 
2 K.E. Haushofer, L.A. Tambs, and E.J. Brehm, An English translation and analysis 
of  Major General Karl Ernst Haushofer’s Geopolitics of  the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the re-
lationship between Geography and History., Lewiston, N.Y., Edwin Mellen Press, 2002.
3 Report of  the Asian Development Bank (ADB), “Asia 2050: Realising the Asian 
Century”, 2011, p. 3.
4 Analysis conducted by Ms. Maitreyee Shilpa Kishor and supported/validated by 
Ms. Sonali Mukherjee, Research Interns, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), 
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of Indo-Pacific” – rather than the “Rise of Asia” – a more ap-
propriate maxim.
However, as the aforementioned ADB Report says, “Asia’s 
rise is by no means preordained […] (and is fraught with) […] 
multiple risks and challenges” in the coming years and dec-
ades5. The process could be disrupted due to various factors and 
encounters growing challenges, particularly in terms of how to 
preserve a maritime order rooted in the adherence to established 
international norms. This led to the imperative of “enormous 
liveliness brought forth through the union of two free and open 
oceans”, as articulated by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
during his August 2017 address in Kenya, which has lately come 
to be known as the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”6.
In this context, it is important for the regional countries and 
other stakeholders in the region to comprehend these new ge-
opolitical realities. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to examine 
the Indo-Pacific concept in terms of its genesis, drivers, and the 
geopolitical interests and approaches of some key actors. Based 
on current trends, the analysis also presents a policy-relevant 
prognosis on the future relevance of the “Indo-Pacific” concept. 
Early Usage of “Indo-Pacific”
Concepts like the “Indo-Pacific” that lead to the creation of 
new mental maps of how countries view the world are broad 
and evolve over a considerable period of time. The process is an 
amalgamation of the thoughts of statesmen, think-tanks, and 
New Delhi, September 2018. The data is largely sourced from the World Bank 
estimates for 2017 (or extrapolations thereof). The analysis does not incorporate 
the countries like France whose territorial possessions in the Indo-Pacific region 
are too small to contribute substantially to the national GDP.  
5 ADB, (2011), pp. 3-4.
6 Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of  the Sixth 
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), 27 
August 2016, Nairobi (Kenya), Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan, 27 August 
2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html 
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the academia over many years and decades, and is underpinned 
by the imperatives of the geopolitical environment. 
For long, the vast geopolitical dissimilarity in the countries 
littoral to the Indian and Pacific oceans translated into the term 
“Indo-Pacific” being used merely by biographers to denote the 
commonality and inter-linkages of marine ecosystems in the 
tropical swath of the Indian and Pacific oceans7. 
In the geopolitical context, however, the work of Karl 
Haushofer in 1920 (Indopazifischer Raum) was probably the first 
academic statement on the “Indo-Pacific”. Since then, “Indo-
Pacific” was often used in oral discourse, largely in Australia, 
which was largely premised on Canberra’s two-ocean geo-stra-
tegic imperatives. Nonetheless, until the beginning of the XXI 
century, there was rare, if any, formal academic articulation on 
the “Indo-Pacific” concept. 
In 2005, however, the “Indo-Pacific” concept began to catch 
on once again. As Rory Medcalf wrote in 2017, 
by 2005, there was a breakthrough in the expansion of diplo-
matic architecture tying Southeast Asian countries with various 
other powers. This led to the establishment of the so-called East 
Asia Summit. But from birth, the summit was misnamed. It 
was in fact an Indo-Pacific institution, an early reflection of the 
changes in the regional system of economic and strategic links8.
In the fall of 2005, noted New Zealander analyst Peter Cozens 
wrote a paper in the Maritime Affairs journal reflecting upon 60 
years of maritime developments in the Indo-Pacific region, which 
he described as a maritime-strategic continuum that “extends 
from the northern extremities of the Indian Ocean to include […] 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, Australasia, the islands of Melanesia, 
Micronesia and Polynesia, and the eastern countries of Asia”9. Dr 
7 G. Helfman, B. Collette, and D. Facey, The Diversity of  Fishes, Blackwell 
Publishing, pp. 274-276, 1997.
8 R. Medcalf, “Goodbye Asia-Pacific. But Why the Sudden Buzz over Indo-
Pacific?”, South China Morning Post, 17 December 2017.
9 P. Cozens, “Some Reflections on Maritime Developments in the Indo-Pacific 
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Cozens’ thoughts, having been triggered by the formation of the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) with its constituent membership stretch-
ing eastwards to include India, spoke about the “Indo-Pacific” 
as representing the “non-Atlantic view of the world”10, thereby 
rejuvenating the views of Karl Haushofer in 1920. 
Contemporary Revival 
In contemporary geopolitics, the “Indo-Pacific” idea began to 
achieve traction after the speech made by Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe before the Indian Parliament in August 200711. The speech 
was based on the emerging geo-economic imperatives of the 
countries of the Asian rim land, notably in terms of the need 
for enhanced geo-economic connectivity between the Indian 
and Pacific oceans, shared prosperity, and the attendant need 
for good order and strategic stability. The idea also necessitated 
exerting restraining pressures upon the disruptive tendencies of 
both state and non-state players. 
The primal catalyst for the “Indo-Pacific” concept was the 
growing strategic convergence between India and Japan with 
regard to the increasing politico-military assertiveness of China. 
Consequently, Japan sought to enhance the security of its Sea 
Lines of Communication (SLOCs). India was also wary due 
to the imminence of Chinese strategic presence in the Indian 
Ocean, as indicated by the Booz Allen Hamilton report on 
China’s “String of Pearls”, which could potentially translate 
into Chinese military bases in the Indian Ocean12.
In 2006, in tandem with the enhanced political interactions 
During the Past Sixty Years”, Maritime Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 15-35. 
10 E-mail interview with Dr. Peter Cozens, 20 August 2018. 
11 “Confluence of  the Two Seas”, speech by HE Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister 
at the Parliament of  the Republic of  India’, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan 
website, 22 August 2007.
12 “China builds up strategic sea lanes”, The Washington Times, 17 January 2005. 
Also see, G.S. Khurana, “China’s ‘String of  Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its 
Security Implications”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 32, no. 1, January 2008. 
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between India and Japan, the think tanks of the two coun-
tries also intensified their exchanges. During a 2006 Dialogue 
between the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis 
(IDSA) and the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) 
in New Delhi, the author represented the IDSA as a maritime 
expert. During the Dialogue, the two sides noted the geo-eco-
nomic linkage between the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the 
Western Pacific due to the increasing resource dependence of 
Pacific-Asia on the IOR. A relatively new development was the 
“security-connect”. For instance, in 2004, the US has launched 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to counter the prolif-
eration of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which oper-
ated across the entire maritime swath from West Asia (Iran and 
Syria) to Northeast Asia (North Korea). 
The Dialogue also focused on China. The Indians and 
Japanese were especially worried about the latest Chinese Type 
093 (Shang-class) nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). The first 
093 SSN was launched in 2002-2003 and was commissioned 
in 2006. In addition, the increasing Chinese presence in the 
Indian Ocean was leading to a fluid balance of power in mari-
time Asia, raising questions as to how this new balance would 
affect their respective strategic interests.
The dialogue veered into China’s strategic vulnerabilities. 
Ironically, these were expressed by the then-Chinese President 
Hu Jintao in November 2003 through his coinage of the 
“Malacca Dilemma”, wherein “certain major powers” were bent 
on controlling the strait13. The reference to India was implic-
it, yet undeniable. The “Indo-Pacific” idea was thus proposed 
by the author to showcase the Indian Navy’s ability to choke 
China’s jugular, and thereby dissuade its growing assertiveness. 
This led to the publication of his January 2007 paper titled 
“Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation” in 
the IDSA’s Strategic Analyses journal14. The paper began by in-
13 I. Storey, “China’s Malacca Dilemma”, China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 
vol. 6, no. 8, 12 April 2006.
14 G.S. Khurana, “Security of  Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation”, 
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troducing the Indo-Pacific concept and its geographical bound-
aries and stated that “[…] (although) the threats to SLOCs 
due to military conflicts have receded globally […] exceptions, 
nonetheless, persist in the Indo-Pacific region”. It sought to 
highlight the vulnerability of Japan’s SLOCs, with the aim of 
sending a subtle message to China: given the Indian Navy’s 
focus on SLOC-security and the “measures [that it has taken 
to] facilitate the monitoring of mercantile traffic in the Indian 
Ocean”15, China’s own SLOCs could be targeted if the coun-
try continued to assert its politico-military power. Thus, China 
should reconsider its approach.
A few months later, in August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe visited India and addressed the Indian Parliament. 
Drawing from the message by Swami Vivekananda (the Indian 
spiritual leader of the XIX century),The different streams, having 
their sources in different places, all mingle their water in the sea, 
and from the 1655 book by the Mughal prince Dara Shikoh ti-
tled, “Confluence of the Two Seas”, he proposed the formation 
of “the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in “the broader Asia”, 
comprising “an immense network, incorporating the United 
States of America and Australia”, and enabled by a “Strategic 
Global Partnership of Japan and India” located at the bookends 
of the Indo-Pacific region. He added that “[o]pen and transpar-
ent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowl-
edge to flow freely [because], as maritime states, both India and 
Japan have vital interests in the security of sea lanes (emphasis 
added)”16. Abe was giving the strategic rationale for “a close 
partnership between India and Japan […] in the wider context 
of Asia”17.
Strategic Analysis, vol. 31, no. 1, January/February 2007, pp. 139 and 144.
15 Ibid., p. 145
16 “Confluence of  the Two Seas”…, cit.
17 Talk by Dr. Arvind Gupta, Director, Vivekananda International Foundation, 
New Delhi, on “India Needs a Proactive Approach to the Indo-Pacific”, Society 
of  Indian Ocean Studies, 31 July 2018, Vivekananda International Foundation 
(VIF), 9 August 2018.
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Thereon, the term “Indo-Pacific” caught on in the strategic 
discourse worldwide. One of the earliest of these references was 
carried in Robert Kaplan’s 2010 book Monsoon, wherein he 
demonstrates the criticality of the Indian Ocean for the future 
of US power in the XIX century geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific 
continuum18. Later that year, then-US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton spoke about “expanding our work with the Indian 
Navy in the Pacific, because we understand how important the 
Indo-Pacific basin is to global trade and commerce”19. Notably, 
while much of her speech maintained the reference to “Asia-
Pacific”, the term “Indo-Pacific” was used only in reference to 
naval cooperation with India. In 2012, noted Australian analyst 
Rory Medcalf wrote that he was convinced that “Indo-Pacific” 
was “a term whose time has come”20.
The Inadequacy of the “Asia-Pacific” Concept
The “Indo-Pacific” concept acknowledges the importance of 
the IOR in Asia’s geopolitical and security construct, and there-
by enables a more holistic comprehension and analyses in com-
parison to the term “Asia-Pacific,” wherein the IOR was never 
included, at least not explicitly. As D. Gnanagurunathan writes,
Japan and Australia promoted the term “Asia Pacific” in the 
1970s and 1980s to draw them closer to the United States and 
the economically burgeoning East Asia. India was far, geograph-
ically, from the region, and politically, economically and strate-
gically remained uninvolved for inherent reasons21.
18 R.D. Kaplan. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of  American Power., 
Random House, October 2010.
19 Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of  State, “America’s 
Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”, US Department of  State, 28 October 2010.
20 R. Medcalf, “A Term Whose Time Has Come: The Indo-Pacific”, The Diplomat, 
4 December 2012.
21 D. Gnanagurunathan (Indian Council for World Affairs, New Delhi), “India 
and the idea of  the ‘Indo-Pacific”, East Asia Forum, 20 October 2012.
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The “India” Factor
The coinage of “Indo-Pacific” has much to do with the in-
creased eminence of India at the turn of the XIX century. In 
2006, Donald Berlin wrote that the “rise of India” is itself a 
key factor in the increasing significance of the Indian Ocean22. 
India could no longer be excluded from any geopolitical or se-
curity reckoning in the Asia-Pacific. For example, India was an 
obvious choice for inclusion in the ASEAN23 Regional Forum 
in 1996 and the EAS in 2005. Even for the PSI (2004), then-
US President Bush sought to enrol India as a key participant. 
However, while located in the area of responsibility of the US 
Pacific Command (PACOM) – now renamed Indo-Pacific 
Command (INDOPACOM) – to many analysts, India nev-
er belonged to the Asia-Pacific. During the 2009 Shangri-La 
Dialogue in Singapore, India’s former naval chief Admiral Arun 
Prakash highlighted this contradiction, saying, 
I am not quite sure about the origin of the term Asia-Pacific, 
but I presume it was coined to include America in this part of 
the world, which is perfectly all right. As an Indian, every time 
I hear the term Asia-Pacific I feel a sense of exclusion, because it 
seems to include Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific 
islands, and it terminates at the Melaka Straits, but there is a 
whole world west of the Melaka Straits […]. [S]o my question 
to the distinguished panel is […] do you see a contradiction be-
tween the terms Asia-Pacific, Asia and the Indian Ocean region?
The “Indo-Pacific” concept helped to overcome this dilem-
ma by incorporating “India” in the affairs of “maritime-Asia”, 
even though the “Indo-“ in the compound word “Indo-Pacific” 
stands for “Indian Ocean”, and not “India”.
A national geo-strategy cannot be formulated without 
factoring in ‘geographical’ realities, and a nation’s geography is 
22 D.L Berlin, “India in the Indian Ocean”, Naval War College Review, vol. 59, no. 
2, Spring 2006. 
23 Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
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never perfect. One cannot alter geography but can modify its 
geo-strategic orientation, which India attempted nearly three 
decades ago through its 1991 Look East Policy. However, India 
was not too proactive in its pursuit of the Policy. In 2006-2007, 
the Indo-Pacific concept was also a subconscious effort to give 
wind to India’s languishing easterly geo-strategic reorientation, 
which later gained strength in 2014 through Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi’s “Act East” articulation. India’s strategic ration-
ale was largely driven by its geo-economic objectives. Towards 
this end, New Delhi sought to ensure a benign environment 
in its extended maritime neighbourhood, but that was not all. 
India also sought to stretch its “geostrategic frontiers”24 east-
wards to reinforce “strategic deterrence”25 against China.  
This led to New Delhi’s strategic convergence with the US, 
which was more than willing to support New Delhi. During her 
visit to Perth, Australia, in November 2012, then-US Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton lauded India as “an important player 
in the Indo-Pacific region” that should play a larger role in the 
region’s affairs. She applauded the upswing in Australia’s bilat-
eral ties with the “world’s largest democracy”, India, and en-
couraged Canberra to strengthen its military cooperation with 
New Delhi26.
24 The “Geostrategic Frontier” encloses a geographical area beyond the sover-
eign territory wherein a country must be able to influence events for assuring and 
insuring its national security, including against traditional military threats. It is a 
very critical area, since it also provides strategic depth to the country. See G.S. 
Khurana, “High End in the Pacific: Envisioning the Upper Limits of  India-US 
Naval Cooperation in Pacific-Asia”, Journal of  Defence Studies (JDS), vol. 11, no. 4, 
October/December 2017, pp. 54-56.
25 The concept must not be confused with “nuclear deterrence”. It operates at 
the national-strategic level and includes nuclear deterrence. The effort to develop 
strategic deterrence seeks to synergise and leverage all elements of  national pow-
er – diplomatic, economic, informational, and military – as well as the nation’s 
global influence. G.S. Khurana, Porthole: Geopolitical, Strategic and Maritime Terms 
and Concepts, New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2016, p. 186. 
26 “Hillary Clinton lauds India’s role in Indo-Pacific region, urges for increased 
participation”, India Today, 14 November 2012.
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During his address at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi indicated the geographical 
swath of New Delhi’s conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific as 
stretching from Africa to the Americas. He emphasised a few key 
facets reflecting New Delhi’s policy perspective on Indo-Pacific, 
which included “inclusiveness,” “openness”, “ASEAN centrali-
ty”, and the fact that the concept was not directed against any 
country27. These are indicative of the Prime Minister’s policy 
guidance that “strategic deterrence” needs to be reinforced in 
tandem with more “gentle” persuasive and dissuasive pressures 
upon China. 
Interests and Approaches of Other Key Players
Australia
For a long time, Australia has perceived itself as geo-strategical-
ly placed in the Indo-Pacific continuum. As soon as the concept 
began to gain importance, the Australian government made 
haste to articulate it in its May 2013 Defence White Paper, 
which became the first-ever “official and formal” statement 
on the “Indo-Pacific” in the contemporary times. The White 
Paper notes two key contributing factors in the emergence of 
the concept: first, the emergence of India “as an important 
strategic, diplomatic and economic actor, ‘looking East’, and 
becoming more engaged in regional frameworks”; and second, 
the “growing trade, investment and energy flows across this 
broader region (that) are strengthening economic and security 
interdependencies […][with both factors] increasingly attract-
ing international attention to the Indian Ocean”28. 
27 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2018, Ministry of  
External Affairs, Government of  India.
28 Australian Government (Department of  Defence), Defending Australia and its 
National Interests, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 7.
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Commenting on the White Paper, Rory Medcalf endorsed 
India’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific construct stating that 
Australia’s new defence policy recognises India’s eastward orien-
tation29. The Australian point of view is also reflected in the 
writing of renowned Australian analyst David Brewster30. 
Interestingly, however, like Japan, Australia has envisioned a 
“free and open Pacific”, but Canberra’s geo-strategic conceptu-
alisation does not encompass Japan.
Indonesia
The geographical centrality of Indonesia in the Indo-Pacific 
continuum holds much geopolitical significance for the coun-
try. This led President Jokowi to embrace the new concept 
with much optimism. In his address at the 9th EAS Summit 
in Myanmar in November 2014, he stressed on maritime co-
operation with Indonesia being the “Porus Maritime Dunia 
(Global Maritime Fulcrum) […] in determining the future of 
the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions (the Pacific and Indian 
Ocean Region - PACINDO)”31. In May 2013, Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Marty Natelegawa, highlighting the fact that 
it was indeed Jakarta’s initiative to include Australia and India 
in the EAS, went even further to the extent of proposing an 
“Indo-Pacific wide Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation”, 
which would further strengthen the EAS32.
While Indonesia could potentially play a key role in the larg-
er geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, the military-strategic signifi-
cance of its geographical location and disposition cannot be ig-
nored. As an archipelagic state overlooking the four key maritime 
29 R. Medcalf, “The Indo-Pacific Pivot”, The Indian Express, 10 May 2013.
30 D. Brewster, “A ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and what it means for Australia”, 
The Interpreter, Lowry Institute, 7 March 2018.
31 “Presiden Jokowi Deklarasikan Indonesia Saebagai Poros Maritim Dunis” 
(Bhasa Indonesia language for “President Jokowi Declares Indonesia as a World 
Maritime Axis”), Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  the Republic of  Indonesia, 15 
November 2014.
32 Ibid.
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choke-points, it virtually controls strategic commodities and mil-
itary communications between the Indian and the Pacific oceans. 
United States
Between 2009-2010, the US began to realise the inadequacy 
of the “Asia-Pacific” to meet its geopolitical objectives in Asia. 
Ostensibly, the key reason was China’s expanding military-stra-
tegic footprint in the Indian Ocean, beginning with its an-
ti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden launched in December 
200833. This led the US to seek India’s proactive role in the pan-
Asian security architecture, as evidenced by the statement made 
by the US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in his address at 
the 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue. He said that the US looked to 
India to be a partner and “net provider of security in the Indian 
Ocean and beyond”34. In 2010, as mentioned earlier, the US 
officially recognised “Indo-Pacific” for the first time through 
the address by then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton35.
However, until 2011, the US conceptualisation remained 
confined to the “Asia-Pacific”, which, unfortunately for 
Washington, was tied to President Obama’s “Rebalance to 
Asia”. As Evan Feigenbaum writes, 
For Washington, the problem is at once intellectual, strategic, 
and bureaucratic. Intellectually, the United States still has three 
separate foreign policies in Asia one for East Asia, another for 
South Asia, and a third for Central Asia […]. As Asia reinte-
grates, then, the United States is too often stuck in an outdated 
mode of thinking36.
33 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao’s Regular Press Conference on 
18 December 2008, Permanent Mission of  the People’s Republic of  China to 
the UN website, 19 December 2008, at http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/
t526955.htm 
34 “Shangri-La Dialogue: Gates says watershed in Indo-US relations”, domain-B, 
30 May 2009.
35 Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, US Secretary of  State, “America’s 
Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”…, cit.
36 E.A. Feigenbaum, “Why America No Longer Gets Asia”, The Washington 
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The US geostrategic reorientation began in 2012, leading to 
the dilation of the “Asia-Pacific” formulation to “Indo-Asia 
Pacific”. In his 2013 posture report to Congress, Admiral 
Samuel Locklear, the US PACOM Commander, referred to 
his area of responsibility as the “Indo-Asia-Pacific”. As Rear 
Admiral Michael McDevitt explains, 
Indo-Asia-Pacific was necessary to make sure that India was 
“connected” to a traditional Asia-Pacific policy orientation, and 
the U.S. government’s military, policy, and diplomatic policy 
organs were better oriented to adapt to the contours of a more 
integrated Asia, to become more effective in helping manage US 
interests in the region’s future37.
During his Asia tour in November 2017, however, President 
Trump further altered the “Indo-Asia-Pacific” formulation to 
“Indo-Pacific”, making repeated mentions of the newer term 
and contextualising it with the “partnership” with India, which 
was expected to play a more active security role. It led the me-
dia, strategists, and policy-makers worldwide scrambling, try-
ing to delve deeper into his intent and the ramifications of his 
actions38. Analysts claimed that President Trump had implied 
a new “alliance”39. Whether or not it was a reincarnation of 
Obama’s “Rebalance to Asia”, the tone and tenor indicated a 
desire for an anti-China partnership, thereby polarising the 
“Indo-Pacific” region and distorting the original “Indo-Pacific” 
idea, which, in the author’s view, was not constructive. This led 
Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Spring 2011, vol. 34, no. 
2, pp. 25-43, cit. pp. 26-27.
37 E-mail interview with Rear Admiral McDevitt on 18 August 2018. Rear 
Admiral McDevitt, USN (Retd.) is the founder of  the Strategic Studies Division 
of  the US Center for Naval Analyses (CNA).
38 “Why Trump keeps saying Indo-Pacific”, BBC News, 9 November 2017; and D. 
Dodwell, “No one is commenting on this ‘big idea’ Trump put forward at Apec”, 
South China Morning Post, 12 November 2017.
39 C. Shepherd and S. Miglani, “Indo-Pacific? Not from where China is sitting...”, 
Reuters, 10 November 2017.
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to his op-ed in the Washington Post titled “Trump’s new Cold 
War alliance in Asia is dangerous”40. The write-up expressed 
concerns that the original “Indo-Pacific” idea had drifted away 
from the original “constructive” India-Japan proposition of a 
geopolitical amalgamation of the Indo-Pacific towards regional 
stability. 
Within days from President Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ artic-
ulation, Australia, India, Japan, and the US held their first 
joint-secretary level meeting of the “Quadrilateral Dialogue” 
(Quad)41. This may have been timed to enhance the pressure 
on Beijing, but contributed further to constricting the strategic 
options of the regional countries. 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Consequent to the US President’s articulation of the “Indo-
Pacific” idea, and its temporal coincidence with the reviv-
al of the Quad, the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as a whole has been averse to it. From ASEAN’s per-
spective, this will force smaller countries to take sides, leading 
to a weakening of the ASEAN. Some key ASEAN countries like 
Vietnam42, Indonesia, and Singapore, driven by their respective 
national interests, are already “on board” on the Indo-Pacific 
construct. This is amply indicative of the lingering fault-lines in 
the ASEAN. This led the US to go into damage-control mode. 
To assuage the ASEAN, during the ASEAN+ Foreign Ministers’ 
meeting in August 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
emphasised that the ASEAN countries would be central to 
Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy43.
40 G.S. Khurana, “Trump’s new Cold War alliance in Asia is dangerous”, The 
Washington Post, 14 November 2017. 
41 K. Bhattacherjee, “India, Japan, U.S., Australia hold first ‘Quad’ talks at Manila 
ahead of  ASEA Summit”, The Hindu, 12 November 2017.
42 D. Grossman, “Why March 2018 Was an Active Month in Vietnam’s Balancing 
Against China in the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 23 March 2018, 
43 Z. Hussain, “US remains committed to Asean centrality, Mike Pompeo tells 
foreign ministers”, The Straits Times, 3 August 2018.
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The European Union
The reaction of the European Union has been similar to that 
of the ASEAN, though its focus has been on the Quad. From 
the EU’s perspective (as one German analyst puts it), “[a] stra-
tegic alignment of the Indo-Pacific ‘Quad’ is tempting (but) 
involves a quasi-military alliance, which would run counter 
to the EU’s approach of strengthening regional solutions and 
cooperation”44. Therefore, the concurrent launch of the Quad 
has aggravated the polarisation of the region. However, unlike 
some ASEAN countries, some major European powers like 
France and the UK are more amenable to strategic partnerships 
in the region under the rubric of the “Indo-Pacific”. 
China
China was silently circumspect about the “Indo-Pacific” idea 
since it was first noted by Beijing in 2012. In October 2012, 
Australian writers Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips remarked, 
[…] Viewed from Beijing, the idea of the Indo-Pacific […] ap-
pears to be to keep the US in, lift India up, and keep China out 
of the Indian Ocean […]. The Indo-Pac concept has [therefore] 
[…] received a frosty reception in China45.
A year later, in 2013, Chinese analysts prodded Beijing to inte-
grate within the “Indo-Pacific” to secure its own national inter-
ests. In June 2013, for instance, Minghao Zhao wrote,
[A] power game of great significance has unfolded in Indo-
Pacific Asia. The US, India, Japan and other players are seeking 
to collaborate to build an “Indo-Pacific order” that is congenial 
to their long-term interests. China is not necessarily excluded 
from this project, and it should seek a seat at the table and help 
44 M.A. Kuo, “What the EU Thinks of  the US ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy”, The 
Diplomat, 31 January 2018.
45 N. Bisley and A. Phillips, “The Indo-Pacific: what does it actually mean?”, East 
Asia Forum, 6 October 2012.
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recast the strategic objectives and interaction norms (in China’s 
favour)46.
However, other Chinese analysts had opposite views. For in-
stance, Zhao Zebian set forth his analysis of the “Indo-Pacific” 
concept in Mandarin Chinese: when translated into English, 
it reads “Indo-Pacific’ concept and its implications for China”. 
The analysis avers that the new concept “lifts India up” to the 
detriment of China47. 
In December 2014 (six months after the Modi-led govern-
ment assumed power in India), the Chinese newspaper People’s 
Daily ran an exercise in strategic communications. The write-
up said that, 
Mr. Modi wants a peaceful and stable periphery that will allow 
him to concentrate on domestic economic structural reform and 
infrastructure building […]. The Indian government and schol-
ars have not endorsed the Indo-Pacific geo-strategy scripted by 
the United States and Japan to use India with the aim to balance 
and even contain China’s increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific 
region and the Indian Ocean48. 
The concern among Chinese analysts rose palpably after 
President Trump’s “Indo-Pacific” articulation in November 
2017. The People’s Daily analysed this as a reincarnation of the 
US “rebalance to Asia” strategy to “restrict China and weaken 
its influence in Asia-Pacific”, wherein India would be the stra-
tegic “pillar”. The analysis also alluded to the Quad, saying that, 
46 M. Zhao, “The Emerging Strategic Triangle in Indo-Pacific Asia”, The Diplomat, 
4 June 2013.
47 Zhao Qinghai Zebian, “印太”概念及其对中国的含义 (“Indo-Pacific” con-
cept and its implications for China), Contemporary International Relations, China 
Institute for International Studies (CIIS), 31 July 2013.
48 A. Aneja, “China invites India for Indo-Pacific partnership”, The Hindu, 5 
December 2014.
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the US is actively promoting India’s “Act East policy” policy, 
which is deeply integrated with the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of 
the US and Japan, and gradually forms the Asian security ar-
chitecture dominated by the United States, India, Japan, and 
Australia49. 
In March 2018, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed 
the “Indo-Pacific” as “an attention-grabbing idea” that would 
“dissipate like ocean foam”50. Interestingly, however, Chinese 
thinking seems to have undergone a major transformation since 
then, turning “adversity” into “opportunity”. As the Chinese 
saying goes, “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or white, 
as long as it catches mice”51. Accordingly, Beijing has capitalised 
upon the Indo-Pacific concept by reinforcing its geopolitical 
connections with the IOR countries. Chinese academic litera-
ture has been referring to China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 
initiative as “Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics”. The 
MSR is coupled by a government approval for Hainan Free 
Trade Zone and Port, which is being seen by Chinese analysts as 
the “Indo-Pacific gateway”52. Indirectly, the Indo-Pacific con-
cept has also enhanced the legitimacy of the Chinese military 
presence in the Indian Ocean. In sum, the key countries en-
dorsing the Indo-Pacific concept – Australia, India, Japan, and 
the US are thereby victims of their own conceptualisations.
49 “不谈‘亚太’谈‘印太’特朗普访华前在暗示什么” (“Don’t talk about 
‘Asia-Pacific’ and talk about ‘Indo-Pacific’: What is hinted before Trump’s visit to 
China?”), People’s Daily Overseas Edition, 6 November 2017.
50 D.K. Emmerson, “In Search for the Real Indo-Pacific”, YaleGlobal Online, 14 
June 2018.
51 Speech by Deng Xiaoping at the Communist Youth League conference, 7 July 
1962, China Daily, Updated 20 August 2014.
52 Xu Shaomin, “Geography is not destiny: Rise of  Indo-Pacific”, The Global 
Times, 21 November 2017.
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Conclusions 
Undeniably, China has been the key actor in the contempo-
rary revival of the “Indo-Pacific” concept about a decade ago. 
However, there lies a nuanced – albeit important – difference 
between the original conceptualisation of “Indo-Pacific” in 
2006-07, and the current one envisioned by President Trump. 
In the mid-2000s, China’s increasingly assertive behaviour was 
causing anxieties both in India and Japan. For the Japanese, the 
“Indo-Pacific” provided a notional assurance from India as an 
emerging power in the wider “maritime” Asia. On the other 
hand, India was seeking Japan’s help to make its own strate-
gic assessments on China. Also, following futile efforts by New 
Delhi to persuade Beijing to adopt a conciliatory approach, 
India was compelled to scale up its outreach to Japan in order 
to moderate China’s behaviour through “dissuasion”. In con-
trast, President Trump’s re-interpretation of the “Indo-Pacific” 
construct amounts to partnering with India to create a China-
specific alliance, and its temporal coincidence with the revival 
of the “Quad”53 is not very helpful for shaping a benign and 
stable environment in the wider region. 
Notwithstanding the above, as trends indicate, the Indo-
Pacific concept is likely to increasingly gain acceptance, even 
while differences persist among the key players in terms of their 
respective geostrategic interests and the attendant interpreta-
tions of its geographical scope. However, the effectiveness of 
“Indo-Pacific” in meeting its original objective of freedom and 
prosperity will depend much on how the regional structure is 
fleshed out at the political level and on functional cooperation 
among the key stakeholders, including the regional countries. 
Towards this end, the stakeholders will need to factor in four 
key imperatives. 
53 A. Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral 
Meeting on Regional Cooperation: The ‘Quad’ is back”, The Diplomat, 13 
November 2017.
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First, even though ASEAN centrality is valuable for Indo-
Pacific multilateralism, and should be upheld, the lead role of 
EAS would need to be supplemented by the Quad. 
Second, while moderating the behaviour of China remains 
a “way-point”’ to the overarching objective of “Indo-Pacific”, 
the cooperative endeavours would need to avoid military focus 
and exclusivity. 
Third, the emphasis would need to be laid on geo-econom-
ics, maritime safety, and good order at sea, including freedom 
of navigation. 
Fourth, China is winning the game of regional influence vis-
à-vis the United States. This is unhelpful for a stable balance of 
power in the region, and thus necessitates a more proactive role 
of the other regional powers like Australia, India, and Japan. 
2.  The Indo-Pacific As a New Infrastructural 
     and Economic-Trade Area: 
     A Real Competitor to BRI?
Sergio Miracola
The American President Donald Trump announced – during 
his first Asia tour in November 2017 – that it was now time 
to think about the Indo-Pacific strategy. This has inevitably re-
shaped the existing Asia-Pacific strategy, which had character-
ised the American geopolitical approach until that time. This 
shift increases the chances of recreating what is now known as 
the “Quadrilateral Dialogue” (Quad), an alliance which com-
prises the US, India, Japan, and Australia.
At the strategic level, the Indo-Pacific is America’s attempt 
to check on China’s rise and geopolitical expansion. In doing 
so, the crucial role for the US strategic vision would be played 
by India, as New Delhi is becoming more assertive towards the 
other regional players. The other state actors involved, such as 
Japan and Australia, are expected to further expand Washington’s 
strategic vision. At this stage, the military component would 
exert an important role, since all the actors involved, including 
China, are progressively increasing their military development. 
However, the new American strategic design does not only 
comprise the military dimension. The new Indo-Pacific stra-
tegic concept also has an infrastructural and trade dimension. 
This is conceived as a means to check on China’s growth also at 
the commercial and infrastructural level. The Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), in fact, is becoming Beijing’s tool for its 
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geo-economic aggrandisement, and this is contributing to alter 
the strategic relations between the different regional actors.  
China, which is deeply involved in the region, above all 
through the BRI, is now thinking about how to respond at the 
strategic level, even if it is still early to draw conclusions about 
what China’s Indo-Pacific strategy really encompasses, also due 
to the fact that the new American strategic vision for the Indo-
Pacific is yet to be fully implemented. Based on these premis-
es, this chapter will first of all describe the fundamental ele-
ments characterising the Indo-Pacific, its infrastructural, trade, 
and security elements. Secondly, it will discuss China’s over-
all geopolitical strategy for the Indo-Pacific, that is, Beijing’s 
geo-economic strategy for the area. This section will inevitably 
intertwine with the current BRI and how it is fulfilling China’s 
economic and trade objectives. Finally, the third section would 
look at the security dimension and at how China is trying to 
respond militarily for the consolidation of its foreign presence 
and its geopolitical expansion. 
The Indo-Pacific As a New Strategic Framework
The American government under the presidency of Donald 
Trump has started to change the logic of the US involvement in 
the Asian region, which has now moved from the Asia-Pacific to 
the Indo-Pacific. The underpinning feature characterising both 
strategic logics remained the same: the containment of China. 
However, the shift in focus towards the Indo-Pacific also changed 
the implied method to reach that objective. While the Asia-
Pacific’s overall aim was to implement a containment of China by 
relying on the use of the sea and the historic American allies, the 
new Indo-Pacific strategic framework, apart from including new 
state actors such as Australia and India, tries to contain China 
through more sophisticated means, such as regional infrastruc-
ture and economic development. At the same time, the Indo-
Pacific, as it is conceived, would create an overarching strategic 
partnership able to control China’s rise both on land and at sea.
The Indo-Pacific As a New Infrastructural and Economic-Trade Area 35
According to this specific context, the US is trying to push 
forward a new investment plan for the region, which could di-
rectly compete with a Chinese investment plan. However, the 
initial objective of this economic scheme is not aiming at build-
ing infrastructures, but to invest directly into those countries 
that desperately need funds in order to develop domestically. 
In so doing, the US has set forward a four-pronged strategy, 
which comprises “funding, mobilising private capital, cooper-
ation among financiers, and an emphasis on high standards”1.
The first section of this strategy – funding – is now getting 
more traction, even if the amount of money to be invested is 
far away from what China has been pumping into its Belt and 
Road Initiative. At the end of July 2018, US Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo announced that the US could invest US$113 
million into the Indo-Pacific countries. However, this funding 
“appears primarily intended to provide technical support to 
help governments develop and manage their own investments, 
particularly by attracting private capital”2.
The second segment – mobilising private capital – repre-
sents the American overall idea to establish new private fund-
ing corporations, such as the willingness to transform the ex-
isting Overseas Private Investment Corporation into a new 
International Development Finance Corporation “with mod-
ernised financing capabilities, including a doubling of its con-
tingent liability ceiling to US$60 billion”. To reach this objec-
tive, the US government issued in February 2018 the BUILD 
Act, whose main function is to invest money into Indo-Pacific 
countries in order to spread US influence so as to incentivise 
them to see the US as a potential alternative to the Chinese new 
infrastructure plan of the Belt and Road Initiative.
The third section of the American Indo-Pacific strategy 
aims to create new forms of cooperation among the financ-
ers. Through this line of reasoning, the US established a new 
1 R. Rajah, “An Emerging Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Strategy”, Lowyinstitute.Org, 
last modified 2018.
2 Ibid.
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trilateral framework between the US, Australia, and Japan, where 
Canberra and Tokyo might be willing to participate at the finan-
cial level for the infrastructural development of the Indo-Pacific. 
On 30 July 2018, for example, the three countries issued a joint 
statement, clearly stating the objectives for the Indo-Pacific: 
The United States, Japan, and Australia have formed a trilateral 
partnership to mobilise investment in projects that drive eco-
nomic growth, create opportunities, and foster a free, open, in-
clusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific. We share the belief that good 
investments stem from transparency, open competition, sustain-
ability, adhering to robust global standards, employing the local 
workforce, and avoiding unsustainable debt burdens.We will 
uphold these principles as we mobilise investment in infrastruc-
ture, such as energy, transportation, tourism, and technology that 
will help stabilise economies, enhance connectivity, and provide 
lasting benefits throughout the region. To deepen this trilateral 
partnership, we are currently developing a framework for coop-
eration. OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] is also 
placing a representative in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.  
As we look to the future, this partnership represents our com-
mitment to an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open and pros-
perous. By working together, we can attract more private capital 
to achieve greater results3.
According to this new strategic logic, since 2016 Japan has set 
up a new project, called “quality infrastructure investment” in-
itiative. The idea is to increase the level of funding for the cre-
ation of specific infrastructures in the Indo-Pacific area, which 
reflect a high quality level. This is because, according to the 
Japanese plan, “quality infrastructure form [sic] the founda-
tions of a nation’s economic growth”, while “strengthening the 
connectivity between nations and regions [represents the] foun-
tains of world economic growth”4.
3 “Australia, US And Japan Announce Trilateral Partnership For Infrastructure 
Investment In The Indo-Pacific”, Department of  Foreign Affairs and Trade, last 
modified 2018.
4 K. Sonoura, “Japan’s Initiatives For Promoting ‘Quality Infrastructure 
Investment’”, 2017.
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During the last G7 summit held in Ise-Shima in 2016, 
the Japanese government issued five principles for its Quality 
Infrastructure Investment initiative5. This Japanese initiative is 
becoming a reality in at least four major infrastructural projects: 
the first one is in Kenya and it concerns the Mombasa Port 
development project. The second one concerns the Mumbai – 
Ahmedabad High-Speed Railway in India. The third project 
refers to the Thilawa Special Economic Zone in Myanmar. 
Finally, the fourth project concerns the creation of a power grid 
in Tanzania6.
The fourth characteristic of the American strategy is to em-
phasise the “high standards” of its funding, with respect to 
the Chinese one, labelled as poor-quality investment and as a 
debt trap, as it is happening for Pakistan and Sri Lanka, that 
is, poor countries that granted China control of their ports for 
an extended time in exchange for money. Within the overall 
American strategy, “high standards, by contrast, is intended to 
mean better-built projects, transparency, competitive tender-
ing, strong environmental and social safeguards, and, most im-
portantly, economic sustainability”7.
Besides the American strategic guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, 
the ongoing Japanese infrastructural programs, Indian new as-
sertiveness in the area, and Australia increasing its regional in-
volvement, the state actors involved are also starting significant 
bilateral relations, which would definitely pave the way, in the 
longer term, for the quadrilateral strategic setting known as the 
5 “G7 Ise-Shima Principles For Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment”, 
Mofa.Go.Jp, 2016. The five principles are: 1) “Ensuring effective governance, 
reliable operation and economic efficiency in view of  life-cycle cost as well as 
safety and resilience against natural disaster, terrorism and cyber-attack risks. 2) 
Ensuring job creation, capacity building and transfer of  expertise and know-
how for local communities. 3) Addressing social and environmental impacts. 
4) Ensuring alignment with economic and development strategies including as-
pect of  climate change and environment at the national and regional levels. 5) 
Enhancing effective resource mobilisation including through PPP.
6 K. Sonoura (2017).
7 R. Rajah (2018).
Geopolitics by Other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality38
Quad. However, before the Quad could take its final shape, 
there have been significant diplomatic developments between 
these different state actors. Two deserve particular attention: 
those between the US and India and between India and Japan. 
As regards Washington-New Delhi relations, the Trump ad-
ministration’s new Indo-Pacific strategy – first announced in 
November 2017 and then implemented into the December 
2017 National Security Strategy8 – follows the roots of the previ-
ous American strategy, specifically the one former US President 
Obama put forward in 2015 – the US-India Joint Strategic 
Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region9. The Joint 
Strategic Vision emphasised the importance of connectivity 
both at the political and infrastructural level and implicitly ar-
gued in favour of a more committed containment of China: 
To support regional economic integration, we will promote 
accelerated infrastructure connectivity and economic develop-
ment in a manner that links South, Southeast and Central Asia, 
including by enhancing energy transmission and encouraging 
free trade and greater people-to-people linkages. Regional pros-
perity depends on security. We affirm the importance of safe-
guarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation 
and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South 
China Sea. We call on all parties to avoid the threat or use of 
force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes 
through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally rec-
ognised principles of international law, including the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea10.
Since 2015, in fact, the US and India “conducted more con-
ventional military exercises with each other than either of them 
conducts with any other country”. This is because, in recent 
8 “National Security Strategy of  The United States Of  America”, Whitehouse.
Gov, pp. 45-47, 2017.
9 A. Ayres, “The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean”, Council 
On Foreign Relations, 2018.
10 “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for The Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean 
Region”, Whitehouse.Gov, 2015.
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years, there has been a progressive convergence between India’s 
“Act East” policy and the US “rebalance” to Asia11.
The same also applies to the new National Security Strategy, 
which highlights, at the economic level, the importance of “free 
and open seaways, transparent infrastructure financing practic-
es, unimpeded commerce, and the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes”. In order to reach these objectives, the new American 
document also emphasised the growing security ties with India 
and the importance of strengthening other relevant regional or-
ganisations such as the ASEAN and the APEC, which “remain 
centrepieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and plat-
forms for promoting an order based on freedom”12.
In order to increase the diplomatic and security ties with 
India, the United States should also take into account “India’s 
sense of the region [which] includes the larger maritime space 
to its west”13. In fact, together with South Africa, in 1997 New 
Delhi created the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), “a 
mini-lateral organisation […] to better institutionalise consul-
tation across this poorly linked area”14. 
Among the other state actors involved in the creation of the 
Quad, only Australia has an active role within the IORA, while 
Japan and the US are only Dialogue Partners. At the same time, 
the IORA’s area of interest overlaps with the BRI project, a clear 
indication that India’s and China’s strategic visions might soon 
end up colliding. 
The other diplomatic relationship worth mentioning in this 
context is the one between India and Japan. After significant 
anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in China in 2005, 
two year later the government adopted a new “China plus one” 
strategy, in order to reduce its economic dependence on China 
11 M. Pardesi, “Evolution of  India-Japan Ties: Prospects and Limitations”, in 
R. Basrur and S. Kuttyed (eds.), India And Japan. Assessing The Strategic Partnership, 
Singapore, Palgrave Mcmillan, 2018, p. 33.
12 “National Security Strategy Of  The United States Of  America”..., cit.
13 A. Ayres (2018).
14 Ibid.
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while contemporarily expanding investment opportunities15.
The idea to connect more deeply with India was confirmed 
in the same year, when the Japanese government suggested to 
link Japan to the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
proposed at the time this idea to the Indian Parliament. By 
referring to a book written in 1655, which enthusiastically em-
braced the idea of connecting the Indian continent with East 
Asia, Abe emphasised the geopolitical importance of the “con-
fluence of the two seas”16.
The new foreign policy course of action is also related to rel-
evant domestic changes, such as the attempt to modify the pac-
ifist article 9 of the Constitution in order to transform Japan’s 
current Self-Defence Forces into ‘ordinary’ armed forces. As Abe 
stated in 2012, according to Japan’s historic role in the Pacific 
Ocean, it is now crucial to make sure that “[p]eace, stability, 
and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean [becomes] in-
separable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in 
the Indian Ocean”17.
In order to reach this level of regional involvement, the 
Japanese government advanced the idea to create a “dia-
mond”-shaped alliance between the major democracies of the 
Indo-Pacific. As Abe explained:
I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US 
state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime com-
mons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western 
Pacific. I am prepared to invest, to the greatest possible extent, 
Japan’s capabilities in this security diamond18.
15 M. Pardesi (2018), p. 26.
16 “Confluence of  the Two Seas”, speech by HE Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister 
at the Parliament of  the Republic of  India’, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan 
website, 22 August 2007.
17 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond | By Shinzo Abe”, Project 
Syndicate, 2018.
18 Ibid. 
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However, Indo-Japanese relations did not develop simply be-
cause of the Japanese new foreign policy direction. Also, New 
Delhi had changed its strategy. Since Modi gained power, the 
country has adopted the so-called Act East policy, with the in-
tent to have India taking up a more active and visible  role 
in East Asian politics and security. According to this strategic 
logic, Indian ties “with Japan – from economic to strategic – 
have been completely transformed. It is a partnership of great 
substance and purpose that is a cornerstone of India’s Act East 
Policy”19. Their bilateral relation is growing in importance if we 
think that “political and defense consultations between the two 
countries have been institutionalised at the highest level and 
Japan is the first country with which India has set up a ‘2+2’ 
dialogue bringing together their respective foreign and defence 
ministries”20. 
Indo-Japanese cooperation has recently extended also to oth-
er important areas, such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor 
(AAGC), which both countries are willing to establish in the 
future. First launched in 2017, the AAGC represents a crucial 
connection between India and Japan for the development of 
the Indo-Pacific as the new strategic area for their own econom-
ic growth and also as a way to contain China21. 
Finally, even if the countries composing the Quad have de-
veloped so far their own bilateral relations – such as the US-
India relations and the Indo-Japanese relations – it has been 
only recently that the US, India, and Japan started to cooperate 
both in the areas of security and economy. Demonstrating co-
operation skills, especially after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsuna-
mi, the three countries started to coordinate their efforts in sub-
sequent naval exercises. “In a significant move, Japan will now 
19 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2018, Ministry of  
External Affairs, Government of  India.
20 R. Basrur and S. Kuttyed, “Conceptualizing Strategic Partnerships”, in Idem 
(eds.), India and Japan. Assessing the Strategic Partnership, Singapore, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018, p. 2.
21 “Question No.2694 Asia-Africa Development Corridor”, Mea.Gov.In, 2018.
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be a regular participant in the India-US Malabar Exercises”22.  
Their trilateral cooperation is steadily improving, culminat-
ing in the completion of one of the crucial summits between 
these three countries in April 2018. That was the 9th US-India-
Japan Trilateral Meeting, whose objective is to strengthen these 
diplomatic connections for a better development of the Indo-
Pacific both at the strategic and infrastructural level.  
China’s Indo-Pacific Geopolitical Strategy
China’s economic and trade strategy 
for the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific strategic concept, at this stage, represents a 
counter-response to the Chinese economic expansion through-
out Central Asia. Therefore, at present, there is no clear and 
coherent Chinese Indo-Pacific strategy per se, since China 
has set up, as its geopolitical tool of influence, the One Belt 
One Road (OBOR), later re-named Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI). Inaugurated in November 2013 by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping during a state visit to Kazakhstan, the BRI emerged 
on the world stage as one of the fundamental infrastructural 
projects aimed at connecting Asia with Europe through Central 
Asia23. Moreover, the dual nature of this project, infrastructural 
as well as commercial, developed on land and at sea, makes 
the Chinese geopolitical strategy for the XXI century a combi-
nation of those political aspirations that had characterised the 
Tang and the Ming dynasty respectively, that is, the expansion 
on land, that shaped Tang’s westward expansion in Central 
Asia, and the Ming’s expansion at sea, with the historic naval 
22 M.S. Pardesi, “Evolution of  India-Japan Ties: Prospects And Limitations”, in 
R. Basrur and S. Kuttyed (eds.), India and Japan. Assessing the Strategic Partnership, 
Singapore, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 34.
23 G. Grieger, One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China’s regional integration initiative, 
European Parliamentary Research Service, July 2016.
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expeditions by Admiral Zheng. His formidable naval fleet gave 
China the possibility to reach all Southeast Asian countries, the 
Indian subcontinent, and the coasts of Africa24. 
These elements, historical and otherwise, make evident the 
assumption that “there is no doubt that OBOR has a key eco-
nomic component”. The OBOR, in fact, “was designed to deal 
with the aftermath of an investment boom that has left vast 
overcapacity and a need to find new markets abroad”, making 
it “an economic development strategy”25. For example, the cre-
ation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
respond to the Chinese need to extend its commercial and eco-
nomic power as far as Europe, proposing an alternative model 
to the Western economic and financial systems. The arrival of 
the first commercial train from China to London in early 2017 
symbolised the advent of this new trade infrastructural inter-
connection between Eurasian states26.
Moreover, this economic and trading network responded to 
two fundamental necessities: one referred to the idea of rebuild-
ing the Chinese cultural system that would have irradiated the 
Chinese “brand” worldwide, a concept that was mainly based 
on the ancient Chinese doctrine of All Under Heaven (tianx-
ia)27, while the second, connected to the first one, referred to 
24 Xie Tao, “Back On The Silk Road: China’s Version Of  A Rebalance To Asia”, 
Global Asia, vol. 9, no. 1, 2014.
25 Xiaoyu Pu, “One Belt, One Road: Visions And Challenges Of  China’s 
Geoeconomic Strategy”, 中國大陸研究(Mainland China Studies), vol. 59, no. 3, 
2016, p. 113.
26 J. Joseph, “All aboard the China-to-London freight train”, BBC, 18 January 
2017.
27 A. Carlson, “Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief  Consideration of  Recent 
Changes In China’s Approach To International Order And The Emergence of  
the Tianxia Concept”, Journal of  Contemporary China, vol. 20, no. 68, 2010, p. 89-
102; Suisheng Zhao, “Rethinking The Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle 
And The Rise Of  China”, Journal of  Contemporary China, vol. 24, no. 96, 2015, 
pp. 961-982; Zhang Feng, “The Tianxia System”, China Heritage Quarterly, no. 21, 
March 2010.
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the necessity of creating an alternative economic and trading 
system to the American one. Specifically, since the US adopted 
from 2011 onwards a strategy to contain China’s rise, Beijing 
started to articulate the “March West” (西进xijin) policy, in 
order to expand its political sphere of action, that is, moving 
into those areas where its actions could find the least possible 
frictions, that is, Central Asia and Middle East.
This policy outcome has been theorised by one of the most 
influential Chinese strategic thinkers: Wang Jisi, dean of 
the Department of international strategic studies at Peking 
University. He, in fact, can rightly be considered one of the 
first thinkers of the overall China’s OBOR strategy. In 2011, he 
articulated his thought in the following terms:
A grand strategy requires defining a geostrategic focus, and 
China’s geostrategic focus is Asia. When communication lines 
in Central Asia and South Asia were poor, China’s development 
strategy and economic interests tilted toward its east coast and 
the Pacific Ocean. Today, East Asia is still of vital importance, 
but China should and will begin to pay more strategic attention 
to the west. The central government has been conducting the 
Grand Western Development Program in many western prov-
inces and regions, notably Tibet and Xinjiang, for more than 
a decade. It is now more actively initiating and participating 
in new development projects in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, 
Central Asia, and throughout the Caspian Sea region, all the 
way to Europe. This new western outlook may reshape China’s 
geostrategic vision as well as the Eurasian landscape28.
Even if he is not the inventor of the OBOR strategy, it is un-
deniable that his ideas shaped both the strategic and econom-
ic components of the OBOR. This is due to the fact that the 
Chinese government has recently sponsored, as its political 
economic policy, the application of a “market-driven economic 
reform”, which would inevitably “let markets play a ‘decisive’ 
28 Jisi Wang, “China’s Search for A Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 
2, March/April 2011.
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role in the economy”. However, OBOR is not working accord-
ing to a market-oriented logic. There are clear indications that 
it is above all a government-driven project, carrying with itself 
a geostrategic logic. At the same time, another critical com-
ponent of the economic structure of OBOR is related to the 
underpinning idea of using economic means to solve security 
challenges in the region. However, this posits the “chicken and 
egg” dilemma, that is, should we consider security and stability 
as the fundamental prerequisites for economic development or 
should we use investments in insecure regions in order to in-
crease peace and stability? In the Chinese case, things become 
even more complicated due to the fact that most of the Chinese 
infrastructural/economic projects in Central Asia are constantly 
under threat by the weak, corrupt institutions of the recipient 
states at best, or by local insurgent groups at worst29.
This, therefore, illustrates that in addition to the economic 
setting, the OBOR stands also for something else: the exten-
sion of Chinese geopolitical power abroad. The fact that the 
OBOR also refers to the maritime route connecting China to 
the Indian subcontinent, reaching the coasts of Africa (where 
China has also installed a military facility in Djibouti), also 
means that we can assume that Beijing is increasingly commit-
ted to the development of an infrastructural model that would 
inevitably contribute to expanding Chinese military presence 
abroad, while also setting the stage for the first manifestation of 
the Chinese “exportation” of the military30.
Based on this strategic design, by moving westward, China’s 
first foreign policy concern is immediately focused on India 
and the still unresolved territorial disputes between the two 
29 Xiaoyu Pu, (2016), pp. 115, 122.
30 Because of  the “intimate” relationship between the economic and the political 
reasons in Chinese strategic thought, Prof. Xiaoyu Pu argues that this dual com-
bination, that cannot therefore be separated, explains the fact that “OBOR could 
be largely viewed as China’s new geo-economic strategy”, that is, the idea that 
China is willing to use “economic instruments to promote and defend national 
interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results”. Ibid., p. 115.
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countries. Furthermore, there are four additional reasons that 
have encouraged China to take a more proactive stance in 
Central and South Asia. They are the following: 1) India’s rap-
id economic growth that make it one of the “emerging major 
powers in Asia as well as an important factor in the emerging 
strategic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region”; 2) the progres-
sive transformation of the Indo-US and the Indo-Japanese rela-
tionships, which in Beijing are perceived as containment poli-
cies; 3) India’s “Look East” Strategy31, now labelled under Modi 
as the “Act East Asia” policy32, which would undermine China’s 
rise in Asia; and finally 4) India’s rapid military development, 
accompanied by the development of more conventional, mis-
sile and naval capabilities, expanding India’s military profile in 
the Indian Ocean33. 
Specifically, China has developed some maritime install-
ments in Pakistan, such as for example the Gwadar port and the 
associated China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), while 
others, moving eastward, have been installed in Sri Lanka (the 
investment over the Hambantota Port) and in Bangladesh. 
As regards the first project, the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor is playing a relevant role not only in overall Sino-
Pakistani economic relations but also in the region at large, since 
it has also been referred to as a “game changer” for the South 
Asia34. This is directly related to the other important agreement 
between China and Pakistan – that is, military cooperation – 
to the extent that the former has supplied the latter with eight 
submarines, which significantly strengthened Pakistani military 
forces35. 
31 M.S. Pardesi, “Understanding (Changing) Chinese Strategic Perceptions of  
India”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 34, no. 4, 2010, p. 569.
32 C. Ploberger, “One Belt, One Road – China’s New Grand Strategy”, Journal of  
Chinese Economic and Business Studies, vol. 15, no. 3, 2017, pp. 299-300.
33 M.S. Pardesi (2010), p. 56.
34 H. Zaffar, “CPEC: Boon or Bane for Pakistan?”, The Diplomat, 11 November 
2016. 
35 Ibid.
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Moving eastward, the other relevant project concerns China’s 
involvement in Sri Lanka. The president of Sri Lanka, Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, “welcomed much Chinese investment into the 
country’s infrastructure projects, including the Hambantota 
Port in southern Sri Lanka”. This is related to the strategic posi-
tion of the island, since it “straddles some of the world’s busiest 
sea lanes”. China’s strategic moves have, so far, “pumped some 
$5 billion into Sri Lanka in an effort to turn it into a pivot of 
its ‘Maritime Silk Road’”36. 
However, the 2015 election brought to power Maithripala 
Sirisena, who strongly opposed the Chinese infrastructure pro-
jects on the island. Sirisena’s victory was “a strong turnaround 
for the ‘string of pearls’”37, to the extent that China seemed to 
have encountered problems in its “‘dual-use’ infrastructure 
projects in Sri Lanka”38.After some negotiations, however, the 
Sirisena administration eventually approved the Chinese in-
vestment into the island. 
The third project is strategically relevant, since “China’s 
military cooperation with Bangladesh left New Delhi wary of 
Chinese involvement too close to India’s shores.” Through this 
project, the two countries “have built a strong military rela-
tionship, with China as Bangladesh’s largest military equipment 
supplier.” Since 2010, China started to implement its econom-
ic resources into the Bangladesh’s Chittagong Port, in order to 
make it a “strategic enclave, one of China’s ‘pearls’”39. 
On land, the project of countering India through the encir-
cling maneuver started to be implemented through two dif-
ferent but complementary processes. The first is infrastructural 
in nature and is accompanied by the other projects developed 
36 B. Chellaney, “China’s investment in Mahinda Rajapaksa has backfired”, hindu-
stantimes, 28 April 2017.
37 A. Walayat, “Exclusive: A String of  Pearls: China, India, and a Global Game of  
‘Weiqi’”, The US-China Perception Monitor, 21 March 2016.
38 B. Chellaney (2017).
39 A. Walayat, “Exclusive: A String of  Pearls: China, India, and a Global Game of  
‘Weiqi’”, US-China Perceptions Monitor, 21 March 2016.
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at sea and it refers to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). This project not only increas-
es the connectivity between the countries involved (which par-
adoxically include also India), but it serves the Chinese scope 
of controlling Indian development by trying on the one hand 
to “penetrate into the northeast regions of India”, with the pos-
sibility to control two important Tibetan rivers, “upon which 
India and Bangladesh rely to irrigate northern Chinese plains”, 
while on the other hand, proposing India to join this project 
might give it enough benefits so as to mitigate the Sino-Indian 
confrontation over the Indian version of OBOR, that is, the 
Indian “Project Mausam”40.
China’s military strategy for the Indo-Pacific
China’s Indo-Pacific military strategy, along with BRI’s overall 
infrastructural focus, follows two directions: land and sea. On 
land, the Chinese government is concerned with the strength-
ening of the military forces in the western part of the country. 
The strategic objectives of the new Chinese military reforms es-
tablished in 2015 and the associated continuous military drills 
in the Kunlun mountains have increased Chinese strength in 
the area41. This, in turn, has been used to exert a specific in-
fluence on the Sino-Indian relations, especially when it comes 
to confrontation over the disputed territories, thus offering a 
new rationale for the Chinese military development. In fact, 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces in Xinjiang, for ex-
ample, besides being “an economy of force operation”, i.e. rel-
atively small with respect to the task they are being asked to 
perform, nevertheless present an important war asset:
40 R.W. Hu, “China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Strategy”, China Report, vol. 53, no. 2, 
2017, pp. 108-116.
41 S. Miracola, “Sui Monti Kunlun L’esercito S’addestra A Difendere La Via Della 
Seta”, cina forum, 20 November 2015. 
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PLA ground forces are transitioning from a static defensive force 
allocated across seven internal MRs (Military Regions) [now 
turned into five after the November 2015 military reform by 
Xi Jinping], oriented for positional, mobile, urban, and moun-
tain offensive campaign; coastal defence campaigns, and landing 
campaigns, to a more offensive and maneuver-oriented force 
organised and equipped for operations along China’s periphery. 
The ground forces appear to be leading the PLA’s effort to ex-
periment with ad hoc, multi-service, joint tactical formations to 
execute integrated joint operations42.
At sea, China’s Indo-Pacific military strategy mainly focuses 
on ports expansion and maritime doctrine evolution43. China’s 
ports expansion, however, deserves a critical analysis. Along 
with the BRI, China has also consolidated its presence in the 
port of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, Gwadar in Pakistan, 
Hambantota in Sri Lanka, in the Maldives, Tanzania and in the 
Piraeus port in Greece (even if the latter lies outside the Indo-
Pacific region as such). 
The strategic rationale for China’s ports expansion through-
out the region is twofold. First, China needs to protect the sup-
ply routes – that is, the sea lines of communications (SLOC) – 
useful for its own economic development. To ensure the success 
of this objective, for years now China has been engaged in a 
naval military growth aimed at both the construction of a navy 
capable of performing military as well as humanitarian opera-
tions outside China’s coastal areas and at the protection of its 
trade interests, especially in light of growing regional tensions 
with the United States and India. The necessity to move now 
into the military realm is a “reverse of the Mahanist idea of 
42 U.S. Department of  Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military And Security 
Developments Involving The People’s Republic Of  China 2011, Washington D.C., 2011, 
p. 2, cited in S.J. Blank, “Dragon Rising: Chinese Policy In Central Asia”, American 
Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 33, no. 6, 2011, p. 270.
43 S. Miracola, “The Indo-Pacific ‘Encirclement’: How Is China Reacting?”, 
Commentary, ISPI, 2018.
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commercial ships following the warships”44.
It is clear that for Beijing, the protection of trade routes is mo-
tivated above all by the need to meet the goals of its economic 
growth. For instance, 80% of the oil imported by Beijing pass-
es through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca before 
reaching the South China Sea. For China, therefore, the Indo-
Pacific routes are vital corridors (生命线 – shengming xian) for 
its energy survival. It is essential, then, to be able to defend 
them against possible adversaries45. For example, a naval block-
ade at the Strait of Malacca, in Southeast Asia, which would 
halt the supply of oil and other necessary resources, would pose 
a challenge to China’s domestic stability. This concern had al-
ready been expressed in 2003 by the then-Chinese President 
Hu Jintao who referred to the “Malacca Dilemma” (马六甲困
局–maliujia kunjun) when talking about the so-called choke-
points of Southeast Asia46.
This geopolitical commitment underlines China’s historical 
geographical vulnerability: a wide maritime and land border 
to protect itself against adversaries. Therefore, one of the ma-
jor drivers of China’s ports expansion concerns Beijing’s desire 
to minimise its maritime vulnerability by also shortening its 
supply routes; in other words, finding a way to diminish the 
so-called “tyranny of distance”47. In so doing, China is trying to 
establish its presence (both military and otherwise) in various 
ports along the Indian Ocean in order to protect its maritime 
corridors. This highlights the so-called dual-use strategy, name-
ly: use of ports for both civilian and military purposes.
The second reason behind China’s ports expansion con-
cerns Beijing’s desire to extend its own influence throughout 
44 You Ji, “China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy”, Asia Policy, no. 22, 
2016, p. 14.
45 D. Thorne and B. Spevack, Harbored Ambitions. How China’s Port Investments are 
Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific, C4ADS, 2017, p. 16.
46 I. Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’”, China Brief, vol. 6, no. 8, 2006.
47 J.W. Garver, “Diverging Perceptions of  China’s Emergence as an Indian Ocean 
Power”, Asia Policy, no. 22, 2016, p. 56.
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the region to realise both its hard and soft power objectives. 
Specifically, this influence could also be achieved through the 
so-called “military operations other than war” (MOOTW – 非
战争军事行动 – fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong in Chinese). 
They refer to humanitarian and anti-piracy operations. China 
already experienced such a crisis scenario – the collapse of the 
Libyan government in 2011. At the time, the Chinese govern-
ment had to develop its own maritime forces for extracting its 
citizens from areas of crisis.  
In line with its own strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific, 
China is establishing its military presence also in Vanuatu, a 
tiny republic located in the Pacific Ocean. Since this outpost 
lies outside China’s traditional areas of geopolitical interest, it is 
clear that such a move responds more to Beijing’s overall objec-
tive to extend its presence throughout the region than its own 
intimate necessity to protect the sea lines of communication. 
In fact, this prospective Chinese base would create favourable 
conditions for checking Australia’s moves, especially in light of 
Canberra’s involvement in what may be the revival of the Quad. 
At the same time, this action would further enhance Beijing’s 
ability to monitor US actions in Guam48.
The second element, a direct result of the first, concerns 
China’s new maritime strategy, which also encompasses the 
Indo-Pacific. The most valid explanation is offered by the 2015 
China’s Military Strategy White Paper49. It illustrates Beijing’s 
desire to develop a blue-water navy fleet, able to carry out op-
erations for offshore protection (远海护卫– yuanhai huwei). 
The document has also labelled it as “frontier defence”, that 
is, the protection of the new Chinese frontiers abroad direct-
ly related to Beijing’s own national and security interests. This 
stands in contrast to Chinese traditional defence operations, 
carried out near the coast (近海防御 –jinhai fangyu), for which 
China’s coastal fleet (green-water navy) would have been already 
48 S. Miracola (2018).
49 “China’s Military Strategy - White Paper”, Full Text, English.Gov.Cn, 2015.
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sufficient. The creation of a blue-water navy is crucial according 
to the new national defence document, since it highlights the 
importance of moving from one maritime theater of operation 
(the Pacific Ocean) to two (the Pacific and Indian oceans)50.
Moreover, this strategic shift also entails the so-called “1.5 
war” doctrine, which refer to China’s plan to build a military 
capability able enough to withstand one major war on one 
front while containing the military operations occurring on the 
other. Namely, China is trying to find a way to face a major war 
in the East or South China Sea against, for instance, the US, 
while also facing the possibility of an Indian attack on its land 
frontier or vice versa51.
The establishment of a high seas fleet would facilitate the 
expansion of the Chinese military presence at the regional and 
global level and would help Beijing to counter Indian and US 
attempts to encircle China. Taking New Delhi into Beijing’s 
strategic calculation, China is creating, in the Indian Ocean (Sri 
Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), what has been de-
fined as the strategy of the “pearl chain” (珍珠链 – zhenzhu-
lian), not be misunderstood for the so-called “string of pearls”, 
which simply envisages the creation of logistical support points 
in the Indian Ocean. Unlike the string of pearls, the pearl chain 
consists in the attempt to physically control the main strategic 
ports of the Indian Ocean, so as to form a combat-oriented 
containment line directed at India. New Delhi, for its part, 
under the Modi presidency, has launched an intense program 
of military modernisation. The Indian navy is expanding into 
what the government refers to as its area of influence. The re-
sults of this new Indian assertiveness have already manifested 
themselves in 2017, first when New Delhi sent its own mili-
tary unit to the Strait of Malacca with the aim of monitoring 
the commercial flow of the area, and then through the military 
standoff with China on the Doklam plateau, located between 
50 You Ji (2016), p. 26.
51 Ibid.
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Bhutan, India, and China; clear signs of the Indian will to con-
trol Chinese expansionism.
As a result, Beijing’s crucial aspects of its developing Indo-
Pacific strategy – ports expansion and blue-water navy – are 
two assets to be closely monitored for the future strategic in-
teraction within the region. The ports, in fact, are considered 
strategic support points (战略支点 – zhanlue zhidian)52, in or-
der to both protect the maritime routes for the transportation 
of the necessary resources for Beijing’s economy and to extend 
the Chinese influence at regional and global level. Chinese in-
fluence that could also be the result of a more assertive foreign 
policy, which tries to find a way to counter-encircle Beijing’s 
direct antagonists. 
Conclusions
The Indo-Pacific represents a new strategic scenario that will 
shape Asian politics, economy,  and security in the years ahead. 
It will be a geopolitical instrument necessary to connect emerg-
ing and developed countries, such as India and other African 
countries on one hand and Japan and Australia on the other. 
Furthermore, it is also an American attempt to gain a foot-
hold into the Asian continent, which could be more persistent 
with respect to the previous strategic policies that the American 
administration have been adopting so far. For example, the 
above-mentioned “pivot to Asia”, proposed by the Obama 
administration in 2011, has not achieved the desired results, 
specifically the containment of China and the increase of 
American power in the region. The Indo-Pacific strategy is an-
other attempt to critically check China’s expansion, especially 
now that the BRI is becoming more and more pervasive within 
the geopolitical logic governing the Asian continent. The Indo-
Pacific strategy, therefore, does not look only at the security 
dimension, but also at the economic and infrastructural level, 
52 D. Thorne and B. Spevack (2017), p. 24.
Geopolitics by Other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality54
so as to challenge the Chinese investment system along the One 
Belt One Road. 
China’s Indo-Pacific strategy follows two directions. First, 
China is trying to develop a strategy that is coterminous to its 
overall Belt and Road Initiative. In other words, the economic 
and infrastructural projects developed so far will still be playing 
a major role within any type of strategic logic China is willing 
to develop for the Indo-Pacific.
The second direction of China’s Indo-Pacific strategy direct-
ly concerns its ports expansion and its maritime development. 
The former one envisages China’s ability to extend its infra-
structure throughout the Indo-Pacific both for economic – and 
therefore commercial – and security reasons. Through ports 
acquisition, China is becoming a crucial actor in the regional 
strategic dynamics.
In relation to this, the latter element, the maritime devel-
opment, expresses China’s willingness to develop an efficient 
navy and a comprehensive maritime doctrine, which could 
back China’s economic and ports expansion. A stronger navy 
backed by a more sophisticated military doctrine would defi-
nitely strengthen China’s ability to project power abroad, there-
fore becoming a stronger opponent in the international arena. 
A stronger opponent that the United States is now willing to 
counter by adopting a more comprehensive geopolitical strat-
egy that is not limited only to the military field but also en-
compasses the infrastructural and economic level, as the US is 
trying to challenge China also on those areas for which it still 
assumes to be holding a strong supremacy.     
3.  An Administration at War with Itself: 
     The New US Strategy 
     for the Indo-Pacific
Brad Glosserman
If a single principle guides the Trump administration’s strate-
gic thinking, it is the return of “great power competition”. The 
US National Security Strategy adopted that framework, and it 
has shaped policy and pronouncements ever since. In Asia, the 
primary “great power competitor” is China, and responding to 
“the China challenge” has consumed policymakers since the 
Trump administration took office (and even before). The recog-
nition and subsequent declaration of a competition with China 
is not a strategy, however, and the US has struggled to put meat 
on the bones of its approach towards China ever since. 
The first real attempt to articulate a strategy to deal with 
China occurred in the fall of 2017 when then-Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson spoke of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific region. 
Since then, this concept has become the framework for the US 
thinking about and policy toward the region. This chapter ex-
plores the history of the “Indo-Pacific” as a strategic referent, 
its meaning, and the US government policy toward this vital 
region. It concludes with a criticism of the US approach and 
anticipates its evolution.
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Trump and the Art of Rebranding  
While Tillerson’s October 2017 speech at the Washington-
based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
announced the Trump administration’s formal embrace of the 
Indo-Pacific concept, the idea has a long provenance. Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first to speak of an “Indo-
Pacific” partnership in an August 2007 address to the Indian 
Parliament. The Obama administration adopted that outlook 
to define the geography of its “rebalance to Asia”. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton used the term in her seminal article 
“America’s Pacific Century”, while former US President Barack 
Obama spoke of the need to integrate the two oceans in his 
November 2011 speech to the Australian Parliament.  Clinton’s 
frenetic Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Kurt 
Campbell was an evangelist for the notion as well. 
Soon after, the term was in vogue throughout the region. In 
2013, Australian analyst Rory Medcalf argued that “Asian geo-
politics is abuzz with talk of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and noted that the 
phrase had been “thoroughly inducted into the U.S. rhetorical 
armory”. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi picked it up 
in 2012, and Australia officially embraced the term in its 2013 
Defence White Paper. Southeast Asian leaders also endorsed the 
concept. After Tillerson deployed the term in his CSIS speech – 
19 mentions no less – it became the standard term of reference 
for US policy: it was in President Trump’s speeches during his 
November 2017 Asia tour (although he sometimes referred to 
“the Indo-Asia-Pacific”), the National Security Strategy, and all 
subsequent documents, as well as speeches in the region by all 
US officials. 
In fact, the ideas that underpinned “the Indo-Pacific” predat-
ed those mentions. In the late 1980s, Adm. Thomas Hayward, 
head of US Pacific Command, developed war-fighting plans 
that assumed a single operational theatre of the two oceans. 
His successors have inherited that outlook: when Adm. Harry 
Harris was Head of US Pacific Command (PACOM) (from 
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2015-2018), he liked to say that his area of operations (AO) 
ranged “from Hollywood to Bollywood, from polar bears to 
penguins”. Once the administration of US President Bill 
Clinton had time to digest the impact and significance of India’s 
1998 nuclear tests, it swallowed its anger and began serious out-
reach to India to build a more stable and enduring relationship 
with the world’s largest democracy. Clinton policy was prem-
ised on the belief that security challenges in South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean necessitated a wider perspective and a working 
relationship with Delhi. His successor, George W. Bush built 
on that foundation, especially as he sought allies and partners 
to deal with the challenge of Muslim extremists that had gone 
to ground in Central Asia. 
The Bush administration had a second, even more compel-
ling reason to embrace India in its strategic vision for the re-
gion: the rise of China. China had been recording double-dig-
it growth for nearly a decade when Bush took office, and his 
administration considered China’s growth and the channelling 
of its resources into a modernising military as an ever-more 
proximate threat. For strategists in the US government, a dem-
ocratic, market-oriented India would be critical in efforts to 
constrain China. 
Yet even as Bush strategists worried about the long-term 
implications of China’s rise, they prioritised Beijing’s role as a 
partner in the fight against terrorism. As a result, they never 
formulated an Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific strategy. The Obama 
administration dropped the “global war on terror” that Bush 
waged and emphasised instead the rise of Asia, which demand-
ed a new conceptualisation of global power dynamics. The 
“Rebalance” (or “the pivot”) was developed in response. It rested 
on the foundational significance of a linkage of the two oceans, 
and while the Trump administration rejects the language of the 
rebalance – and anything else with Obama’s fingerprints – it has 
embraced its logic.  
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Explaining the Indo-Pacific
At the CSIS, Tillerson observed that “The Pacific and the Indian 
Oceans have linked our nations for centuries [...]. As we look to 
the next 100 years, it is vital that the Indo-Pacific, a region so cen-
tral to our shared history, continued to be free and open”. A quick 
look at a map makes clear his logic. Tillerson noted that “40% 
of the world’s oil supply crisscrosses the Indian Ocean every day, 
through critical points of transit like the Straits of Malacca and 
Hormuz”. The sea lines of communication that traverse the re-
gion are the lifelines of the economies of Northeast and Southeast 
Asia; it is estimated that 90% of the energy that fuels the Japanese 
and South Korean economies travels those routes. One authorita-
tive analysis concluded that an estimated US$3.4 trillion in trade 
transited the South China Sea in 2016, nearly 21% of global 
trade. Given that so much of that trade originates in the Middle 
East (energy) or Africa (raw materials), it makes sense to identify 
the two bodies of water as a single operational theatre. 
Six months later, Tillerson was gone, but the concept had 
taken root. The next attempt to explain the administration’s 
thinking about the Indo-Pacific, which by then was called “a 
strategy”, was offered by Alex Wong, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asia and the Pacific, in an April briefing to the 
press. Wong noted that central to the logic of the Indo-Pacific 
strategy was the phrase “free and open”. Tillerson had used those 
words in his speech, but merely as descriptors; Wong insisted 
that they were essential. He expanded, adding that “We want 
the nations of the Indo-Pacific to be free from coercion, that 
they can pursue in a sovereign manner the paths they choose 
[…] at the national level, we want the societies of the various 
Indo-Pacific countries to become progressively more free – free 
in terms of good governance, in terms of fundamental rights, 
in terms of transparency and anti-corruption”. Open, for the 
Trump administration, means “open sea lines of communica-
tion and open airways […], open logistics – infrastructure  […] 
open investment  […] open trade  […]”.
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Former US Secretary of Defence James Mattis1 provided the 
third attempt to put flesh on the bones of the Indo-Pacific strat-
egy in remarks to the Shangri-La Dialogue, the IISS defence 
meeting that is held in Singapore each year. Mattis described 
the Indo-Pacific strategy as “a subset of our broader security 
strategy” which involved “deepening alliances and partnerships 
as a priority”. Central to its implementation is deepening en-
gagement with existing regional mechanisms as well as seizing 
on new opportunities for multilateral cooperation. From his 
perspective – and it is important to note that it is the Secretary 
of Defence who is speaking – there are four main themes to 
the Indo-Pacific strategy: expanding attention on the maritime 
space by helping partners build naval and law enforcement ca-
pabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection 
of maritime orders and interests; interoperability, to ensure that 
the US military can more easily integrate with others; strength-
ening the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance; 
and private sector-led economic development with no empty 
promises or surrender of economic sovereignty.
The fourth attempt to explain the Indo-Pacific strategy was 
made by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a late July 2018 
speech on the eve of his departure for a tour of Southeast Asia. 
Perhaps stung by criticism that the strategy lacked, despite its 
rhetoric, an economic component, his remarks focused on eco-
nomic engagement. He reiterated the region’s “great importance 
to American foreign policy”, as it is “one of the greatest engines 
of future global – of the future global economy, and it already 
is today”. Honing the language that Wong served up just three 
months earlier, he explained that by “free” the US means every 
nation is “able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by 
other countries. At the national level, ‘free’ means good govern-
ance and the assurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamen-
tal rights and liberties”. Open, Pompeo continued, means that 
1 James Mattis resigned as US Defence Secretary on December 20, 2018, one day 
after Trump announced the withdrawal of  US military troops from Syria.
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all regional countries “enjoy open access to seas and airways. 
We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime 
disputes. […] Economically, ‘open’; means fair and reciprocal 
trade, open investment environments, transparent agreements 
between nations, and improved connectivity to drive regional 
ties […]”.
He then articulated the “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision”. In 
it, the US aspires to “a regional order, of independent nations 
that can defend their people and compete fairly in the interna-
tional marketplace. We stand ready to enhance the security of 
our partners and to assist them in developing their economies 
and societies in ways that ensure human dignity. We will help 
them keep their people free from coercion or great power dom-
ination”. In simple terms, the US seeks “strategic partnerships, 
not strategic dependency”. 
To make that vision real, Pompeo announced the creation of 
a US$113 million fund to promote public-private partnerships. 
Priorities for lending include energy, infrastructure, and digital 
connectivity: US$25 million will go to a Digital Connectivity 
and Cybersecurity Partnership, which will, among other things, 
expand US technology exports, and about US$50 million will 
go to support energy and other infrastructure needs. Officials at 
the Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC), which provides 
US government support for American businesses abroad, added 
that they hope to double the US$4 billion currently invested in 
the Indo-Pacific “in the next few years”.  
The following day, the US, Japan, and Australia unveiled a 
trilateral partnership for infrastructure investment across the 
region. Organised by OPIC, Japan’s Bank for International 
Cooperation and Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, it will focus on energy, transportation, tourism, and 
technology infrastructure. It will promote “transparency, open 
competition, sustainability, adhering to robust global stand-
ards, employing the local workforce, and avoiding unsustain-
able debt burdens”. 
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Dissecting the Indo-Pacific
US officials concede that their first year was spent developing 
and articulating the Indo-Pacific concept and the resulting 
strategy. Now, they insist that they are focused on implement-
ing that vision and closing the gap between US rhetoric and 
its actual engagement. As the administration works to put its 
strategy into effect, core principles and features have emerged 
or become clearer.  
First, the geography of the Indo-Pacific creates diplomatic 
and security imperatives. Since its two defining features are 
oceans, the resulting strategy is largely maritime in nature. This 
privileges cooperation among littoral governments, and priori-
tises programs and programs that include their navies and coast 
guards. Not surprisingly, the primary form of cooperation that 
has emerged since the concept was announced has been secu-
rity-oriented and has been operationalised in the Quadrilateral 
Dialogue, or “the Quad” that includes the US, Japan, Australia, 
and India. 
Geography also raises a basic question: what exactly does 
it include? The Indian and Pacific oceans are vast. Does the 
Indo-Pacific include all of them? Typically, the Pacific nations 
involved are from North America; there is no mention of South 
America in these designs. But some Asia-Pacific organisations, 
such as APEC (the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation fo-
rum), include South American countries such as Chile. Does 
the Indo-Pacific extend that far south? Equally unclear are the 
concept’s western limits. The US Pacific Command (recent-
ly renamed the Indo-Pacific Command) extends to India; for 
many Americans, the “Indo” component of the Indo-Pacific 
stops midway through the Indian subcontinent. By contrast, 
Japanese strategists push its boundaries all the way to Africa 
and include the Persian Gulf region as well, since the supply 
lines they seek to protect extend that far. (It helps that China’s 
ambitious foreign economic policy project, the Belt and Road 
Initiative, includes Africa). Equally, confusing is the absence of 
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“Asia” in the Indo-Pacific nomenclature. Reference to the “Asia 
Pacific” made clear that continental Asia was included. While 
much of that land mass can be included in the Indo-Pacific – 
the countries on the littoral – how much exactly that is remains 
uncertain; how far inland will Indo-Pacific projects extend? Are 
landlocked countries even included? 
Geography also puts Southeast Asia at the heart of the strat-
egy – literally. That sub-region is at the precise point at which 
the two bodies of water converge. Thus, ASEAN (Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations) assumes outsize importance in the 
implementation of any Indo-Pacific strategy. ASEAN has zeal-
ously guarded its position as convener, gatekeeper, and arbiter 
of issues of concern to the region and does so by insisting on 
“ASEAN centrality”, or the use of ASEAN-chaired institutions 
and mechanisms for regional economic and security dialogues. 
This ensures that it calls the shots when engaging larger ex-
tra-regional powers, managing the competition among them 
and maximising opportunities to maneuver among them and 
play one off the others. US officials (and indeed those of all 
outside powers engaging the region) have been and remain 
acutely aware of the need to acknowledge ASEAN centrality: 
former US Secretary of Defence Mattis mentioned the phrase 
four times in his speech and comments during the Shangri-
La Dialogue, and Secretary of State Pompeo emphasised the 
US commitment to the concept when he attended the ASEAN 
Ministerial meetings and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
in early August.  Yet while Southeast Asian governments have 
acknowledged and in some cases encouraged adoption of the 
Indo-Pacific framework, they have been slow to try to shape its 
contour and contents. 
Second, the Indo-Pacific strategy has assumed a normative 
element. Tillerson’s original speech referred to the US desire 
to ensure that the region stays “free and open”. The National 
Security Strategy mentions a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, but 
again it is merely a desired end state. When a genuine strategy 
is articulated, it is that of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, or 
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FOIP: the two adjectives have become an integral part of the 
vision. For the Trump administration (and other like-minded 
governments), this has meant an emphasis on the rule of law, 
peaceful resolution of disputes, good governance, and the pro-
tection of human rights. As Tillerson noted, “our starting point 
should continue to be greater engagement and cooperation 
with Indo-Pacific democracies”. While its proponents insist 
that respect for these values is open-ended and targets no par-
ticular country, it is clear that some governments are perceived 
as less committed, if not hostile, to them. Some Southeast 
Asian analysts have voiced considerable unease with this nor-
mative dimension to the Indo-Pacific strategy, concerned both 
by the possibility of excluding some Southeast Asian govern-
ments (which would do great damage to ASEAN unity) and the 
prospect of targeting China (a topic taken up below).   
A third key feature of the Indo-Pacific strategy is the role 
played by India. It is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage 
an Indo-Pacific strategy that did not hold out a major role for 
India. The Tillerson speech was delivered at an event sponsored 
by the CSIS India Chair and was intended to signal a more 
expansive approach to the region. As Mattis noted in June, “the 
U.S. values the role India can play in regional and global secu-
rity, and we view the U.S.-India relationship as a natural part-
nership between the world’s two largest democracies, based on a 
convergence of strategic interests, shared values, and respect for 
a rule-based international order”. As was noted, Washington 
has for nearly two decades tried to build a better relationship 
with Delhi. That effort has been fitful, but it has moved for-
ward. For his part, India Prime Minister Narendra Modi has 
embraced the language of the “Indo-Pacific” using it at his key-
note speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. But he stressed that 
“India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific region is a positive one. […] 
By no means do we see it directed at any country. […] New 
Delhi’s engagement in the area will be inclusive”. 
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Not So Fast
For many US strategists, the Indo-Pacific framework is a 
no-brainer. It is well suited to XXI century geostrategic and 
geo-economic realities, maximises US strengths – its maritime 
capabilities, its network of alliances and partners throughout 
that geographic space and its soft power – and promotes an 
effective sharing of burdens among like-minded nations. 
Unfortunately, several problems in both conception and im-
plementation threaten the success of the FOIP. Some are prac-
tical. For example, the above-mentioned disagreements over 
the geographic reach of the Indo-Pacific must be worked out 
if governments are to cooperate on missions. There must be 
agreement on the area covered if security-related cooperation is 
to be effective. There are related disagreements about the Quad 
– what its mission is, who its potential additional members 
could be, and where it will operate. There is also a tendency to 
conflate the Quad – which is merely a mechanism for regional 
security cooperation – with all such cooperation or even the 
entire Indo-Pacific strategy itself. Clarity is required.
But there are several other issues that go to the heart of the 
Indo-Pacific strategy and the resolution of which is both es-
sential to its success and extremely difficult to achieve. Here, I 
focus on just three. 
The first concerns values and the role they play in the strate-
gy. For a number of reasons, values are problematic. For a start, 
there is the question of which values are intrinsic to the strategy. 
The US and like-minded countries identify democracy as the 
starting point for cooperation, but they also speak of respect for 
the rule of law, market-oriented economies, and peaceful dis-
pute resolution. Even without being pedantic, it is hard to call 
all those things “values”: some are principles, some are policies. 
The lack of precision facilitates criticism that this element of the 
strategy is intended to justify the exclusion of countries with 
whom participants have other disagreements – in other words, 
China. More troubling is the seeming US disregard – or at least 
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that of the president himself – for values. US rhetoric continues 
to uphold human rights and values, but its policies seem mal-
leable. There is a perception that this administration is transac-
tional in its foreign policy and human rights practices can be 
overlooked if the offending government can deliver something 
of value to the United States. A related problem is that many 
governments in the Indo-Pacific do not honour these values. 
Democracy and the protection of human rights are in retreat 
in several countries in the region – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam, for example – and any 
emphasis on them is likely to alienate, antagonise, or disqualify 
them from joining the strategy.  
A second core issue is India. It has long been assumed in 
Washington that Delhi can serve as a strategic counterweight 
to China. Only India can match China in population, and its 
economic success has some optimists arguing that it will catch 
up with or even overtake its neighbour to the north. It will take 
time, but a booming Indian economy could challenge China as 
the centre of the Asian economy and counter growing Chinese 
economic influence. India is a regional power that seeks influ-
ence not only in South Asia but in Southeast Asia too. India’s 
mistrust towards China – they have fought three border skir-
mishes; four, if last year’s encounter at the Doklam Plateau is 
included – is assumed to reinforce alignment with the US. 
That is a dangerous assumption. On several levels, Washington 
and Delhi agree on policy and desired regional outcomes. Yet 
for all the overlap in outlook and orientation – they share a 
belief in democracy, both are aligned with Japan and Australia, 
and both are wary of China and see it as a potential (if not 
actual) adversary – it is not clear that this convergence permits 
the two countries to coordinate action in a meaningful way. 
Delhi remains ready to work with Beijing as well. India and 
China are revisionist powers that believe the current interna-
tional order does not reflect their interests; both are members 
of the BRICS group, which seeks a more multipolar world, and 
they have similar approaches to trade and economic reform. 
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Most important, however, is India’s commitment to sovereign-
ty, independence, and neutrality. Delhi has zealously protected 
its nonaligned status since gaining independence over a half 
century ago, and no Indian government will make choices that 
either compromise that position or even allow criticism that it 
is doing so. Delhi will likely forego cooperation – even when in 
its own interest – if there is even the apprehension of an appear-
ance of a loss of independence. 
A third concern is China. The US insists that the Indo-Pacific 
strategy is not intended to contain or counter China. Officials 
argue that it is an open and inclusive concept, and all countries 
that adhere to the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific 
can join. When US officials discuss the Indo-Pacific, they don’t 
mention China or they instead point out that “it is not just 
about China”.  Yet the formulation of a “Free and Open Indo-
Pacific” makes it impossible to miss the anti-Chinese intent. 
When officials explain that “free” means “free from coercion”, 
the only regional capital that seems – from the US perspective 
– to limit the choices of other countries is Beijing. In addition, 
the effort to ensure greater freedom for regional countries – in 
terms of governance, fundamental rights, transparency, and an-
ti-corruption – is a stark counterpoint to the guiding principles 
of the Chinese political model. And “open”, as explained by US 
officials – abiding by rules, not forcing technology transfer, not 
favouring national champions, not stealing intellectual proper-
ty – also seems to identify China as the primary threat. Finally, 
the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy high-
lights “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive 
visions of world order [that] is taking place in the Indo-Pacific 
region”.  That framework would seem to exclude the possibility 
of cooperating with Beijing within an Indo-Pacific strategy. 
The US cannot afford a wholly antagonistic relationship with 
China, however. The two countries’ economies are deeply in-
tegrated. China is the largest holder of US Treasury Bills; it 
is critical to the supply chain of US companies and is a vital 
market for US agricultural and industrial goods. China is the 
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source of many of the low-cost goods that US consumers buy. 
The two countries must work together if they are to solve prob-
lems that both governments prioritise: North Korea’s nuclear 
program, Islamic extremism, cybersecurity, reducing the risk 
of inadvertent conflict, among a long list. As the two largest 
economies in the world, the two largest greenhouse gas emit-
ters, nuclear weapon states, holders of permanent seats on the 
United Nations Security Council, the US and China must find 
a modus vivendi. 
The US must also be wary of identifying China as an adver-
sary because it would force nations in the Indo-Pacific region to 
choose between the two – and it is not clear which they would 
pick. Historically, countries throughout the region have relied 
on the United States for their security even as China has be-
come more important to their economies. Many of those gov-
ernments prefer a distant power as an external balancer and fear 
that China would not be as benevolent if it were to assume that 
role. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian officials and experts invari-
ably say that they do not want a line drawn through the region 
and do not want to be forced to pick between Washington and 
Beijing.  The US, Japan, Australia, and India over a decade ago 
attempted to form a quadrilateral security arrangement, but 
that effort collapsed when Canberra got apprehensive about 
Chinese objections to the plan. 
Wrong-Headed Economics
The biggest problem for the Indo-Pacific strategy, however, is its 
economic component. The administration is right to note that 
the world is increasingly dominated by great power competi-
tion. But while that competition may assume a military charac-
ter, today its primary form is economic. China has recognised 
the challenge and responded accordingly. It set up the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road 
Initiative – which is anticipated to be the world’s largest de-
velopment program, reaching trillions of dollars – to fill Asia’s 
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yawning infrastructure gap, winning friends and extending its 
influence in the process. The Trump administration, however, 
has been slow to respond, rolling out the economic dimen-
sion of its strategy only in mid-summer in Secretary Pompeo’s 
above-mentioned speech. The US program is dwarfed by the 
scale of China’s efforts. Pompeo explained that the discrepancy 
reflects both a US preference for a modest government role and 
the fact that it is a down payment on a larger project to reor-
ganise and rationalise the US aid bureaucracy. He also argued 
that the way that the US does business works to its advantage: 
“With American companies, citizens around the world know 
that what you see is what you get: honest contracts, honest 
terms and no need for off-the-books mischief”. 
Unfortunately, a bigger problem hampers US efforts to com-
pete with China on the economic front: the administration’s 
understanding of economics is flawed and its singular determi-
nation to rectify US trade imbalances and redirect investment 
back to the United States undermines US policy. No reputa-
ble economist believes that trade imbalances have any real im-
pact on American economic ills. Worse, the stated objective of 
Trump administration policy is to bring money – either in the 
form of investment or via trade – home, to spur job and wage 
growth in the US. In other words, the US goal at its most basic 
level is to take money away from trade and business partners.
The execution of US economic policy has compounded these 
problems. One of Trump’s first acts upon entering the White 
House was to withdraw the United States from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), the 12-member trade agreement 
that sought to develop a new regional economic architecture 
and ensure that the US was one of its principal creators.  That 
single act did tremendous damage to US leverage and influence 
over regional Asian economic policy. Since then, the US has 
embarked on a unilateral effort to rewrite global trade rules and 
outcomes, protesting World Trade Organization (WTO) dis-
pute settlement procedures and imposing tariffs and sanctions 
on trade partners and practices it deems unfair. Most worrying, 
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the administration has resorted to the use of “national secu-
rity” justifications for those actions, rendering them virtually 
unreviewable. 
Many US complaints about trading partner behaviour, es-
pecially that of China, are valid. Annual reports from cham-
bers of commerce in China detail long lists of complaints about 
Chinese government behaviour and the resulting “tilt” in the 
domestic market.  China’s state-owned enterprises have nav-
igated WTO rules to reduce constraints on their behaviour. 
The only way that Chinese behaviour will change is if a large 
number of key trading partners establish and maintain a united 
front against it. Unfortunately, US economic unilateralism has 
antagonised many of its most important allies in that effort. 
Ironically, China now claims to be a key supporter of the global 
economic order and charges the US with being the principle 
danger to its survival. 
Moving Ahead 
In this environment, the success of the Indo-Pacific strategy, 
despite its underlying logic and appeal, is not guaranteed. To 
better establish conditions for its success, the US should first 
ensure that the strategy is implemented visibly. There must be 
evidence that Washington is prioritising the Indo-Pacific in 
budgets, staffing, and attention. The most powerful critique of 
the rebalance was that its rhetoric was never matched by the 
reality of US policy. Other regions commanded more attention, 
resources, and billets than did the Asia Pacific. Expertise and 
analysis were focused elsewhere. 
Most significantly, the US must continually engage the re-
gion. Former Defence Secretary Mattis has made regular visits 
to the region, and Secretary of State Pompeo has joined various 
ASEAN meetings and processes. Unfortunately, his leading role 
in negotiations with North Korea reduces time for other initia-
tives; at some point, he must hand that job off to the special en-
voy for North Korea, although crises elsewhere in the world will 
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also demand his attention. The US needs an Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asia and the Pacific and the fact that the po-
sition is unfilled nearly two years into the administration’s first 
term is inexplicable and counterproductive to US interests in 
the region. The president’s decision to not go to the 2018 East 
Asian Summit and the APEC Leader’s Meeting raises additional 
questions about US commitment.
It would be helpful if the US abandoned an economic logic 
that is illogical at best and inimical to US interests at worst, but 
the president’s commitment to “Making America Great Again” 
and his conviction that he is the smartest man in every room 
he enters suggest that such a shift is not forthcoming. A recog-
nition and appreciation of the value of allies would eliminate 
much of the concern and doubt about the US security com-
mitment to the region and make implementation of the Indo-
Pacific strategy much easier. In other words, in many ways, the 
US must fight its impulses to make that strategy real.
4.  India and the Pacific Ocean: 
     The “Act East” Between Trade, 
     Infrastructure and Security
Jagannath P. Panda
New Delhi’s approach to the Pacific world is a growing testimo-
ny of the role of India as an Indo-Pacific power. The ambition 
to engage and enhance New Delhi’s strategic presence is one of 
the most important aspects of India’s approach to the Pacific 
World – the Pacific Ocean and the Pacific Island Countries 
(PICs). This is aptly reflected in Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue on 1 June 2018, 
stating how India’s engagement with the PICs is witnessing a 
“new phase of engagement” to bridge the “distance of geogra-
phy through shared interests and action”1. As India’s “Act East” 
policy is witnessing changes in political, economic, and security 
outreach in the larger Indo-Pacific calculus, the Pacific Ocean 
will undoubtedly continue to grow as an important geo-strate-
gic maritime region in Indian policy configuration. This chap-
ter evaluates the strategic significance of the Pacific Ocean in 
Indian foreign policy and examines how it is commensurate 
with India’s “Act East” Policy (AEP) between trade and econo-
my, infrastructure, and security outreach of India in the region. 
The chapter argues that India’s growing adherence to the Pacific 
* The author would like to thank Ms. Nivedita Kapoor and Ms. Atmaja Gohain 
Baruah for their research assistantship for this chapter.
1 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2018, Ministry of  
External Affairs, Government of  India.
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world is an undertaking moving beyond limited engagement 
in the immediate maritime periphery and enriching its overall 
Indo-Pacific stature as a power through improved presence in 
the Pacific Ocean and particularly, among the PICs. 
The Pacific Ocean in India’s “Act East” Policy
Among many other parameters, reaching out to the “extend-
ed neighbourhood” in the Asia-Pacific, now increasingly la-
beled as the Indo-Pacific, has been one of the principal as-
pects of India’s “Act East” policy2. While promoting strategic 
contact ranging from economic cooperation to cultural ties 
in the “extended neighbourhood” is the principal objective, 
enhancing connectivity between Northeast India and the im-
mediate neighbourhood of Southeast Asia – from the Bay of 
Bengal to the Mekong region – has been the other principal 
narrative of India’s “Act East” policy3. The official parlance 
of India’s “extended neighbourhood” concept is more than a 
decade old and was outlined in 2006 by the then Minister 
of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee. He said that India’s 
political, economic, and defence engagement with West Asia, 
Central Asia, Southeast Asia, as well as with the Indian Ocean 
Region (IOR), explained this phenomenon4. This concept 
of “extended neighbourhood” suggests a classic mixture of 
soft power as well as hard power projection with continuous 
political, economic, and ideational engagements that India 
steadily employs in different regions of the world5. In East 
2 Act East Policy, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of  External Affairs, 
Government of  India, 23 December 2015.
3 Ibid. 
4 P. Mukherjee, “India’s Foreign Policy: A Road Map for the Decade Ahead” 
Speech, 46th National Defence College Course, MEA Media Centre, 15 
November 2006.
5 J. Panda, “India in East Asia: Reviewing the Role of  a Security Provider”, in S.D. 
Muni and V. Chadha (eds.), Asian Strategic Review 2015: India as a Security Provider”, 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Pentagon Press, New 
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Asia, engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and other multilateral forums such as the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Mekong-Ganga 
Cooperation (MGC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 
and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) are other 
principal aspects of India’s “Act East” policy. What is impor-
tant to note that India factors the maritime domain as one of 
the important aspects of its “Act East” policy, and hence, a 
growing interest towards the “Pacific Ocean” is clearly visible 
on India’s part, especially from June 2014 onwards. 
Dedicating the naval craft INS Vikramaditya to the nation, 
Prime Minister Modi contextualised the operational history of 
Indian Navy as key to securing India’s “maritime trading in-
terests”. He emphasised India’s growth story as being linked 
to India’s maritime security and said that it was necessary that 
India secure and keep the sea-lanes open to improve commerce.6 
Therefore, the importance of the Pacific Ocean needs to be un-
derstood in terms of India’s rising commercial interests in the 
maritime domain, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. More than 
this, New Delhi’s growing tryst towards the Pacific Ocean is a 
reflection of four issues: securing sea-lanes of communications 
(SLOCs); growing Chinese adventurism in the Indian Ocean; 
the American Indo-Pacific strategy or the previously “pivot to 
Asia” strategy; and, more importantly, India’s growing ambi-
tion as a power in the Indo-Pacific region. These issues are in-
ter-linked and instrumental for India’s growing exposure to the 
Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, an assessment of India’s increas-
ing adherence to the Indo-Pacific security balance, previous-
ly termed Asia-Pacific security calculus, explains New Delhi’s 
growing interests in the Pacific Ocean. 
Delhi, 2015, pp. 213-229.
6 Narendra Modi, “PM dedicates INS Vikramaditya to the nation”, 14 June 2014; 
A. Aneja, “Secure sea lanes can drive India’s growth story: Modi”, The Hindu, 14 
June 2014.
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The United States has termed India as a partner in its pre-
vious “pivot to Asia” strategy and in its current “Indo-Pacific” 
strategy. US President Donald Trump’s 2017 National Security 
Strategy viewed India as a “leading global power” in the Indo-
Pacific7. Even the US Pacific Command has been renamed as 
the US Indo-Pacific Command, symbolising India’s centrality 
in its greater Indian Ocean Strategy. The renaming exercise was 
not to downscale the importance of Pacific Ocean; rather, the 
US sought to establish strategic compatibility with the chang-
ing maritime environment by assigning more significance to 
India. A corollary of this is aptly noticed in India-US 2+2 di-
alogue Joint Statement which states how both sides are aiming 
to “work collectively with other partner countries” in the Indo-
Pacific and beyond8. This is one factor that is currently encour-
aging India to show more interest towards the Pacific Ocean 
while upgrading its Indian Ocean maritime presence. 
Fundamentally speaking, New Delhi visualises the “Pacific 
Ocean” as an extension of India’s security calculus in pro-
tecting the IOR environment. The importance of the Pacific 
Ocean and the PICs are growing in India’s maritime outreach 
– partly due to India’s drive to extend maritime outreach to the 
Pacific Ocean and partly due to its growing diplomatic engage-
ment amidst the increasing presence of other major powers 
in the PICs. Though India’s naval adventurism in the Pacific 
Ocean is still negligible compared to its naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean, a new mode of engagement seems to emerge 
in the Pacific world where India aims to establish a maritime 
link with its “Act East” policy through trade and economy, 
infrastructure and security. In fact, to further enrich its “Act 
East”, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Fiji, considered 
as a gateway nation for India to the PICs, in November 2014. 
7 White House, National Security Strategy of  the United States of  America, December 
2017.
8 Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, Press Information 
Bureau, Ministry of  Defence, Government of  India, 6 September 2018, http://
pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183300 
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With its large Indian-origin population, Fiji has always been 
a preferred country for India’s diplomatic and political out-
reach. Although India’s diplomatic and official contacts with 
the PICs have a long history (Table 1), Modi’s visit to Fiji was 
still significant since it was the first visit by an Indian Prime 
Minister after 31 years. 
Tab. 1 - India’s diplomatic ties with Pacific Island Countries









Samoa 1970 HCI, Wellington, New Zealand Indira Gandhi





High Commission of 
India, Port Moresby, 
PNG
Indira Gandhi
Nauru 1975 HCI, Suva, Fiji Indira Gandhi
Kiribati 1985 HCI, Suva, Fiji Rajiv Gandhi
Vanuatu 1986 HCI, Suva, Fiji Rajiv Gandhi
Solomon Islands 1987 HCI, Port Moresby, PNG Rajiv Gandhi
Republic of 
Marshall Islands 1995
Indian Embassy, Tokyo, 
Japan PV Narasimha Rao
Palau 1995 Indian Embassy, Manila, Philippines PV Narasimha Rao
Federated States
of Micronesia 1996
Indian Embassy, Manila, 
Philippines HD Deve Gowda
Cook Islands 1998 HCI, Suva, Fiji IK Gujral/ Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Tuvalu HCI, Suva, Fiji
Niue 2012 HCI, Wellington, New Zealand Manmohan Singh
* India had a diplomatic presence in Fiji since 1948, when a Commissioner was appointed so that the 
affairs of Indians in the island could be catered to, even though it was still under British rule. After Fiji 
gained independence in 1970, India decided that instead of a Commissioner, the position in Fiji would 
be that of a High Commissioner. After a coup in 1987, the Indian High Commission was closed. It was 
reopened in 1999 and has been functioning uninterrupted since. 
Source: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Government of Samoa.
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Modi’s visit revealed a far-reaching and mature foreign policy 
outreach, signifying a new trend of diplomacy9. Since then, a 
new and incremental mode of institutional, political, and cul-
tural engagement is visible between India and the PICs.
An Emerging Security Actor
To India, the Pacific Ocean and PICs are significant for a num-
ber of reasons. First, the Pacific Ocean establishes a chain of 
strategic connections between the Malacca Strait, the South 
China Sea, and India’s East. To India’s concern, the Eastern 
Naval Fleet has limited outreach up to the Malacca Strait, 
which does not really cover the PICs10. India’s maritime out-
reach is further limited since it does not have a permanent na-
val or military establishment either in the Pacific Ocean or in 
the PICs. What has however gradually drawn India’s interest 
closer to the Pacific Ocean are a number of choke points that 
are strategically important on a global level. This approach is 
reflected in India’s official release titled Ensuring Secure Seas: 
Indian Maritime Security Strategy [Ministry of Defence (Navy) 
2015]11, which states how Malacca and Singapore Straits, the 
Lombok Strait, and the Ombai and Wetar Straits are significant 
in establishing a link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific 
Ocean. Among these three choke points, considered as a “dense 
shipping zone,” the Malacca Strait is significant to India’s stra-
tegic interests since more than 70,000 ships transit annually 
through this shipping zone12. The Lombok Strait is seen as an 
“alternative passage” route for larger ship movements between 
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean whereas the Ombai 
9 Shubham, “Why Narendra Modi’s visit to Fiji is important”, One India News, 18 
November 2014.
10 B. Chandramohan, “India’s Strategic Expansion in the Pacific Islands”, The 
Diplomat, 13 June 2018.
11 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Indian Navy, Naval Strategic 
Publication (NSP) 1.2, October 2015. 
12 Ibid. 
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and Wetar Straits are known as transit routes for submarine 
movements13. Against this background, India has increasingly 
factored the PICs as an important aspect of the “Act East” pol-
icy and of its Indo-Pacific construct. 
To India, a greater presence across the Malacca Strait is of 
utmost strategic significance. Upgrading its maritime presence 
there, not only in terms of a better patrolling across the ship-
ping routes but also to keep a close eye on building “awareness” 
at the Western edge of the Malacca Strait, is an important el-
ement of India’s maritime approach14. The ultimate target be-
hind that maritime upgrading is not only controlling but also 
dominating the Indian Ocean 15. This target is closely associated 
with the rising Chinese presence in the IOR. From anti-piracy 
operations to submarines deployment in the Indian Ocean to 
the opening of a military base in Djibouti – these are just some 
of the features of the growing PLA Navy’s (PLAN) outreach 
in the Indian Ocean that has made India concerned16. To bal-
ance out this Chinese maritime adventurism, India has shown 
greater interest in the East Coast and in the Bay of Bengal ar-
eas. Developing new capabilities in the Andaman & Nicobar 
Islands and deploying P-8 to increase surveillance and strike 
capabilities are both steps in this regard17.
In the greater East Asian context, India has gradually en-
riched its defence partnerships with some of the Southeast 
Asian countries. Holding joint maritime exercises is one impor-
tant feature of India’s strategic outreach in the region. India’s 
accession to the Sabang Port in Indonesia and the Changi na-
val base in Singapore are two clear examples of India’s efforts 
to expand its defence ties in Southeast Asia. Accession to the 
13 Ibid. 
14 A. Banerjee, “Indian Navy looks to dominate Malacca Straits”, The Tribune, 12 
June 2017.
15 Ibid. 
16 D. Brewster, “India beefs up maritime surveillance near Malacca Strait”, The 
Interpreter, 26 January 2016.
17 Ibid. 
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Sabang Port is a key development for India since it is located 
at the entrance of the Malacca Strait and offers a strategic ad-
vantage to India over Chinese maritime presence in the region. 
The INS Sumitra’s recent visit to Sabang has certainly enhanced 
the image of the Indian Navy in Southeast Asia. India’s growing 
maritime exposure in the Pacific world is further attested by 
the Indian Navy’s aircraft, P81, crossing the International Date 
Line and covering the longest ferry distance from Guam to 
Hawaii and making history by being the first Indian aircraft to 
participate in the Rim of Pacific Multinational Naval Exercise 
(RIMPAC)18. 
Above all, what has encouraged India to become attentive to-
wards the Pacific Ocean is the intensity of conflict in the South 
China Sea. India is not a party to the dispute and has always 
stated that the South China Sea dispute should be resolved 
peacefully among the claimant countries through mechanism 
and instruments foreseen by international law. India’s stated 
position is also to protect its commercial interests in the South 
China Sea and ensure “navigational freedom”19. However, other 
factors beyond the South China Sea dispute have encouraged 
India to pay closer attention to the Pacific Ocean. While China’s 
increasing militarisation in the South China Sea is one factor, 
the growing importance of the South China Sea as a gateway 
for shipping in East Asia and the linkage between the Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean have obliged many countries including 
India to look at the Pacific Ocean afresh. It has significantly en-
hanced India’s “strategic vision as a growing power” in terms of 
expanding the maritime security role and responsibility across 
the two Oceans – Pacific and Indian20. As a result, India seems 
18 A. Ghosh, “Indian Navy creates history, participates in RIMPAC exercise”, 
Democracy News Live, 11 July 2018.
19 “Navigational freedom in South China Sea more important to India: 
Shivshankar Menon”, The Economic Times, July 12, 2018. 
20 A. Singh, “Maritime Security Partner in the Indo-Pacific”, in S.D. Muni and V. 
Chadha (eds.), Asian Strategic Review 2015: India as a Security Provider, Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2015, p. 
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to be engaging in building its capacities in areas such as coastal 
surveillance and hydrographic surveys in the Pacific Ocean and 
with the PICs. In fact, not having a credible maritime or mil-
itary establishment in the PICs has encouraged India to strive 
for a better strategic link between the two Oceans. This interest 
was aptly reflected in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s clos-
ing remarks at the Forum for India-Pacific Island Cooperation 
(FIPIC) Summit in Jaipur when he stated that “we also look 
forward to goodwill visits by Indian Navy to Pacific Islands”21. 
In order to enhance presence and build capacity, India is focus-
ing more on the developmental aspect of India’s strategic con-
nection with the Pacific Ocean and PICs, particularly through 
healthcare facilities, forest management, better management of 
the fishing zones, coastal and ocean studies, disaster manage-
ment support, etc. 
From a larger context, one of the most significant features of 
India’s “Act East” policy is New Delhi’s progression as an emerg-
ing security actor in East Asia. Though the PICs are not neces-
sarily clubbed under the geographic purview of East Asia, still 
the Indo-Pacific construct has established a strategic connec-
tion between Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific Ocean. 
India views this evolving context as a relevant phenomenon for 
its outreach in the Indian Ocean and the PICs. This was again 
aptly noted in Prime Minister Modi’s inaugural speech at the 
FIPIC Summit in Jaipur on 21 August 2015, where he high-
lighted how the Pacific and Indian Ocean had become the “cen-
tre of gravity” and the “fortunes of nations in and around the 
two oceans are inter-linked”22. In other words, India envisions 
the Pacific Ocean to be as relevant to India’s strategic interests as 
the Indian Ocean. As a result, one can observe India expanding 
152. 
21 Text of  PM’s closing remarks at Forum for India Pacific Island Countries (FIPIC) 
Summit, Jaipur, Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s Office, Government 
of  India, 21 August 2015.
22 PM’s opening remarks at Forum for India Pacific Island Countries (FIPIC) Summit, 
Jaipur, 21 August 2015.
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its maritime and security outreach towards the Pacific Ocean 
even though it is still in its nascent stage. 
Holding defence and naval officers’ meetings with the PICs, 
training personnel from the PICs, and building security out-
reach capacities in the South China Sea zone are key trade-
marks of this Indian growing security outreach. For instance, 
New Delhi has trained a number of Tongan defence personnel 
in different training institutes in India23. The visit of different 
naval ships to the PICs has been another appealing aspect of 
India’s growing maritime and security outreach towards the re-
gion. The visit of the INS Sumitra to Fiji in October 2016, 
the INS Satpura’s visit to the Republic of Marshall Islands in 
August 2016, the INS Satpura’s visit to the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the INS Tabar’s visit to Tonga in July 2006, and 
the INS Tarangini’s visit to Samoa in January 2004 exemplifies 
India’s interest in emerging as a better maritime security actor 
in the Pacific Ocean, especially among the PICs. India’s role in 
East Asia encompasses building-up its own presence and capac-
ities across defence, maritime, economic, and political contacts. 
New Delhi is keen to build the image and hold the responsibili-
ty of a security actor and partner rather than a security provider 
at present. Apart from a leadership vision, a security provider 
necessarily needs a stronger security presence all the time. To 
attain this status of security provider, an incremental approach 
is noticeable on India’s part to gradually enhance its maritime 
and security presence in the PICs. 
Enhancing the Indo-Pacific Relationship Character
The Pacific Ocean has an important role in India’s Indo-Pacific 
construct. Prime Minister Narendra Modi highlighted its cen-
trality in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue on 1 June 2018, 
where he described how the Malacca Strait and the South China 
23 “India-Tonga Relations”, Ministry of  External Affairs, Government of  India, 
December 2014.
India and the Pacific Ocean 81
Sea connect India to the Pacific world, particularly with the 
ASEAN countries, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and 
the Americas24. In other words, the Indian outlook towards the 
“Pacific Ocean” is an important aspect of India’s growing ex-
posure on the Indo-Pacific, which is based on a “Continental 
Connect” perspective. ASEAN, Southeast Asia, and the Indian 
Ocean are all undeniably important to India’s Indo-Pacific out-
look. Equally emerging as important is the Pacific Ocean, along 
with the PICs, which not only enhances India’s “Act East” policy 
but also offers greater support to India’s positioning as a growing 
power, primarily as an economic and maritime power. Former 
Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s speech on 20 August 
2015, further strengthen this concept, stating that “India views 
its economic linkages and cooperation with the Pacific Island 
Countries as an ‘extension of India’s ‘Act East’ policy”25. This 
Indian perspective not only is based on the bilateral turf of 
India’s relations with the PICs but also aims at greater economic 
and strategic cooperation in areas unexplored before. 
Besides, the need to improve the growing connectivity be-
tween the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and the renaming of 
the US Pacific Command into Indo-Pacific Command by the 
US26 is encouraging India to attach increasing importance to 
the Pacific Ocean. In other words, India foresees the PICs and 
the Pacific Ocean as an extension of its “Act East” policy to 
have a greater economic outreach in the rapidly evolving trad-
ing environment in the Indo-Pacific region. India anticipates 
that the Pacific Ocean and the PICs will witness greater pres-
ence of commercial and military maritime traffic, especially by 
major powers, in the wake of the conclusion of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiation 
24 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue…, cit.
25 “Pacific Island countries are a key factor in India’s extended ‘Act East’ policy, 
says President”, Press Information Bureau, President’s Office, Government of  
India, 20 August 2018.
26 T. Copp, “INDOPACOM, it is: US Pacific Command gets renamed”, Military 
Times, 30 May 2018. 
Geopolitics by Other Means. The Indo-Pacific Reality82
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11). India is not a part 
of the TPP-11 and hence, cannot expect this model to create 
an optimistic economic environment in India’s favour in the 
region. That is not the case with the RCEP, which is the arch of 
East Asian economic environment. India has been an integral 
part of the RCEP negotiations from the beginning which is 
aligned with India’s “Act East” policy. Aligning economically 
more closely with Australia and New Zealand, the two main 
countries across the Pacific and also ASEAN dialogue partners, 
is another prime objective of India. The objective is to bridge 
the gap of India’s economic outreach and try to establish a stra-
tegic connection between the ASEAN and the PICs. 
One of the principal modes of interaction between India and 
the PICs in recent years is India seeking to institutionalise its 
foothold within the region. The Pacific has not really figured 
as a significance strategic region for India’s regional framework 
until recently. China’s growing foreign policy outreach in the 
region have encouraged many countries in the world to focus 
on the Pacific Ocean and on the PICs, including India. Besides, 
the growing significance of the PICs in world politics have en-
couraged India to see the region more intently. As a result, India 
has started an engagement policy through the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), 
the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)27. India is a dialogue 
partner at the PIF and an observer member at the APEC. In 
fact, India’s attempt to become a member of the APEC is a 
two-decade long affair through which New Delhi is continu-
ously trying to institutionalise its relationship with the Pacific 
economies. India’s application for APEC membership was not 
successful in both 1997 and 2007 when the discussion over in-
clusion of new members to the APEC was high on the agenda28.
27 B. Balakrishnan, “India’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands”, Indian Foreign 
Affairs Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, October/December 2015, p. 357. 
28 J.P. Panda, “Beijing’s APEC Call on India: A New Twist in India-China Power 
Politics?”, IDSA Issue Brief, 5 August 2014.
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The 1990s, India was denied APEC membership on the ac-
count that its economy was neither competitive enough nor 
integrated into the global economic system. Besides, India did 
not pursue the APEC membership seriously due to its frequent-
ly changing governments29. Now, with New Delhi’s observer 
status within the APEC, India’s prospect for APEC member-
ship has grown considerably. With the Indian economy grow-
ing and becoming more open and free for trade and investment, 
New Delhi envisions greater involvement with the economies 
of the Asia-Pacific. Even though Asia-Pacific as a geopolitical 
construct is fast becoming secondary to the Indo-Pacific con-
struct, India is still pursuing stronger ties with the Asia-Pacific, 
through ASEAN, RCEP, ARF, ADMM+, etc. Rather, India’s 
role and prominence is evidently becoming more institutional-
ised within and outside its “Act East” policy. To further enhance 
this process, the Indian government has encouraged a new re-
gional approach – carry forward trade and investment engage-
ment and infrastructure development with a range of countries 
in both its immediate and extended neighbourhood, including 
countries from the Pacific Ocean region. A reflection of this is 
the Forum for FIPIC. 
The inaugural FIPIC summit was held in Suva, Fiji in 
November 2014 while the second FIPIC was held in Jaipur 
in August 2015. This forum has not only institutionalised the 
relationship between India and the Pacific Island Countries but 
has also strengthened the scope of cooperation and dialogue 
and has offered a formal context to expedite exchanges between 
the two sides: a clear objective put forward by the Indian lead-
ership30. India’s growing tryst with the PICs and the FIPIC em-
29 T. Chakraborti and M. Chakraborty, “India and the Asia Pacific Region: 
Dilemma of  a Changing APEC Mindset”, Asia-Pacific Journal of  Social Sciences, 
Special Issue, no. 1, December 2010, p. 8.
30 President of  India’s message on the occasion of  constitution day of  Marshall Islands, Press 
Information Bureau, President’s Secretariat, Government of  India, 1 May 2017. 
Also see, Text of  PM’s closing remarks at Forum for India Pacific Island Countries (FIPIC) 
Summit, Jaipur, Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s Office, Government 
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phasised the “new thrust” of India’s diplomacy that takes on 
board both the smaller and major powers together31.
A closer assessment of the two FIPIC summits indicates how 
India’s relationship with the PICs is becoming more versatile 
and systematic. In this regard, a number of patterns have already 
emerged. First, FIPIC has been instrumental in creating a plat-
form for intellectual exchange between India and the PICs. The 
India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference is 
the finest example of this. This conference addressed issues such 
as health, disaster management, climate change, International 
Solar Alliance (ISA), and blue economy32. What is, however, 
important is that this conference facilitates the exchange of 
knowledge and experience and takes forward public-private 
partnerships between India and the participating island coun-
tries from the Pacific. 
Second, both the FIPIC and the India-Pacific Islands 
Sustainable Development Conference promote dialogue be-
tween Indian governing bodies and research institutes with the 
PICs institutions and bodies. The prime aim behind this type of 
cooperation is to enhance a specific level of cooperation in three 
sectors: knowledge sharing, technology sharing, and capacity build-
ing33. The setting up of the FIPIC Trade Office in New Delhi at 
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry 
(FICCI) is an important step to further trade contacts be-
tween India and the PICs. The India-Pacific Islands Sustainable 
Development Conference, held on 25-26 May 2017 in Suva, 
Fiji, reflects India’s commitment to creating “sustainable part-
nerships”. The conference aimed at enhancing people-to-people 
of  India, 21 August 2015. 
31 “A Year of  Smart Diplomacy: Milestones 2015”, Year End Review 2015, Press 
Information Bureau, Ministry of  External Affairs, Government of  India, 22 
December 2015. 
32 India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference to enhance cooperation between 
India and Pacific Island Countries, Ministry of  External Affairs, Government of  
India, 12 May 2017. 
33 Inauguration of  India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference, Ministry of  
External Affairs, Government of  India, 25 May 2017. 
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dialogue and promote understanding of key issues related to 
the environment, climate change, disaster management, and re-
gional cooperation. Importantly, India announced a US$1 mil-
lion trust fund for Fiji’s Presidency on COP-23. Besides, India 
has signed several Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) to 
promote sustainable development and scientific and econom-
ic cooperation with the PICs, including the setup of Centers 
of Excellence in Information Technology (CEIT). With Fiji, 
India has signed MoUs in the areas of youth development and 
renewable agency and to enhance cooperation in broadcasting 
agencies. Sharing technology, sharing knowledge, and building 
capacity to address non-traditional security threats (NTS) are 
thus prominent in India’s outreach efforts towards the region. 
What is important to note is that these growing institu-
tional contacts between India and the PICs are not being 
established in isolation. Growing frequency of political and 
institutional contacts (Table 1) and India’s developmental ap-
proach towards the PICs (Table 2) are two significant aspects 
of India’s regional approach. Although political contacts be-
tween them may be traced back to India’s post-independence 
strategy34, in recent years the Indian leadership has shown 
a new interest towards the Island countries, and their visits 
seem to have established a new Indian confidence at the re-
gional level. Since 2014, at least nine PICs have been visited 
by the Indian political leaders (Table 3).
34 Bhaskar Balakrishnan was India’s former Ambassador to Greece and Cuba. 
In the article “India’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands” in Indian Foreign 
Affairs Journal, he writes that the special linkage with Fiji was evidenced dur-
ing the British rule in India. However, India’s formal interactions with the PICs 
started in post-independence when Indian workers were brought to Fiji to work 
on sugarcane plantations. B. Balakrishnan, “India’s Engagement with the Pacific 
Islands”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 10, no. 4, October/December 2015, 
pp. 355-357. 
Tab. 2 - India’s major development inititatives in Pacific Island Countries (2004-2018) 
Trade and commerce
• July 2005: India extended $50.4 million line of credit to Fiji for their sugar industries.
• 2009: Federated States of Micronesia was given US$73,145 for its coconut industry.
• 2011: Federated States of Micronesia granted US$100,000 for use in coconut industry.
• April 2012: Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar offered to assist Fiji in horticulture, rice and sugar.
• November 2012: High Commission of India showcased ‘India’s investment and trade potential’ in Papua New Guinea.
• November 2014: PM Narendra Modi extended a line of credit to Fiji worth US$70 million for a power plant, US$5 million fund for small scale 
enterprises and further collaboration in agricultural sectors.
• August 2015: PM Narendra Modi declared assistance to MSMEs at the FIPIC summit in Jaipur.
• June 2016: India provided US$2.2 million for the development of Small and Medium Enterprises to Fiji.
• April 2016: President Pranab Mukherjee offered Papua New Guinea a US$100 million line of credit for infrastructure.
• March 2017: Air Services agreement signed so as to enhance connectivity between India and Fiji.
• June 2018: MoS (Health) Ashwini Kumar Choubey gave US$50,000 to Tuvalu as part of development aid.
Defence / Maritime
• January 2004: INS Tarangini, a training ship of the Indian Navy, visited Samoa.
• July 2006: INS Tabar visited Tonga, which was visited by Tonga’s Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers.
• 2016: INS Satpura visited the Federated States of Micronesia and naval officers held meetings.
• August 2016: INS Satpura visited Republic of Marshall Islands and met with local dignitaries.
• October 2016: INS Sumitra visited Fiji on 26 October for agricultural purposes.
• 2017: 30 members of Tongan defence service have been trained since 2011.
Science and Technology
• July 2014: Tonga given $300,000 for setting up a Tsunami Alert System.
• October 2014: Tonga given $115,000 for information and communication technology.
• November 2014: Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) personnel to be sent for aid in health, information technology to PICs.
• September 2015: Tonga given $71,627 to build up capacity to guard against illegal transmissions.
• 2015: 300 citizens of Papua New Guinea have received technical training under the ITEC program.
• August 2015: PM Modi declared doubling ITEC seats for 13 PICs (Fiji has 110), electrifying 200 homes through solar technology, training 70
women engineers in solar, setting up an IT lab in every PIC.
• 2016: 87 Fijians were trained by ITEC during the financial year 2016-17.
• January 2017: India provided Niue with $910,700 towards setting up a 4G network on the island.
• 2017: 21 people from Kiribati have been trained by ITEC since 2011.
• 2017: 20 seats were offered to Samoa for ITEC training during the year 2017-18 while 15 were trained in 2016.
Space
• November 2014: Collaboration in space technology for better communication facilities and to improve the economy, monitor environmental
changes and aid government policies in PICs.
• August 2015: Establishment of Space Technology Applications Centre for region-wide training.
Education
• 2007: Nauru given vehicles for use by school-going children.
• 2008: US$100,000 given to Nauru to hire teachers.
• 2010: Cook Islands given US$60,000 to improve facilities in educational institutions.
• 2012: Declaration of 75 seats for technical cooperation, 25 scholarships, 53 openings for training programs for Navy and defence personnel
(10).
• 2013: Five students from Tuvalu were awarded ICCR scholarship, same as 2012.
• November 2014: PM Narendra Modi announced tele-education projects across PICs.
• August 2015: Establishing an Institute for Sustainable Coastal and Ocean Research besides Marine Biology Research Stations and providing
scholarships for college students.
• 2017: 30 scholarships were on offer to Fijian students during the year.
• 2017: A centre for excellence in information technology (CEIT) is being set up at National University of Samoa.
Culture
• July 2012: Indian Cultural Centre in Fiji sent a team of five to participate in the annual Heilala festival, Tonga.
• June 2013: Indian Film Festival organised by the High Commission of India in Papua New Guinea.
• November 2014: PM Modi during his visit to Fiji announced efforts to increase shooting of Indian movies in Fiji.
• 2016: India has worked in collaboration to organise International Film Festival in Fiji annually since 2012.
• 2017: Cultural groups have visited Nauru annually since 2015 showcasing Indian culture and traditions.
• June 2017: International Yoga Day organised in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu and Palau.
• October 2017: Festival of India held in Tonga, Tuvalu, Fiji, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Nauru and Vanuatu to promote Indian culture showcasing
its food, music, dance and languages.
• 2017: Seven Fijians have been awarded the Pravasi Bhartiya Samman since 2004.
Grant-in-Aid/Humanitarian
• April 2007: Solomon Islands was given humanitarian assistance of US$100,000 for victims of the Tsunami.
• 2009: Assisted Fiji with US$100,000 in aid to help it deal with relief efforts after the cyclone.
• March 2010: India sent humanitarian aid worth $100,000 to Fiji to deal with aftermath of cyclone Tomas.
• September 2011: MOS (EA) Preneet Kaur offered US$200,000 for improvement of healthcare facilities locally in Fiji.
• 2011: Since 2006, large portions of grant-in-aid has been utilised for provision of health facilities in Samoa.
• February 2012: Tuvalu given US$100,000 to deal with drought.
• December 2012: US$134,502 given to Kiribati to improve healthcare facilities.
• March 2013: India provided US$100,000 to help Fiji with relief and rehabilitation after cyclone Evan.
• 2013: India have given US$399,639 since 2008 for various infrastructure and other projects in Niue.
• March 2015: Aid of US$250,000 given as aid for cyclone relief to Vanuatu.
• 2016: India contributed US$100,000 towards relief efforts after cyclone Winston and supplied aid valued at $ 3 million.
• October 2016: MoS Piyush Goyal visited Solomon Islands and proposed assistance in the field of renewable energy.
• March 2017: Cook Islands given US$690,846 for community development efforts.
• May 2017: Grant-in-aid of over US$750,000 given to Republic of Marshall Islands since 2008 for use in local development, renewable energy,
communication and policy implementation.
• February 2018: US$1 million granted to Tonga to handle relief operations after cyclone Gita.
Region-Wide Development Initiatives
• June 2014: US$167,610 given to Palau as a help as it hosted the Pacific Island Forum meeting.
• September 2014: Funds approved for improving facilities in hospital in Tuvalu.
• November 2014: Increase in grant-in-aids to all PICs to US$200,000 (to be rolled over), Special Adaptation Fund of
• US$1 million, a trade office to be set up in India for the countries, training diplomats, improving healthcare facilities.
• August 2015: PM Modi declared at the FIPIC summit that diplomat training will be made more comprehensive.
• October 2016: MoS (Power, Coal, New & Renewable Energy and Mines) Piyush Goyal gave US$190,000 for schools in Vanuatu. Under the
same annual grant of US$200,000, Vanuatu will be sent energy efficient equipment.
• 2017: India is looking to further aid and cooperation in areas of health (tele-medicine and pharmaceutical sector) and sending IT experts to
PICs for project implementation and training.
Source: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Indian Navy
Tab. 3 - Visits of Indian leaders and dignitaries to Pacific Island Countries (2006-2018)
PICs Year Name of dignitaries / leaders Agreements Signed / MoUs Outcome
Fiji
2006 MOS (EA) E Ahamed Development Cooperation Agreement
Target: defence, agriculture, IT, trade, tourism 
and investment.
2011 MOS (EA) Preneet Kaur US$200,000 grant for CWM Hospital and EVMs.
2014 PM Narendra Modi
MoUs on Extending a Line of 
Credit for a Co-Generation 
Plant, engage in diplomat train-
ing and earmarking potential 
diplomatic missions.
Forum for India-Pacific Islands cooperation. 
Funding from India increased by $ 5 million.
2017 MOS (EA)Gen V. K. Singh
MoUs to set up Centres of 
Excellence in Information 
Technology with Fiji, Cook 
Islands, Nauru, Samoa and 
Niue.
Bilateral MoUs with Fiji for 
Co-operation in youth devel-
opment, renewable energy and 
media.
The India-Pacific Islands Sustainable 
Development Conference, the International 
Solar Alliance and support for India’s candida-
ture to International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea and  
International Law Commission.
2018 MOS (HRD)Satya Pal Singh --
Attended 20th Conference of the 
Commonwealth Education Ministers. Invited 






A grant worth $ 300,000 was 
given for a local government 
project regarding water and 
sanitation.
Support for India’s candidature for permanent 
seat at UNSC and cooperation in blue econo-
my, climate change, energy,  
disaster management.
Nauru 2018 MOS (Defence)Subhash Bhamre --
India offered 22 Mahindra SUVs and two 
buses worth $ 706,000. Cooperated in energy, 
infrastructure, climate change and education.
Papua New 
Guinea  2016 President Pranab Mukherjee
Four MoUs signed: Agriculture 
Research Cooperation between 
University of Technology and 
Indian Council for Agricultural 
Research, Cooperation in the 
Health Sector, $100 million 
Indian Line of Credit for 
Development of Infrastructure 
in PNG and Setting up a 
Centre of Excellence in IT by 
India in PNG.
Indian tourists to be given visa on arrival. 
The Bilateral Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement to be finalised soon. 
India will provide Anti Retro Viral drugs to 






MOS (Ministry of Science 
and Technology) Y. S. 
Chowdary
-- Supported India’s candidature for permanent status at UNSC.
Niue -- -- -- --
Palau 2017
MOS (Ministry of Science 
and Technology) YK 
Chowdary
-- Attended swearing in ceremony of president Tommy Esang Remengesau.
Cook Islands 2012 MOS (EA) E Ahamed -- 24th Post Forum Dialogue Partners Meeting.
Samoa
2012 Indian state assembly delegations -- 23rd Commonwealth Parliamentary Seminar.
2018 MoS (Tribal Affairs) JS Bhabhor --
Met PM and president of Samoa to discuss 
bilateral relations.
Solomon 
Islands -- -- --
Tonga
2007 MOS (EA) E Ahamed -- Post Forum Dialogue Partners’ Meeting
2012 Lok Sabha Speaker Meira Kumar --
Commonwealth Parliamentary Assembly Mid-
Year Executive Committee Meeting.
Vanuatu
2010 MOS (EA) Preneet Kaur -- Pacific Islands Forum Dialogue meeting.
2016 MOS for Power, Coal, Renewable Energy and Mines
MoU on Establishing India-
Vanuatu Centre of Excellence 
in IT
US$190,000 given to Vanuatu to set up 
Information technology in schools. Energy 
efficient equipment will be supplied by India  
around to US$200,000.
Tuvalu 2018 MOS (Health) Ashwini 
Kumar Choubey ---
Gave US$50,000 for development aid. 
Cooperation in matters of healthcare 
sector, energy, education, information 
technology 
was discussed.
Sources: From various open sources such as Press Bureau of India, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of Government of India etc.
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There is an upswing in India’s cultural diplomacy with the 
PICs. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Fiji in 2014 
and India’s historical and special contacts in recent years with 
Fiji have been the backbone of this political narrative. Seen as 
part of India’s “Pacific bonding”, Fiji has been the strongest link-
age India had in the region, setting an example for other coun-
tries to view India as a strong developmental partner35. Fiji has 
hosted a number of events for India, promoting the emerging 
bonding between India and the PICs. Importantly, New Delhi 
has seen Fiji as the “heart of the Pacific Ocean” and has recently 
decided to initiate a defence partnership. An MoU with Fiji in 
areas such as defence, disaster management, military training, 
and humanitarian assistance in May 2017 has strengthened the 
India-Fiji cooperation in security areas36. What is important to 
note is also that Fiji’s response to India has been equally warm. 
New Delhi is seen as a valued partner and India’s growing emer-
gence as a power in global affairs is acknowledged37. 
India’s growing Pacific bonding seems promising and balanced 
between a New Delhi as a developmental actor and a supporter of 
an inclusive order in Indo-Pacific. To enrich India’s outreach and 
posture as a power, the target is to address the “diplomacy deficit” 
in the PICs38. What is more important to note is India’s interest 
to include the PICs as global partners in international affairs such 
as climate change and the reform of the United Nations. On 
issues related to climate change, particularly on mitigation and 
adaptation, India and the PICs may not be on the same side. 
This is aptly noticed in the official stance that “India and the 
Pacific Islands share similar challenges of climate change but also 
have great opportunities for cooperation in our development 
35 M. Chand, “India & Fiji: A Pacific Bonding”, Ministry of  External Affairs: 
Government of  India, 18 November 2014.
36 “India and Fiji Sign MoU on Defence Cooperation”, Press Information 
Bureau, Ministry of  Defence, Government of  India, 29 May 2017. 
37 “Fiji Values Bilateral Relations With India-Koya”, Fiji First, 29 November 2017. 
38 M. Chand, “India & Fiji: A Pacific Bonding”, Ministry of  External Affairs, 
Government of  India, 18 November 2014.
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efforts”39. Factoring in both climate change and UN reform, 
Prime Minister Modi contextualised the relation between India 
and the PICs as a partnership of “shared aspirations and chal-
lenges”40. One of the “shared aspirations” for both sides is to gain 
more prominence internationally, through a stronger position at 
the United Nations. To India, gaining the support of the PICs for 
permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) is an important strategic objective. An appeal to the 
PICs in this regard was made by Prime Minister Modi at the 
Jaipur FIPIC summit. In return, New Delhi expressed support 
for Pacific regionalism and offered to help for better and greater 
representation of the Small Island States in international fora, 
including the possibility of an expanded and reformed UNSC in 
both permanent and non-permanent categories. 
Furthermore, visits by Indian leaders to the PICs have fur-
ther highlighted New Delhi’s willingness to offer developmen-
tal assistance to those countries. This encompasses areas such 
as science and technology, space, education, culture, and hu-
manitarian assistance. Developmental initiatives in science and 
technology and space are two main areas where India seems 
to be taking the lead. For instance, among its most ambitious 
initiatives, India has announced the establishment of a Space 
Technology Applications Centre (STAC) in one of the PICs 
and has offered support for training and development in space 
applications41. Collaboration in progressive areas such as solar 
technology, 4G networks, and the training of information tech-
nology (IT) specialists promotes India’s soft power standing as 
a developmental partner for the PICs. The increase of grants-
in-aid from US$125,000 to US$200,000, the launch of special 
training programs for PICs diplomats, and the introduction of 
e-tourist visas to promote tourism contacts are important fea-
tures of this engagement. 
39 Ibid.
40 PM’s opening remarks at Forum for India Pacific Island Countries (FIPIC) Summit, 
Jaipur…, cit.
41 Ibid.
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Conclusions
To sum up, India’s exposure in the Pacific Ocean and to the 
PICs, while still nascent, is a subject matter of incremental 
engagement. The growing importance of the Pacific Ocean 
and the rising importance of the PICs in global affairs have 
certainly encouraged India to adopt a new approach towards 
the region. India’s “Act East” policy seems to confirm that di-
rection. What has also been an encouraging aspect for India 
to revitalise its relationship towards the PICs is the strate-
gic complexity that the region offers in light of the current 
China-Taiwan dynamics. Taiwan’s diplomatic ties with six of 
the Pacific countries and the earlier US “pivot to Asia” strategy 
had always encouraged Beijing to view the PICs more serious-
ly. Chinese President Xi’s intensive policy towards the Pacific 
islands is tilting the diplomatic game of tug-of-war between 
China and Taiwan in Beijing’s favour where many Pacific 
Island Countries are reconsidering their ties with Taiwan. 
Concerned about the rising Chinese outreach in the 
Pacific, Taiwan continues to float its own outreach through 
the support of like-minded partners such as Japan, the US, 
and Australia – the three key countries in Indo-Pacific. India 
is also a key economic partner for Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. 
Taiwan-India scientific and economic cooperation has been 
progressing even though there is scope to further expand these 
contacts. The rise of the free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 
construct and Taiwan’s “New Southbound Policy” (NSP) is 
encouraging India to see both Taiwan and the PICs more in-
tently in its “Act East” policy than before. In brief, India’s 
incremental engagement towards the PICs and the Pacific 
Ocean points to the following:  first, India’s growing ambi-
tion as a maritime power, and its strategic vision to secure 
its maritime interests between the Pacific and Indian Ocean; 
second, India’s growing outreach as a power beyond the imme-
diate neighbourhood in the wake of its gradual developmen-
tal approach towards the PICs; and third, the enlarged scope 
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of India’s “Act East” policy keeping in view India’s growing 
Indo-Pacific outlook, with both the Pacific Ocean and PICs 
as necessary components. 
 
5.  Japan and the Indo-Pacific: 
     Alive and Kicking 
Axel Berkofsky
Tokyo’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” 
Japan arrived late in the Indo-Pacific, but eventually it did. And 
Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept is the core 
of Tokyo’s strategy and policies in and towards the Indo-Pacific.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formally introduced 
the FOIP strategy on the occasion of the Fourth International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) held in 
Nairobi in August 2016. Since then, the FOIP concept, Tokyo 
explains1, has taken shape and has become a strategy Tokyo is 
investing enormous resources and capital into. Although Tokyo 
obviously does not admit to that, the FOIP is at least in part 
designed as competitor to Beijing’s “Belt and Road Initiative” 
(BRI), enabling Tokyo to regain some of the economic and po-
litical clout lost over countries in East and Southeast Asia since 
Beijing announced the BRI in 2013. The main goal of Japan’s 
1 Judging by the number of  policy declarations, government-sponsored confer-
ences, and workshops covering and dealing with Japanese security and defence 
policies in the Indo-Pacific, Tokyo assigns enormous importance to the policies 
in the region. There is no doubt that China’s BRI and the massive investments 
accompanying it in the region have created a sense of  urgency among Japanese 
policymakers to seek to catch up with Beijing and offer an alternative in terms of  
cooperation and investments to the developing countries in the region.  
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FOIP is to promote what is referred to as “connectivity”’ be-
tween Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. When policymakers 
and scholars talk about “connectivity” what they usually mean 
is, above all, expansion of trade and investment ties through 
improved infrastructural links. 
Tokyo’s FOIP is complemented by the so-called “Quadrilateral 
Security Dialogue” (Quad), the Indo-Pacific security dialogue 
between Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. The 
Quad seeks to further enhance Japanese-Indian-Australian-US 
cooperation in the areas of maritime security, terrorism, and 
freedom of navigation and much of what the Quad countries 
jointly seek to achieve is also part of Tokyo’s FOIP. In the recent 
past, the four countries held talks on a rules- and norms-based 
order in the region, freedom of navigation, overflight rights, 
the rule of international connectivity, and maritime security. It 
emerged that while Japan and India – for obvious reasons relat-
ed to Chinese territorial and maritime policies in Southeast and 
South Asia – emphasise issues such as freedom of navigation, 
respect for and compliance with international law, and mari-
time security, the US and Australia emphasise military security 
cooperation as their respective priorities. 
Japan “focussing” on maritime security translates, among 
others, into the Japanese navy and coast, together with coun-
terparts from the US, India, and Australia, contributing to 
US-led so-called freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) 
and military exercises in the South China Sea. In August 2018, 
Tokyo deployed three warships to the South China Sea to hold 
joint military exercises with five Asian navies and the US from 
the end of August to October. The Japanese navy vessels made 
port calls in India, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines and during the exercise linked up with the US Navy 
deployed in the region2. While announcing the deployment of 
the vessels in August 2018, Tokyo also announced the will to 
2 See J. Johnson, “Japan to Send Helicopter Destroyer for Rare Long-Term 
Exercise in South China Sea and Indian Ocean”, Japan Times, 22 August 2018. 
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strengthen Sri Lanka’s maritime security capabilities by donat-
ing two coast guard patrol crafts to the South Asian country3.
In September 2018 then, a Japanese submarine joined for 
the first time a naval military exercise in the South China Sea in 
disputed territorial waters (claimed above all by China as part 
of what Beijing insists is part of the Chinese national territory). 
At the time, the Japanese submarine was accompanied by other 
Japanese warships, including the Kaga helicopter carrier4.
Cooperating with Europe and the EU in the form of what 
is referred to as “Quad plus” in the Indian Ocean region has 
also been thought and talked about in Tokyo in the recent 
past. However, while Tokyo undoubtedly welcomes European 
support for Japanese FOIP policies – including through na-
val patrolling in the South China Sea – European involvement 
will – at least for the time being – be limited to France and 
the UK making tangible contributions. For starters, many of 
the European naval forces – with the notable exceptions of 
France and the UK – simply do not have the naval capabili-
ties to get engaged in patrolling activities far away from home. 
Furthermore, there is very little appetite in Brussels and among 
EU policymakers for increasing European involvement in Asian 
security through naval patrolling in Asian territorial waters5.  
However, in view of Chinese territorial expansion in the South 
China Sea in complete disregard and dismissal of internation-
al law – displayed by the construction of civilian and military 
facilities in disputed islands over there – the EU insistence in 
not wanting to take sides in Asian territorial disputes (including 
3 Ibid. 
4 See e.g. “Japanese Submarine Conducts Frist Drills in South China Sea”, 
Reuters, 17 September 2018.
5 European politicians and EU officials essentially fear Chinese economic and 
political repercussions should Europe “dare” to increase its current involvement 
in Asian territorial disputes involving China. The EU’s “current involvement” is 
in essence limited to “urging all parties to solve territorial disputes peacefully”. A 
formula that is reiterated in every EU statement or declarations commenting in 
territorial disputes in Asia. 
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the ones in the China Sea involving China) certainly does not 
add to the credibility of the EU as foreign and security policy-
maker with global reach, including in Asia. Europe has enor-
mous economic and trade interests in Asia and defending a 
rules-based maritime order (which China violates in the South 
China Sea) should indeed be part of EU/European foreign and 
security policy conduct in Asia. Either way, Tokyo will probably 
continue investing resources and political capital into seeking 
to get additional like-minded partner countries and partners 
to join its FOIP’s policy vision and strategy of a free, open, 
and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. The UK, Canada, France, 
and Singapore – and also Vietnam – are at times cited as those 
like-minded countries.  
“Quality Infrastructure” 
According to the Asian Development Bank, it is estimat-
ed that developing Asia needs about US$26 trillion in infra-
structure investment from 2016 to 20306. This is where Japan 
comes in, making a very significant contribution. At the core 
of Japan’s above-mentioned FOIP is what Tokyo calls ‘quality 
infrastructure’, i.e. infrastructure development projects fund-
ed or co-funded by Japan in Asia and Africa. In May 2015, 
Prime Minister Abe announced a “Partnership for Quality 
Infrastructure”, initially providing US$110 billion for financ-
ing the construction of roads, railways, and ports in Asia7. The 
“Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiative foresees in-
frastructure spending over five years. 
Tokyo’s “Quality Infrastructure” is, at least on paper, the very 
opposite of China’s approach towards funding infrastructure 
6 See J. Sugihara, “US, Japan and Australia team on financing Indo-Pacific 
Infrastructure”, Nikkei Asian Review, 11 November 2018.
7 See M.P. Goodman, “An Uneasy Japan Steps Up”, Global Economics Monthly, 
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, vol. VII, 
no. 4, April 2018. 
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projects in Asia and Africa. Chinese infrastructure development 
policies, be it within or outside the BRI framework, are (very) 
often criticised for lacking transparency and being non-sustain-
able and exclusive. Exclusive in the sense that Chinese compa-
nies build infrastructure on a sole-source basis and claim ex-
clusive access to the infrastructure built for itself. Furthermore, 
many recipients of Chinese funds – above all the poorer devel-
oping countries in South Asia such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, or 
Sri Lanka – are feared to get caught in so-called “debt traps”: 
China is giving out loans to those countries knowing that they 
will never be able to repay them. This inevitably creates political 
dependencies and has enabled Beijing to oblige the above-men-
tioned and other countries to grant China concessions, includ-
ing of territorial nature.
Japan has more than once (indeed very often) pointed out 
that its approach towards infrastructure development policies 
aimed at increasing “connectivity” is fundamentally different 
from the Chinese infrastructure development approach applied 
in the BRI context. In 2016, Japan put that on paper. On the 
occasion of the G7 summit in Japan in 2016, Tokyo announced 
the five principles guiding its “Quality Infrastructure” projects: 
1) Ensuring effective governance, reliable operation and eco-
nomic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost as well as safety and 
resilience against natural disaster, terrorism and cyber-attack 
risks; 2) Ensuring job creation, capacity building and transfer of 
expertise and know-how for local communities; 3) Addressing 
social and environmental impacts; 4) Ensuring alignment with 
economic and development strategies including aspect of cli-
mate change and environment at the national and regional 
levels; 5) Enhancing effective resource mobilisation including 
through PPP8.
In 2016, Tokyo decided to expand the “Partnership for 
Quality Infrastructure” initiative to US$200 billion by including 
8 G7 Ise-Shima Principles For Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment, 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs Japan (MOFA), https://www.mofa.go.jp/
files/000196472.pdf.
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Africa and the South Pacific. Envisioned and ongoing invest-
ments include: 1. Nacala, Mozambique, where Japan is financ-
ing the construction of port with US$320 million; 2. Mombasa, 
Kenya, where Tokyo is funding port and related infrastructure 
with US$300 million; 3. Toamasina, Madagascar, where Tokyo 
is funding a port with US$400 million; 4. Mumbai, India, where 
Tokyo is funding a trans-harbour link with US$2.2 billion; 5. 
Matarbari, Bangladesh, where the Japanese government is fund-
ing a port and power station with US$3.7 billion; 6. Yangon, 
Myanmar, with Tokyo funding a container terminal with 
US$200 million); and 7. Dawei, Myanmar, where Tokyo is fi-
nancing a port and special economic zone with US$800 million.
Other Japanese “Quality Infrastructure” projects are: 
1. The Mombasa container port development project 
in Kenya. In October 2017, The Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA9) signed a US$340 mil-
lion loan agreement with the Kenyan government for 
the construction of a second container terminal in 
Mombasa. Mombasa port is the largest in East Africa, 
and Tokyo has granted the Kenyan government a 40-
year repayment period at an interest rate of 0.2%. 
2. The funding of the construction of the Mumbai-
Ahmedabad high-speed rail corridor10. Japan is funding 
80% of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train11 project 
through a soft loan of roughly 8 billion at an interest 
rate of 0.1%, with a tenure stretching over 50 years and 
a moratorium period of 15 years.
3.  Japanese investments in the Thilawa Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) in Myanmar/Burma. In August 2017, the 
JICA signed a loan agreement with the Myanmar Japan 
Thilawa Development Ltd (MJTD)12. 
9 Japan’s development agency affiliated with the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs.
10 See “Japan Dedicated to Making Indian Shinkansen a Reality”, The Economic 
Times, 9 November 2018.
11 The Japanese bullet train Shinkansen.
12 See Press Release Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 17 August 
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4. A US$300m gas-fired power station in Tanzania. The 
fourth project covers Japanese assistance to construct a 
gas-fired power station in Tanzania that will increase the 
country’s generating capacity by 15%. The work is con-
ducted by Japan’s Sumitomo Corporation, Mitsubishi 
Hitachi Power Systems, and Toshiba Plant Systems and 
Services.
In Southeast Asia, Tokyo is funding roads and highways in 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and is assisting the develop-
ment of Cambodia’s Sihanoukville port and the construction of 
railway lines in Thailand (from Bangkok to Chiang Mai) and 
the seaside resort town of Hua Hin. In 2016, Tokyo launched 
the Japan-Mekong Connectivity Initiative, which funds the 
establishment of the trade-promoting East-West Economic 
Corridor from the port of Danang in Vietnam through Laos 
and Thailand and on to Myanmar. Japan is also financing the 
Southern Economic Corridor that is envisioned to run from 
Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam through Cambodia and south-
ern Laos to Thailand and finally the south-eastern Myanmar 
port city of Dawei. In Dawei, Tokyo is funding the develop-
ment of a new industrial zone. In October 2018, Tokyo as-
signed US$625 million to projects aimed at reducing traffic 
congestion and improve drainage and sewerage systems in the 
Burmese capital Yangon13.
Also in 2018, Tokyo got the US and Australia to officially 
endorse its “Quality Infrastructure” concept. The three coun-
tries agreed in August 2018 to promote “Quality Infrastructure 
Development” in the Indo-Pacific region and the above-men-
tioned “Quad” is now using the term “quality infrastructure” as 
an integral part of the envisioned increased cooperation among 
Japan, the US, Australia, and India. Furthermore, govern-
ment agencies from the US, Japan, and Australia have recently 
2017, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2017/170817_01.html. 
13 B. Lintner, “Japan Offers ‘Quality’ Alternative to China’s”, The Asia Times, 18 
October 2018.
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agreed to provide joint financing for infrastructure in Asia, part 
of a three-way national cooperation on projects in the Indo-
Pacific Region. America’s Overseas Private Investment Corp., 
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and Australia’s 
Export Finance and Insurance Corp. will work together to sup-
port such energy projects as liquefied natural gas terminals, as 
well as infrastructure like undersea cables. Support will also in-
clude the provision of loans and guarantees for private-sector 
financing. 
Japanese infrastructure investments in Asia, in general, 
and Southeast Asia, in particular, precede Tokyo’s “Quality 
Infrastructure” concept. Since the early 2000s until the end of 
2017, Japan’s infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia, in-
cluding completed as well as ongoing ventures, amounted to 
roughly US$230 billion. In comparison, China’s total infra-
structure in Southeast Asia over the same period amounted to 
US$155 billion. 
East and South Asian countries received 61.2% of Japanese 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 2016, and they 
will continue to receive a similar (if not higher) percentage of 
overall Japanese ODA in the years ahead. However, Tokyo un-
der Abe has decided that economic and financial support and 
the expansion of trade ties in the region are not enough to pres-
ent itself as a credible actor charged with the mission to uphold 
a regional order based on rules and norms and the compliance 
with international law. Tokyo has, therefore – e.g. over recent 
years – invested into the strengthening of capacities of the coast 
guards of various Southeast Asian countries. 
Competing and Cooperating with China 
Tokyo is well aware that Beijing smells containment and con-
spiracy in Tokyo’s “Quality Infrastructure” policies. Increased 
security cooperation with the US, India, and Australia further 
confirm the suspicion in Beijing that Tokyo and its like-minded 
partners are teaming up against China. While Beijing portrays 
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itself as the target and/or victim of an alleged Japanese-Indian-
Australian-US containment strategy, Chinese policymakers had 
to expect a reaction to its very assertive and aggressive regional 
policies in general  and policies related to territorial claims in 
the East and South China Seas in particular. Unfortunately, 
Chinese policymakers and scholars (typically and indeed sys-
tematically under pressure from policymakers and CCP party 
officials) continue to pretend that they do not at all understand 
why Chinese policies related to territorial claims in the East 
and South China Sea are perceived as aggressive in Japan (and 
pretty much everywhere else too). The inability to understand, 
however, that building military facilities on disputed islands in 
the South China Sea is perceived as aggressive, is remarkable in 
view of the fact that the Permanent Court of Arbitration has 
ruled, in 2016, that China building those facilities is in viola-
tion of international law. 
After initially refusing to consider joining the BRI, in July 
2017 Japan announced that it would consider the possibility 
of getting involved in BRI-related initiatives and projects if the 
projects in question met four conditions. For Japan to contrib-
ute, BRI projects must be characterised by 1. openness and 2. 
transparency, they must be 3. economically sustainable and bal-
anced and finally 4. the involved developing countries must be 
able to claim financial ownership over the projects in question. 
Unsurprisingly, China refused to accept the Japanese precon-
ditions, and it can be assumed that Tokyo was at the time well 
aware that its conditions would be unacceptable to China. In 
fact, the above-listed preconditions arguably describe the very 
opposite of how many Chinese-led and Chinese-funded BRI 
project along the land and maritime Silk Road are being man-
aged and operated.
Nonetheless, Tokyo’s decision to no longer categorically re-
fuse to cooperate with China on the BRI could (if realised) 
make economic sense, since this would give Tokyo some op-
portunity to hold China to higher levels of transparency and 
accountability. In other words, Japan and other like-minded 
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countries could have more leverage over the quality of some 
BRI projects. However, so far Beijing has refused to accept 
Japanese preconditions for its participation in BRI projects and 
is – unless there is a fundamental shift in Chinese policy – very 
likely to continue doing so.
China, however, continues to keep on trying to get Japan on 
board of the BRI train. At the end of 2018 potential Japanese-
Chinese cooperation received new impetus when China offi-
cially invited Japan to participate in the BRI. By the time of 
this writing (November/December) Tokyo, however, continues 
to remain reluctant to commit itself to officially contributing 
to official BRI projects, fearing criticism from the US14. Also at 
the very beginning of October 2018, Tokyo and Beijing agreed 
to set up a joint committee aimed at working on the possibility 
to jointly build a high-speed railway system in Thailand. That is 
(potentially) significant as Japan and China until recently com-
peted for the construction of that high-speed railway system15.
During Abe’s state visit to Beijing in October 2018, Tokyo 
and Beijing signed a memorandum of understanding, which 
foresees the promotion of corporate cooperation aimed at some 
50 infrastructure investment initiatives in third countries16. 
However, by the time of this writing, there were no details avail-
able on what kind of projects Japan and China will be jointly 
cooperating on. In fact, it is still not known whether the infra-
structure projects Tokyo and Beijing are planning to cooperate 
on belong to Beijing’s BRI or whether they are separate projects 
with no direct connection to the BRI as Tokyo points out. 
14 See T. Ng and C. Wong, “China Invites Japan along Belt and Road as Shinzo 
Abe Makes Landmark Trip to Beijing”, South China Morning Post, 25 October 
2018.
15 See M. Duchatel, Japan-China Relations: Confrontation with a Smile, European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1 October 2018.
16 See S. Armstrong, “Japan Joins to Shape China’s Belt and Road”, East Asia 
Forum, 28 October 2018. 
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Tokyo Taking the Lead
Tokyo is prepared and indeed very determined to do more than 
working on Japanese-driven ‘Quality Infrastructure’ projects to 
foster regional and inter-regional economic and trade cooper-
ation. In early 2018, Japan decided to take the lead to adopt 
the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), the inter-regional free trade 
agreement Washington decided to withdraw from in January 
2017. The agreement was signed by 11 members in March 
2018. The TPP countries account for more than 14% of global 
trade, and Tokyo’s leadership was essential in bringing the re-
maining 11 members to adopt the deal. China is not a member 
of the TPP, but given that the agreement is a compilation of 
the existing WTO trade rules, there is no reason why China 
should not join the agreement in the future17. Whether China, 
however, is interested in joining an agreement that requires the 
country to adopt and stick to the rules and regulations defined 
in other countries remains yet to be seen. In fact, given the 
enormous resources Beijing is already investing into the BRI, 
it seems unlikely – at least for now – that Chinese leaders are 
planning to assign additional resources into rendering the coun-
try’s State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) compliant with TPP rules 
and regulations. Furthermore, Tokyo has more and more taken 
a leadership role promoting a rapid adoption of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an Asia-Pacific 
FTA comprised of 16 countries, including Japan, India, China, 
Australia, and South Korea. Under the banner of Tokyo’s “Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept, in 2018 Japan under 
Abe has also continued to strengthen its economic and trade to-
gether with its security and defence ties with the US, India, and 
Australia. Although Tokyo obviously does not admit to that, 
the FOIP promoted by Tokyo is aimed at becoming a com-
petitor to Beijing’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI),  enabling 
17 See N. Baldauff, Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: What does it Mean for the 
European Union, Egmont Institute Brussels, Security Brief   No. 100, November 
2018. 
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Tokyo to regain some of the economic and political clout it 
has lost over countries in East and Southeast Asia since Beijing 
announced the BRI in 2013.
Teaming Up with India
Already in 2007, Abe proposed the idea of bringing Japan and 
India closer together. During a speech at the Indian Parliament 
at the time, the Japanese Prime Minister spoke about the “con-
fluence of the two seas” meaning the confluence of the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans18. In an often-cited December 2007 article, 
Abe declared that peace, stability, and freedom of navigation 
in the Pacific Ocean are linked to and depend on stability and 
freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean19. In the same arti-
cle, Abe also spoke about cooperation between Japan, Australia, 
India, and the US to secure and protect freedom of naviga-
tion in both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. When Narendra 
Modi came to power as India’s Prime Minister in 2014, he an-
nounced the so-called “Act East” policy, i.e. increased Indian 
involvement in politics and security reach in East and Southeast 
Asia. In 2017, then, India and Japan established the “Act East 
Forum” to further institutionalise bilateral cooperation. During 
the forum’s meeting on 8 October, Abe and Modi discussed 
on which infrastructure projects to collaborate in the future. 
During the Japan-India summit on 29 October 2018, in Tokyo, 
India and Japan furthermore discussed seven yen loan agree-
ments for key infrastructure projects in India, including the 
renovation and modernisation of the Umiam-Umtru Stage-III 
hydroelectric power station in Meghalaya, and the sustainable 
18 “Confluence of  the Two Seas”, speech by HE Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister 
at the Parliament of  the Republic of  India’, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan 
website, 22 August 2007. 
19 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond; Project Syndicate”, 27 
December 2012.
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catchment forest management in Tripura20. At the Shangri-la 
Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018, Modi declared that politi-
cal and security ties with Japan are of great importance to reach 
that goal. In fact, he referred to ties with Japan as the “corner-
stone” of India’s “Act East” policy21. 
Currently, ongoing Indo-Japanese infrastructure cooperation 
stretches as far as Africa. The Asian-Africa Growth Corridor 
(AAGC) initiated jointly by Tokyo and New Delhi is a project 
aimed at jointly promoting development and connectivity with 
Africa22. The AAGC was announced at the Annual Meeting of 
the African Development Bank (AFDB) in India in May 2017. 
In the years ahead, the initiative will focus on four main areas: 
1) development and cooperation; 2) “quality infrastructure” and 
digital and institutional connectivity; 3) enhancing capabilities 
and skills; and 4) establishing people-to-people partnerships. 
Finally, in the recent past India has used its political influ-
ence in South Asia to advance Japanese economic interests. 
Bangladesh’s decision to grant Japanese contractors the con-
struction of a large port in southern Bangladesh (the Matarbari 
port project), worth roughly US$1.5 billion, was influenced by 
Indian brokering. Furthermore, it is possible that India might 
ask Japan to become a partner in the Trincomalee port con-
struction in southern Sri Lanka, a project it was awarded in 
April 201723.
20 See “Why Northeast Asia Matters for India-Japan collaboration in the Indo-
Pacific”, The Economic Times, 31 October 2018.
21 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address At Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2018, 
Ministry of  External Affairs, Government of  India. 
22 See J.P. Panda, Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC): An India- Japan Arch in the 
Making, Focus Asia – Perspective and Analysis no. 21, August 2017, Institute for 
Security and Development Policy Stockholm, Sweden. 
23 See “Sri Lanka to Offer India Port Development to Balance out China”, The 
Economic Times, 19 April 2017; also see D. Brewster, “Japan’s Plan to Build a ‘Free 
and Open Ocean’”, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 29 May 2018.
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Japanese-Indian Defence Ties
In the past, analysts argued that substantive security and de-
fence cooperation with India would be difficult to realise for 
Japan. Remainders of Indian non-alignment policies, it was of-
ten argued, would keep New Delhi from committing itself to 
security and defence ties, which in Beijing could be perceived 
as part of a Western-led containment against China. However, 
that has clearly changed since Beijing has begun attempting to 
turn the Indian Ocean into what Indian defence analysts fear 
could become a “Chinese lake”. While these fears might be – at 
least for now – exaggerated, Beijing’s massive investments in 
ports and other strategic industries in countries like Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and others countries in 
South Asia with access to the Indian Ocean are of concern to 
both Indian policymakers and defence planners. 
Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea and 
Chinese investments in strategic sectors in Pakistan, in particu-
lar, have set off the alarm bells in New Delhi. As recently as 
September 2018, Beijing announced that its military ties with 
Pakistan are the “backbone” of bilateral relations, and Beijing 
will be sticking to its commitment to invest US$60 billion in 
the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (which is 
part of the BRI). However, it must not go unmentioned that 
Beijing publicly confirming its economic and military com-
mitments took place against the background of the suggestion 
by Pakistani Minister of Commerce Abdul Razak Dawood in 
September 2018 to suspend projects in the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor, the Pakistan leg of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, for a year24.
In January 2018, Beijing announced the plan to build an 
offshore naval base near the Pakistani Gwadar port on the 
Arabian Sea. That would become China’s second offshore naval 
24 “China Says Military Backbone to Relations with Pakistan”, Reuters, 19 
September 2018.
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base after opening the first in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa 
in 2017. China has already invested heavily in the civilian fa-
cilities of Gwadar port and the second base would be used to 
dock Chinese naval vessels25. China’s plans to open a military 
base close to the Gwadar Pakistani port is without doubt reason 
for concern in India, which in turn will continue to motivate 
Indian defence planners to envisage closer security and defence 
ties with Japan (and the US and Australia). The expansion of 
Japanese-Indian security and defence is without doubt also a 
response to the perceived Chinese “intrusion” into New Delhi’s 
traditional sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. While 
India – in view of its trade and investment ties with China – 
will probably continue to remain reluctant to allow its security 
cooperation with Japan to be portrayed as full-fledged “contain-
ment” towards China, Indian policymakers have undoubtedly 
realised that the gloves are off, so to speak: countering grow-
ing Chinese influence in general and fostering closer economic 
and military ties with Pakistan in particular have moved up the 
agenda of Indian security and defence policymakers, and co-
operating with Japan is very much part of the Indian equation. 
In October 2018, Japan and India agreed to establish a 
2+2 dialogue mechanism, i.e. regular meetings consultations 
between respective Foreign and Defence Ministers. During a 
meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Abe and his coun-
terpart Modi in October 2018, Japan and India have agreed 
to strengthen what is referred to as ‘maritime domain aware-
ness’ by signing an agreement between the Indian and Japanese 
naval forces26. Also in October 2018, Tokyo and New Delhi 
started negotiating a logistics-sharing agreement, the so-called 
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The 
25 See M. Chan, “First Djibouti ... now Pakistan port Earmarked for a Chinese 
Overseas Naval Base sources say”, South China Morning Post, 5 January 2018. 
26 “India, Japan Agree to Hold 2+2 Dialogue to Enhance Security in the Indo-
Pacific Region”, Economic Times, 29 October 2018; also R. Shubhajit, “India, 
Japan Decide to have 2+2 Talks between Defence Foreign Ministers”, The Indian 
Express, 30 October 2018. 
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ACSA is an agreement which facilitates joint manoeuvres, 
including three-way exercises involving the US Navy in the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific. The Japanese-Indian ACSA will 
give the two armed forces access to each other’s military bases 
for logistical support (India also has an ACSA with the US). An 
ACSA with India helps Japan to project its rising naval power 
in the Indian Ocean and allows Japanese vessels to get fuel and 
servicing at Indian naval bases. Japanese navy vessels will also be 
able to secure access to Indian naval facilities in the Andaman 
and Nicobar islands, located close to the western entrance to 
the Malacca Straits through which Japanese (and Chinese) 
trade and fuel imports pass. India for its part has signed mili-
tary logistics pacts with the US and France, both of which have 
naval bases in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific27.
In the months and years ahead, Prime Minister Abe could 
use the envisioned defence and naval ties with India as a justifi-
cation to further increase Japanese naval capabilities. While the 
quality of Japan’s naval forces is state of the art, defence experts 
argue that the country might have to further increase the num-
ber of naval vessels to be able to meet the requirements needed 
for increased exchanges and missions with other countries’ naval 
forces. In the recent past, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces 
(MSDF) vessels typically sent no more than two Japanese ves-
sels to the Indian Ocean to take part in naval exercises with the 
Indian navy. To be sure, Japan’s naval forces are state of the art 
and are comprised of a total of 114 warships and 45.800 navy 
personnel. The main component of the MSDF is its fleet of 
forty-six destroyers and frigates – more than that those fielded 
by the United Kingdom and France combined28. 
27 See B. Chellaney, “The Linchpines for a rules-based Indo Pacific”, The Japan 
Times, 28 October 2018.
28 See K. Mizokami, “Sorry, China: Why the Japanese Navy is the Best in Asia”, 
The National Interest, 16 October 2016.
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Conclusions
As shown above, Tokyo is clearly putting the money where 
its mouth is in the Indo-Pacific region. Japanese funds for the 
above-mentioned “Quality Infrastructure” development pro-
jects are substantive and Japanese companies have decade-long 
experience with infrastructure development and investments in 
African and Asian countries. Japanese “Quality Infrastructure” 
investments have made sure that Beijing’s BRI is no longer the 
only infrastructure development game in town. 
While Tokyo’s above-mentioned FOIP emphasises the rule 
of law, human rights, and democracy as its guiding values and 
principles, Tokyo unfortunately remains prepared to make 
exceptions as far as the insistence on democracy and rule are 
concerned. Indeed, Tokyo’s commitment to international law 
and democratic values is sometimes selective as it is the case 
of the Philippines and Burma/Myanmar29. Abe maintains a 
close and chummy relationship with the Philippines’ President 
Rodrigo Duterte, whose illegal and violent ‘war on drugs’ has 
led to 12.000 casualties. Furthermore, Abe’s reluctance to con-
demn Myanmar for the well-documented ethnic cleansing of 
the Rohingya minority in Myanmar is evidence that it is some-
times business over principles. 
Japanese above-mentioned preparedness to collaborate with 
China on infrastructure development in Asia makes political 
and economic sense, but as shown above Tokyo does not nec-
essarily need to cooperate with China to take its share of in-
frastructure development in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere along 
China’s Silk Road. While over the last two years Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe was often criticised for being too devoted to erratic 
US President Trump and unable to make independent foreign 
policy decisions opposing Trump’s protectionism and ill-fated 
‘America First’ policies, his decision to no longer categorically 
29 See J.D.J. Brown, “Japan’s Values-Free and Token Indo-Pacific Strategy”, The 
Diplomat, 30 March 2018.
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refuse to collaborate with China on the BRI is evidence that he 
is able to allow good (economic) sense to rule over the fear to 
end up on Trump’s bad side. Recently, Abe has therefore asked 
Japan’s big trading houses to look into how they could partici-
pate in Chinese-led infrastructure projects30. To be sure, Tokyo 
continues to insist that Japanese contributions to Chinese-led 
BRI projects must meet the above-mentioned preconditions 
and Tokyo will continue to insist that the above-mentioned co-
operation with China is not part of the BRI. As shown above, 
Tokyo does without a doubt have the resources and policies in 
place to enter into competition with China’s BRI, and the re-
cipient countries of Japanese investments in Southeast Asia and 
Africa are undoubtedly aware of qualitative differences between 
Chinese and Japanese investments. 
30 “How to read Japan’s rapprochement with China”, The Economist, 25 October 
2018.
6.  Australia’s Economic, Infrastructural 
     and Security Objectives 
     in the Indo-Pacific
John Hemmings
The development of the Indo-Pacific in Australian foreign pol-
icy discourse has been one of the most interesting phenomena 
of the last two decades. This is primarily because it is the first 
conceptual framework to bridge the “US or Asia” binary1 that 
has characterised Australian foreign policy debates since the 
end of the Cold War. While the roots of the concept lay outside 
of Australia – a point which will be explored below – Australia 
has been an essential component of the concept from the very 
beginning, with Australian intellectual participation and inter-
est helping create an Australian voice in the creation of this 
rather open framework. It was also the first country to formally 
adopt the framework in the wheels of government2. Given its 
openness, the Indo-Pacific concept is often misunderstood, a 
factor which has made it open to criticism as a tool of US strat-
egy aimed at containing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
while overemphasising India’s centrality to Asia. Viewed from 
Canberra, it is clear that the framework has ideological and eco-
nomic strands, and thus one sees these two strands running 
1 T. Satake, “The origin of  trilateralism? The US-Japan-Australia security rela-
tions of  the 1990s”, International Relations of  the Asia-Pacific, vol. 11, Issue 1, 1 
January 2011, pp. 87-114.
2 E. Graham, “A Perspective of  the Indo-Pacific from Australia”, presented at 
the Henry Jackson Society Seminar on the Indo-Pacific, 22 October 2018.
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through Australian debates going back to the question of re-
gional leadership of Asian integration in the 1990s3. 
While Australian usage is for the most part geopolitical, there 
is a normative values aspect explicitly noted in the model, in 
that the regional hegemony of an authoritarian PRC is seen 
as unfavourable to Australia’s interests4. India, by contrast, be-
longs to a group of states that loosely follows the liberal, demo-
cratic model. As a result, one sees that the economic strand has 
political and geostrategic implications since it orients Australia 
around an ideologically-driven economic strategy of building 
up India to balance Chinese dominance of the region. Again, 
the economic strand is directly dependent on the first strand, 
ideology, since free-market capitalist states are seen as impor-
tant trendsetters in the future of Asia’s economic architecture. 
As a democratic capitalist state, therefore, Australia has more 
in common with other “like-minded” states – such as India, 
Japan, and the United States – than closed authoritarian states 
like China. However, as some critics of the concept among 
Australia’s foreign policy elites point out, there does seem to 
be an inherent contradiction in this ideological component 
and an “inclusive” Indo-Pacific framework since this norma-
tive element would seem to exclude China. However, as will be 
discussed, this might be because it is less about limiting mem-
bership ideologically than it is about aligning with fellow de-
mocracies to balance hegemony. 
Origin Story
The conceptual origins of the Indo-Pacific framework do not 
come from Australia or the United States. Instead, the concept 
comes from a speech by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
3 Anonymous, Interview with former Director, Oceanic Directorate, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 12 February, 2015.
4 P.N. Varghese, An India Economic Strategy to 2035, 2018, a Report to the Australian 
Government, found at DFAT website. 
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“Confluence of the Two Seas”, given at the Indian Parliament 
on 22 August 2007. Abe’s views on the Indo-Pacific region had 
already been developing for some years, and in Japan the con-
ceptual debate that led to the Indo-Pacific framework was al-
ready more than a decade old by the time of the speech in New 
Delhi5. While many now contest that the Indo-Pacific is by 
itself “anti-Chinese”, there is an element of Sino-Japanese com-
petition in those early debates, that centred around the question 
of who would lead Asia’s regional integration. While Japan had 
developed an economic quasi-leadership role in the late 1970s 
and 1980s under what was referred to as the “flying geese” 
model, this role diminished with the collapse of the Japanese 
bubble, precisely as China’s economy and soft power were be-
coming stronger. This unfavourable situation was compounded 
during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis by the loss of legiti-
macy of the Washington Consensus6 and the simultaneous rise 
in Chinese diplomatic influence inside ASEAN (Association of 
South East Asian Nations) after the PRC “promised to refrain 
from devaluing the Yuan” and gave an “unconditional offer of 
economic aid”7, signing a joint statement over future relations 
at the Kuala Lumpur Summit8. This came to a head at a fate-
ful 1997 ASEAN+3 meeting, in which ASEAN member states 
had invited Korea, Japan, and the PRC to participate in crisis 
talks over the Financial Crisis. Diplomats in Japan’s Ministry of 
5 “Confluence of  the Two Seas”, speech by HE Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister 
at the Parliament of  the Republic of  India, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan 
website, 22 August 2007.
6 D. Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? 
A Review of  the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from 
a Decade of  Reform”, Journal of  Economic Literature, vol. XLIV, December 2006, 
pp. 973-987.
7 Lai Hongyi, “China’s Evolving Relations with Southeast Asia: Domestic 
and Strategic Factors”, in Lai Hongyi and Lim Tin Seng (eds.), Harmony and 
Development: ASEAN-China Relations, Singapore, World Scientific, pp. 27-28.
8 Lai Hongyi and Lim Tin Seng, “ASEAN and China: Towards a Harmonious 
Relationship” in Lai Hongyi and Lim Tin Seng (eds.), Harmony and Development: 
ASEAN-China Relations, Singapore, World Scientific, p. xix.
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Foreign Affairs had lobbied hard – but ultimately, unsuccess-
fully – to have the format enlarged to ASEAN+6 by includ-
ing Australia, New Zealand, and India. The success of China’s 
own preferred grouping – on in which it was by far the most 
dominant member – alarmed many inside Japan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry9. 
Thus if we are to understand correctly the origins of the 
Indo-Pacific framework and Australia’s role in it, we can see that 
initially it had at its core strong competition between the two 
largest Asian economies – Japan and China – which has been 
compounded by different ideologies and development models. 
We can also see that for Australia, the debate was of paramount 
importance because it implicitly allowed for who was to be 
considered “Asian” and who is not. For Canberra, long-accus-
tomed to a debate which pits its Asian-facing policies from its 
US-facing policies, the Indo-Pacific has been characterised by 
its inclusivity and by the fact that it allows Australia to play a 
role that spans both. Naturally, this presents Canberra with both 
challenges and opportunities. In the first instance, it does little 
to alleviate the challenges presented by the PRC’s exclusive “East 
Asians-only” model and the fact that by including India, the 
debate takes on a geopolitical flavour. In addition to the Sino-
Japanese element, Beijing’s preference for architecture exclusive 
of the United States has seen the US-China dyad come into play. 
Tracking the Changes
Professor Rory Medcalf, a former Australian diplomat, analyst 
at the Office of National Assessments, and long-time, influ-
ential proponent of the Indo-Pacific framework in Australian 
academic and government circles notes that the use of the 
term “recasts the mental map of some of the most strategically 
9 T. Terada, “The Origins of  ASEAN+6 and Japan’s Initiatives: China’s Rise 
and the Agent-Structure Analaysis”, The Pacific Review, vol. 23, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 
71-92.
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important parts of the globe. How maps are made and labelled 
matters too, as Robert Kaplan reminds us, because they affect 
how the powerful understand the world”10. The Australian gov-
ernment has not been slow to this recasting of mental maps. 
As Dr. Euan Graham at La Trobe University has pointed out, 
Canberra was the first country to formally adopt the nomen-
clature in Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper, which char-
acterised the concept as an emerging one: “A new Indo-Pacific 
strategic arc is beginning to emerge, connecting the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia […] forged by a range of 
factors”11, including the rise of India as an important strategic 
and political actor, willing to “act East” as well as “look east”. 
Additionally, growing trade, investment, and energy flows have 
created security interdependencies along the Indian Ocean as 
the PRC has developed a number of partnerships through the 
use of its infrastructure development projects, a component of 
the Maritime Silk Road.
Graham notes that the concept has been steadily refined in 
subsequent policy documents, including the 2016 White Paper 
and 2017 Defence White Paper. In the 2017 Foreign Policy 
White Paper, for example, the link between norms and values 
and the rules-based order is made: 
The principles embedded in the post-war order have strongly 
supported Australia’s interests and our values. These principles 
include the promotion of open markets, the importance of in-
ternational law and other norms to guide international coop-
eration, the articulation of universal rights and freedoms and 
the need for states to work cooperatively on global challenges 
[…]. In this dynamic environment, competition is intensifying, 
over both power and the principles and values upon which the 
regional order should be based12.
10 R. Medcalf, “The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?” The American Interest, 10 
October 2013.
11 Australian Government, 2013 Defence White Paper, 2013.
12 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.
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In addition to these conceptual changes, a number of govern-
ment departments have made organisational adjustments to ac-
commodate the new framework and to filter it through the var-
ious arms of policymaking. The Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT), for example, has created a new overarching 
Indo-Pacific Group, under which sub-regional groups now sit. 
Further to that, DFAT has created a Geo-Economics branch, 
which draws together trade and foreign direct investment in 
a way that looks at how both are leveraged as tools for secu-
rity and foreign policy. Bilateral relations with countries like 
India have had the geopolitical aspect of the Indo-Pacific con-
cept added, with one DFAT report saying, “The Australia-India 
strategic relationship stands on its own merits. It is however 
closely linked to the broader security of the region and there-
fore inevitably also brings in China, if only because China, like 
the United States, looms large in the strategic calculations of 
both countries”13.
Australia – Between States?
One of the challenging aspects of the Indo-Pacific concept is 
that while it seems to answer the 1990s binary of “US or Asia” 
that so characterised domestic discourse in Australia, it may well 
replace that with another, that of “US or China”. This issue of 
identity is particularly poignant to Australia as it has been cast 
as an “outpost of Europe”14 in the East and strategically sought 
since the 2012 White Paper, Australia in the Asian Century, to 
move toward an Asia-facing foreign policy approach15. To a large 
degree, the Indo-Pacific has allowed Australia a wider identity as 
a state that straddles two oceans as well as two identities. It has 
also been fortunate that influential member states of ASEAN 
13 P.N. Varghese, “The Geopolitical Pillar”, in Id. (2018).
14 J. Massola, “Australia still an ’outpost of  Europe’ says Malaysia’s Mahathir”, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 2018.
15 Australian Government, Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper 2, 2012.
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have embraced the Indo-Pacific concept as a means of balancing 
potential Chinese hegemony. In 2014, President Joko “Jokowi” 
Widodo’s explained his idea of Indonesia’s role as a maritime 
fulcrum, saying Jakarta “must assert itself as a force between the 
two oceans: The Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean”16. More 
recently, in November of 2018, Indonesia drafted an “Indo-
Pacific Outlook” concept paper for its fellow ASEAN member 
states, which has attempted to marry the Indo-Pacific concept 
with ASEAN primacy and existing multilateral architecture like 
the East Asia Summit17. Perhaps most surprising of all has been 
Australia might update its strategic partnership with ASEAN by 
becoming a full member of the grouping. While the idea of an 
Australian membership surfaced only very briefly in May 2018, 
in a meeting between Malcolm Turnbull and Indonesian pres-
ident Joko Widodo in the run-up to the ASEAN Summit in 
Sydney, it is still a remarkable shift in Australia’s foreign policy 
identity18, which might be down to the Indo-Pacific construct. 
Naturally, as the concept has had ideological and geopolitical 
elements, there has been a switch from the old “US or Asia” dis-
course to a “US or China” discourse among a small minority of 
Australia’s foreign policy elites. Even official documents like the 
2013 DWP noted that “The relationship between the United 
States and China, the region’s and the globe’s two most power-
ful states, will more than any other single factor determine our 
strategic environment over coming decades”19. While there is 
strong mainstream support inside both of Australia’s political 
parties for the concept20, there are charges that the strategy is 
“anti-China” or about “containing” China from a small cadre of 
16 P. Saha, “India-RI cooperation in Indo-Pacific a must”, The Jakarta Post, 23 
April 2018. 
17 A. Saiman and E.M. Bayuni, “Time for ASEAN to drive the Indo-Pacific pro-
cess: Jakarta Post writers”, The Straits Times, 7 November 2018.
18 Australian Associated Press, “Indonesia says it would be a ‘good idea’ for 
Australia to join ASEAN”, The Guardian, 15 March 2018.
19 2013 DWP (last accessed 4 November 2018).
20 E. Graham (2018).
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Australia’s “China hands”. According to one former Australian 
ambassador to China, Geoff Raby, the concept is “a geopolitical 
concept […] as meaningless as the Atlantic-Pacific would be”. 
He critiques the implicit attempt by Canberra to “draw India 
in as the anchor to the Orwellian concept of the Indo-Pacific, 
as if something gains substance by calling it a politically load-
ed name”21. For Hugh White, another critic of the strategy, it 
is clear that the framework is too large to be useful and that 
simply drawing lines linking the Indian Ocean to the Pacific 
Ocean does not make a community22. For Medcalf, critics of 
the Indo-Pacific have missed its defining features: first, it has 
its roots in deep material changes taking place across the trade 
lanes of the described region; second, it has clear organising 
principles tied to the interaction and behaviors of great pow-
ers and rising powers. The material anchors of the framework 
include the rise of China as a great trading power, dependent 
on Middle East energy supplies; the rise of India as a poten-
tial power, straddling those energy and trade routes in the 
Indian Ocean Region (IOR); and the critical strategic role of 
the United States, the indispensable power in both oceans23. 
Additionally, those Australian critics – in seeking to portray the 
framework as one driven by the US and China binary – miss 
the increased involvement of ASEAN in the concept.
Trilats and Quads
One consideration is the Indo-Pacific framework’s relationship 
to changes taking place in the US alliance system – the so-called 
San Francisco System – which has seen a shift from bilateral alli-
ance dyads, between Washington and its regional allies, toward 
21 G. Raby, “China relations can only be unfrozen with Julie Bishop’s sacking”, 
Financial Review, 14 May 2018.
22 H. White, “The Indo-Pacific: talking about it doesn’t make it real”, The Strategist, 
22 November 2018.
23 Ibid.
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mini-lateral dyads, comprised of three or more partners. Dr. 
Michael Green, a noted Japan expert at the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), calls these new multilateral 
security relationships a form of “federated defense”24, and ar-
gues that they sit somewhere between the old bilateral system 
and some new ideal multilateral institution. Australian foreign 
policy elites, namely Aston Calvert and Alexander Downer25, 
played a strong role in the creation of the US-Japan-Australia 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) in 2002, and over the past 
twenty years, the US-Japan-Australia trilateral relationship has 
become the most institutionalised and evolved security group-
ing, with a large degree of military interoperability and intelli-
gence-sharing. While it is not clear that the Quad and the Indo-
Pacific were different sides of the same strategy implemented 
by Canberra, there is no doubt that they derive from the same 
insecurity around the rise of Chinese military capabilities and 
regional ambitions. As a result, they are likely to continue to be 
utilised as a narrower balancing facet of the wider Indo-Pacific 
framework.
The 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper states, 
In parts of the Indo-Pacific, including Southeast Asia, China’s 
power and influence are growing to match, and in some cases 
exceed, that of the United States [...] most regional countries, 
including Australia, clearly consider a significant US role in the 
Indo-Pacific as a stabilizing influence. Japan and India, major 
economies and military powers in their own right, are also play-
ing stronger roles in Indo-Pacific security and political affairs 
and are seeking to influence the balance of the regional order26.
24 D. Brewster, “India and Australia: Creating New Strategic Geometries in 
the Indo-Pacific”, in S. Chandra and B. Goshal (eds.), The Indo-Pacific: Peace and 
Prosperity or Conflict?, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2018.
25 Interview with High Commissioner Alexander Downer, Former Foreign 
Minister, Australia, Department of  Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1996-2007, 
London, 9 September 2015.
26 Australian Government, “Power Shift in the Indo-Pacific”, 2017 Foreign Policy 
White Paper, 2017.
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While Medcalf claims that the Indo-Pacific concept is not par-
ticularly American-centric, he does note Washington’s embrace 
of the concept, pointing out that the Pacific Command in 
Hawaii has been renamed the Indo-Pacific Command27. Given 
the fact that the US is Australia’s primary ally and provider of 
arms, there is little doubt that this helps with the acceptance of 
the framework among Australian foreign policy elites. 
Now that Australia has both the Quad and the Indo-Pacific 
framework, it will be interesting to see how the two interact 
among foreign policy elites in Canberra in the future. There are 
obvious linkages. For example, all four members of the Quad 
have adopted the Indo-Pacific concept, and all four have con-
cerns about China’s expansionist maritime policies. All four are 
democracies. While it is true that a number of commentators 
have been attempting to differentiate the Quad and the Indo-
Pacific concept and even create distance between the two, this 
might well be because of the double-security dilemma that en-
tangles both concepts28. If one looks at the US-Japan-Australia 
trilateral as the precursor to the US-India-Japan-Australia 
Quadrilateral, and notes the heavy input that Australian diplo-
mats played in fostering the grouping in the early 2000s29, there 
is a strong case to be made that Australia plays a pivotal stra-
tegic role in the Indo-Pacific concept, both through its trilat-
eral and quadrilateral relationships with other key Indo-Pacific 
states. While New Delhi remains opposed to allowing Australia 
to take part in the Malabar naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, 
it is unclear whether this is a short-term tactical decision – to 
27 R. Medcalf, “Mapping our Indo-Pacific Future: Rory Medcalf ’s Speech”, full text 
of  the landmark Policy Forum and National Security College talk, 5 June, 2018.
28 This double security dilemma is more fully discussed in T. Satake and J. 
Hemmings, “Japan-Australia security cooperation in the bilateral and multilat-
eral contexts”, International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 4, 1 July, pp. 815-834. In short, it 
discusses how regional states face a security dilemma with the PRC when they 
carry out balancing behaviours like alignment, while simultaneously facing an 
intra-alliance security dilemma involving abandonment and entrapment with the 
United States, the region’s primary security provider. 
29 Ibid.
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help with President Modi’s China outreach this year – or a 
long-term strategic decision. 
Infrastructure and Geo-Economics
It is no secret that there is a large infrastructure financing gap 
in Asia. According to DFAT, the region will require more than 
USD26 trillion of financing by 203030. Australia – like many 
countries in the region – views the geopolitical and economic 
features of the Indo-Pacific concept as strategically intertwined. 
There is little doubt that China has been the instrumental driv-
er in promoting this realist approach toward development and 
the surge of infrastructure-building in the region. The unveil-
ing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in September 2013, followed by the 
subsequent launch of an Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) in Indonesia in October, added to the blue-water am-
bitions of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)31, have 
been the clearest outlines of a wider PRC grand strategy. The 
gradual shape that PRC investment has taken in the region – 
across a number of ports and maritime-oriented projects – has 
indicated a strategic desire for sea-lane control32. As a result of 
this, a number of states – including Australia – have sought 
to implement their own infrastructure projects in the region, 
primarily with India. Given its overreliance on the PRC, the 
seemingly untapped potential of India’s home market, the bal-
ancing potential of a powerful India, and the subcontinent’s 
urgent need for infrastructure, Canberra has a surfeit of reasons 
to engage Delhi economically33. 
30 Australian Government, “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Fact Sheet”, 
Department of  Foreign Affairs and Trade.
31 Y. Koda, “China’s Blue Water Navy Strategy and its implications”, CNAS, 20 
March 2018.
32 Xiaoyan Wu, “China’s ‘Sea Power Nation’ Strategy”, ISDP, June 2014.
33 P.N. Varghese, “Infrastructure, Urban Development & Transport”, in Id. 
(2018).
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Australia has traditionally played a banking role when it 
comes to development and has been the second largest and 12th 
largest contributor to the Asia Development Bank (ADB) and 
World Bank concessional lending funds.34 Recently, Canberra 
has outlined plans to increase infrastructure investments in 
both the South Pacific and India. In the case of the former 
Prime Minister Scott Morrison unveiled the US$1.4 billion 
Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific on 
4 November 2018, aiming to provide grants and long-term 
loans for investments in telecommunications, energy, trans-
port, and water. In addition to this, a further US$728 million 
will be injected into the Export Finance and Insurance Corp., 
Australia’s export credit agency, and it will be given greater lee-
way in strategically-linked investments in the Pacific35, such as 
the deep sea internet cable between Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands. 
While the recent Australian government-commissioned re-
port An India Economic Strategy to 2035 covers a wider range 
of economic engagement, including the energy sector, resource 
extraction, mining, financial services, and agriculture, it is 
clear that infrastructure remains pivotal. India’s infrastructure 
requirements, the report states, “will require investments of 
over US$4.5 trillion by 2040 for the development of its in-
frastructure – of this, India will be able to meet about US$3.9 
trillion, leaving a US$526 billion deficit”36. As transport is ex-
pected to account for over 60% of this infrastructure invest-
ments, Australian investment is focusing on developing high-
ways, offering services in the areas of port logistics, heavy haul 
rail, road safety, and design and engineering. Three companies, 
Macquarie, CIMIC, and Linfox, have already entered into the 
Indian market, with Macquarie operating seven toll roads, and 
34 J. Pryke and R. McGregor, “The new US-Japan-Australia infrastructure fund”, 
The Lowy Interpreter, 31 July 2018.
35 R. McGuirk, “Australia details investment in Pacific as China clout grows”, Star 
Tribune, 7 November, 2018.
36 Ibid.
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committing more than AD$3.2 billion to India since 2008. 
In addition to looking at engaging with India’s quasi-sover-
eign National Investment and Infrastructure Fund, Canberra 
is also interested in joining multilateral groupings, such as the 
embryonic US-Japan-Australia trilateral infrastructure fund. 
While the grouping is still to develop, it indicates that Australia 
is willing to experiment with a variety of infrastructural invest-
ment bodies. Canberra was, after all, a founding member of the 
PRC’s AIIB initiative37. However, as the projects in the South 
Pacific reveal, there is increasing awareness that Chinese projects 
and their terms have a geopolitical element by putting coun-
tries in strategic locations in debt to Beijing. In January 2018, 
Liberal Senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, the-then Minister 
for international development and the Pacific criticised Chinese 
lending as “debt-trap diplomacy” to the Australian, a national 
newspaper38, causing a minor diplomatic furor.
Conclusions
The development of the Indo-Pacific concept has been a great 
boon to countries like Australia. The new mapping of South 
Asia and the Pacific also bring with them their own strategic im-
peratives around sea-lane security, infrastructure development, 
and political/ideological alignment. While Australia’s foreign 
policy elites continue to hedge against the rise of an authori-
tarian China and continue to avoid provoking Beijing outright, 
they have begun to adapt to the PRC’s regional ambitions by 
creating balancing institutions and strategies with a multitude 
of partners. As no country – not even the United States – seems 
large enough to balance China on its own, Australian foreign 
policy elites seek to engage across a number of different sectors 
37 J. Wilson, “The AIIB and Australian participation in Chinese infrastructure 
initiatives”, DevPolicy Blog, 14 August 2018.
38 P. Riordan, “China accuses Concetta Fierravanti-Wells of  ‘blatant slander’”, 
The Australian, 8 October 2018.
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with populous India, ASEAN, and Japan. While it would ap-
pear that the concept has rid Australia of the futile and pointless 
1990s debate “US or Asia”, there is a small but vocal group of 
“China hands” who still see Canberra as facing a binary choice. 
As ASEAN, Japan, and India have all made clear moves toward 
adopting – either officially or nominally – the Indo-Pacific con-
struct, these China-hands have adjusted the old “US or Asia” 
debate into a “US or China” debate. While it is always diffi-
cult to make predictions about domestic politics, it would ap-
pear that in the wake or China’s interference campaign inside 
Australia in 2017 and 2018, the mainstream of foreign policy 
elites in Australia are fully-embracing the Indo-Pacific concept.
In economic terms, infrastructure development and financ-
ing have become the primary tools for engaging with the South 
Pacific and India, but it is clear that both still have deeply geopo-
litical elements and there seems to be a sense that these projects 
and new institutions are in opposition to those created by the 
PRC rather than just sitting alone. One sees this most vividly 
in the US-Japan-Australia trilateral investment fund. Given the 
trilaterals’ place as the most developed military quasi-alliance 
in the region, the choice of using it also to do infrastructure 
sends a clear message to the region and China. The question 
of how this message is received will depend on how well the 
security component of the Trilateral – the Trilateral Strategic 
Dialogue (TSD) and the Security and Defense Cooperation 
Forum (SDCF) is able to draw in India. These two state tri-
laterals, particularly the SDCF, have well-developed military 
interoperability, developed through a multitude of regional, 
inter-service exercises, and intelligence-sharing agreements. 
The Quad, by comparison, is very poorly developed, having 
only just been revived after a ten-year hiatus. Australia’s absence 
from the 2018 Malabar Exercise shows that while India is will-
ing to develop hedging strategies towards China, it is still deep-
ly torn about how far it can go without provoking a security 
dilemma with the rising power. As it is, Australia too must align 
carefully, reliant as ever on the PRC as a trade partner. Perhaps 
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the Indo-Pacific can be used by Australia and its partners to 
bring China into the fold. However, this is an old dream and 
wishful-thinking, both of which we perhaps must leave behind.

Conclusions and Recommendations 
for the EU
Since 2007, the year in which Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe proposed the Indo-Pacific as a new geopolitical strategy in 
a speech before the Indian Parliament, the Indo-Pacific con-
cept has been assuming growing importance at the political, 
diplomatic, and security levels. The strategy was conceived as 
a means to connect India to the Pacific Ocean by establishing 
closer political and security relations between New Delhi and 
other key East Asian state actors minus China.
As a consequence, from that time onwards, all the major 
actors involved started to include the Indo-Pacific into their 
own geo-economic and geostrategic calculations. Australia, 
the United States, India, and Japan are now fully integrated 
into the Indo-Pacific strategic network. In fact, over the last 
two to three years, Japan and India have taken the lead, invest-
ing further energy and resources into turning the Indo-Pacific 
concept into an integral and sustainable policy. The expansion 
of their bilateral security and defence ties are evidence of that, 
and if we are to believe policymakers in both Tokyo and New 
Delhi, Japanese-Indian defence ties have yet to reach their full 
potential.  To be sure, all of this is perceived by Beijing as part 
of a US-Japanese-driven containment strategy towards China, 
while analysts point out that Beijing had to expect a reaction to 
what, outside of China, is referred to as illegal Chinese territo-
rial expansionism in the South China Sea. 
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After Donald Trump’s first trip to Asia in November 2017, 
the Indo-Pacific started to take shape as the geographical and 
conceptual background of US security and strategic involve-
ment in Asia. However, the United States under Donald Trump 
has become the elephant in the room in the Western camp, 
as demonstrated by Washington’s counterproductive retreat 
from the Asia-Pacific and exemplified by its withdrawal from 
the TPP in 2017. Nonetheless, and at least for the time be-
ing, Washington endorses and promotes security cooperation 
with Japan, Australia, and India in the Indo-Pacific as a tool 
to keep China’s military and territorial ambitions in check. 
For now, Washington finds itself alone in conducting so-called 
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in internation-
al territorial waters in the South China Sea, but it cannot be 
excluded that Japan and possibly Australia will at some point 
join Washington’s FONOPs sending a message that the South 
China Sea is not part of China’s integral territory (as China 
likes to argue). Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that some 
individual European countries – notably France and the UK 
– could in the future conduct FONOPs in Asian territorial wa-
ters even if Beijing continues to urge Europe and everybody 
else for that matter not to “meddle in Chinese internal affairs” 
(based on the fallacious Chinese claim that the entire South 
China Sea is de facto part of Chinese territory).
For Japan, India, Australia and other countries inside and 
outside the region, the Indo-Pacific concept is gaining trac-
tion because of China’s increasingly assertive regional poli-
cies, including Beijing’s acquisition of Asian, African, and also 
European commercial ports as foreseen and implemented in 
the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The Indo-Pacific is also very important if we consider the 
increasing relevance of Australia as a key regional player. Since 
the publication of its Defence White Paper in 2013, Canberra 
has adapted its foreign policy strategy to the fast-changing 
Asian strategic landscape. The growing Chinese presence in 
the Pacific Ocean is further undermining Australia’s diplomatic 
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leverage over small Pacific Ocean countries. Thus, Canberra is 
adjusting its regional security policies, which include increased 
cooperation with Japan, India, and the US: a quadrilateral rela-
tionship, the so-called “Quad”.  
China, the alleged “target” of the bilateral and multilateral 
policies adopted under the Indo-Pacific banner, continues to 
invest enormous resources in the BRI in an attempt to make 
cooperation with China economically and financially more at-
tractive than acting against China with the support of perceived 
Chinese “adversaries” in the Indo-Pacific. China feels encircled 
by the “Quad countries” and their potential new allies and con-
tinues to advance carrot-and-stick policies towards countries 
in the region that are either opposed to or in favour of being 
incorporated into BRI policies under Chinese terms. More 
than once in the recent past Beijing has used the dependence 
of Southeast Asian countries on Chinese trade and investment 
ties as a means to exert political pressure. 
In sum, the above-mentioned bilateral and multilateral poli-
cies adopted in the Indo-Pacific are undoubtedly an attempt to 
counter Chinese geo-political and geo-economic policies that 
are perceived as over assertive and indeed aggressive. 
The EU is the world’s biggest trading block and its member 
states are the biggest trading partners of many countries in the 
Indo-Pacific region. Brussels maintains strategic partnerships 
with India, South Korea, Japan and Australia and both Brussels 
and its Asian/Indo-Pacific partners have pledged to increase bi-
lateral and multilateral security cooperation and consultations. 
As a trading block the EU is naturally and vitally interested in 
free and safe passage through Asian territorial waters and this 
is where cooperation with the above-mentioned Quad coun-
tries will inevitably become more important in the years ahead. 
Furthermore, the EU’s cooperation with a number of Southeast 
and South Asian countries in areas such maritime law enforce-
ment, good governance, conflict prevention, confidence-build-
ing and disaster management, together with its institutionalised 
ties with ASEAN (including through its membership in the 
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ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]), will make sure that the EU 
and its member states remains in the regional politics and secu-
rity. All four Quad countries are strategic partners of the EU, 
and Brussels is therefore well equipped to involve itself (more) 
actively in ongoing security cooperation and consultations in 
the Quad framework. 
What should the European Union (EU) policies in and to-
wards the Indo-Pacific be and look like? We offer a number of 
recommendations.
1. The EU should strengthen its own interconnectivity 
policies towards the Indo-Pacific to secure a stron-
ger position vis-à-vis the above-mentioned BRI. In 
the course of 2018, the EU started to advance the idea 
of developing its own infrastructural project across the 
Eurasian landmass. The so-called ‘connectivity plat-
form’ should become a valuable policy tool enabling the 
EU to strengthen its economic, political, and security 
ties with and in the Indo-Pacific region. Brussels and 
its member states should be (much) more active in in-
cluding themselves in the above-mentioned economic 
and security policies driven by the ‘Quad’ countries. As 
liberal democracies, these four countries – Japan, the 
US, Australia and India - share values and approaches 
towards regional and global economic and security pol-
icies with the EU. To be sure, all of this should remain 
complementary to European involvement in Chinese-
led BRI projects and planning. In other words, further 
European involvement in the Indo-Pacific should not 
be at the expense of already ongoing cooperation with 
China. 
2. Through the Indo-Pacific, the EU is advised to fur-
ther strengthen ties with Japan and India. The new 
strategic framework of the Indo-Pacific represents a val-
uable means through which the EU could increase its 
involvement in Asian politics and security. In July 2018 
the EU and Japan signed two important agreements, 
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the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
and the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), aimed 
at strengthening EU-Japan bilateral relations both at 
the economic and security levels. The above-mentioned 
expansion of Indian-Japanese security and defense ties 
offers opportunities for the EU to get more involved in 
the already ongoing joint India-Japan security policies 
in the region.
3. The EU should continue to invest resources in en-
gaging China economically and politically. Brussels 
continues to point out that its further engagement in 
the Indo-Pacific is not aimed at China, and the EU’s 
efforts to solve the numerous outstanding problems on 
its trade and investment agenda with China (problems 
above all related to market access in China) are not part 
of a containment strategy towards China (as China typ-
ically suspects). EU-China trade and investment ties are 
mutually beneficial, but there are a number of unre-
solved issues that must be addressed in a more assertive 
and result-oriented fashion. Beijing must be made to 
understand that urging China to abide by the princi-
ple of ‘reciprocity’ in the context of bilateral EU-China 
trade and investments is not a result of or follow-up to 
a multilateral attempt to team up against China in the 
Indo-Pacific.
4. The EU should strengthen its cybersecurity capabil-
ities. The Indo-Pacific is becoming particularly impor-
tant also for security reasons. The battle between China 
and the rest of the countries comprising the Indo-Pacific 
is also fought in cyberspace. This is because the BRI 
has not only a physical but also a digital dimension. If 
the EU manages to cooperate with the other countries, 
it could protect its digital infrastructure from Chinese 
interventions and hacking activities aimed at gathering 
other countries’ sensitive information, related to indus-
trial and technological innovation. 
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5. The EU could – along with the US, Japan, Australia, 
and India - become the fifth democracy of the Indo-
Pacific concept. Moreover, in light of the recent dip-
lomatic and trade contrasts between the EU and the 
US and the latter’s need to find other regional partners 
to check China’s rise, the EU’s contributions to politics 
and security could prove to be even more important if 
not central. 
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